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

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by Professor Leo Kuper

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by Lord Altrincham

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by Miriam Koshland

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THE TWO FACES OF TERROR

ER since the Nationalists seized power in 1948, South Africa been in a state of suspended terror. The mechanism of anny has been developed with patience and care—in the self-petuation of Nationalist rule through electoral delimitation l disfranchisement, in the punishments with which the law loaded against any effective forms of opposition, in the ctions and powers with which an obsequious parliament has ssed officialdom and, particularly, the police. Political ponents are banned and banished without trial; the security lice pry everywhere, listening and scribbling, pursuing and errogating, with all the bland insolence of their inviolable ssiers; passports and permits are seized or refused without ason or appeal. Yet the engine has remained, for all that, urely locked in second gear.

On the crudest comparison with consummate terrors, like zi Germany or contemporary Portugal, the courts in South rica have protected the law from persistent outrage. Political agonists have not just disappeared, while their families dured exemplary victimization; trial in public court has nained the prerequisite of imprisonment and execution. e law may have been defaced beyond recognition, but it is ll standing. Whatever one's judgment of the treason trial, interminable proceedings and the vagrancy of the prosecution, e accused were not simply rounded up and shot, or shovelled cretly into concentration camps. Quite the reverse. Their al has been conducted with a blare of publicity, and the Crown attempting to prove its contentions before an increasingly stive bench at home and overseas.

Above all, the press has been left fundamentally free. Though lnerable to persecution under a number of 'public safety' laws d consequently compelled to mince fine much of its comment, remains in practice secure from seizure and censorship. It is precarious freedom, of course, and one that may be enjoyed ly at constant editorial risk. The Minister of Justice, pressed give reasons for his five-year ban on the Editor of '*Africa uth*', cited for the most part various quotations from articles at have appeared in the magazine. Yet it has been, all the ne, by the measure of the press under absolute terrors, free-m of a very precious sort, capable, for all its limitations, having kept reason alive in a race-deranged society.

It is inevitable, of course, that press and judiciary toge should be suffocated by the sack-cloth of white suprem The Nationalists have only needed time, to condition the cou to its ultimate submission. Democracy is never destroyed day; it is undermined, gradually, carefully, till it is read last to cave in with one sure cut of the spade. For eleven y the Nationalists have been tuning up the engine. And now time has come to push the pedal down flat to the floor.

Some of the recent appointments to both the provincial appellate divisions of the judiciary are explicable only in term political packaging. Promotions have ridden roughshod c reputation and seniority; and lurking in the shadows of Gov ment policy, legislation stirs to ease the retirement of recalcit judges. The South African judiciary has long enjoyed a rep tion for administering the law uncorrupted by promises of po or fear of place. That it has deserved this reputation so must be provocation enough to a government whose pursui power increasingly collides with the rule of law. No cou can contain a free judiciary and the political and econo violence of apartheid peacefully together; the one must by very nature consume the other in the course of its car And so the Nationalists must serve notice on South Africa independence of judgment is to be as tolerable on the benc it is in parliament. Trial by political opinion stands ready to on the blind-fold.

How should the press escape? The Deputy-Minister of Interior has already announced that a bill to provide for inte censorship is being framed in accordance with the Report of Commission of Enquiry into Undesirable Publications* and i be introduced by the Government at the coming parliamen session. It is not yet certain whether newspapers will covered; but that is not of much moment. If they escap will only be for separate execution straight afterwards. upon the whole world of free comment that the guns of Government are now trained.

It is not easy to be serious about the recommendations in 1957 Report. Where it is not almost pathological, as in its th lensed strictures on underwear advertisements, it is grote in its bigotry, defining the politically undesirable with so obv and profound a contempt for the right of men to hold conflicting opinions at all that editors will be serving five y

*For a detailed analysis of the Report, see '*Africa South*', Vol II No. 2—'The Final St

n jail for publishing articles on the development of democracy in ncient Greece.

For what are we to expect of a government that banned "Black eauty" from entry into South Africa because the title apparently id not make it clear enough to the censors that the chief haracter is a horse? The recent banning of Bertrand Russell's Why I am not a Christian" possesses at least the excuse that he book was read *first* and irritated the spiritual conjunctivitis f Afrikanerdom. With the same degree of discretion employed y the Board of Internal Censors as has been consistenly exercised y the Board controlling what we read from abroad, we may xpect bibles to be published with the Book of Exodus excised nd government gazettes filling up the fiction shelves in all the ookshops.

How can the Nationalists hope to survive the very silence that hey compel? While men may dispute, they may yet resolve n peace; with all argument forbidden, the future rides on the ullet and the knife. During the past six months, African lespair has erupted into flaming sugar-plantations and wattle-roves, in outbursts of violence that have racked the rural reas of Natal. The Congress leadership appeals ceaselessly for alm; but how can it expect its calls to be obeyed? Black error has accomplished what black protest and black petition ave failed so formidably to achieve—the quick concessions of he afraid. Within days of the Cato Manor riots, the Durban ity Council was considering a general increase in African wages; vhile arson scorches Natal, cries for black-white consultation curry in the wake. How can it be otherwise? There are wo faces to terror; and a country that shows the one must be repared to bear the retribution of the other.

The Government would do well to consider the implications f all that it is doing and plans still to do. By shackling the udiciary and suffocating the press, it will accomplish the out-vard political conformity that its ever-growing greed for power oerces it to want. But the starch will only stick to the surface. And too deep for the eyes of censors to scrutinize or the courts to onvict, the antagonism of men who have been deprived of any eal reason for living will surge to the breach, drowning all that s worth saving in South Africa together with what is not. Surely, it is not only the sugar-plantations of Natal that South Africa is setting on fire with the frenzy of apartheid. It is itself.

LAW

NATIONALIST CONTEMPT OF COURT

SENATOR DR. THE HON. LESLIE RUBIN, LL.D.
Senator representing the Africans of the Western Cape.

THE impartiality of judges is the cornerstone of a democratic society. But it is not sufficient for judges to be impartial. It is equally important that they should be known by all the people to be so. This does not mean that they can never be criticized. Fair criticism is a salutary check on all persons holding public office, and there can be no objection when "reasonable argument or expostulation is offered against any judicial act as contrary to law or the public good." But when something is said or written or done which is calculated to bring a court or a judge into disrepute, or to lower their standing or authority in the eyes of the public, contempt of court has been committed and the offender is liable to summary punishment by the court concerned. Behind the exercise of this power by the court is the firm belief that once the people lose faith in their judges, the administration of justice will suffer. The Nationalist Party has an ugly record of contempt of court since it came to power.

In 1951 the Government passed the Separate Representation of Voters Act, which removed the Cape Coloured voters from the common roll. In 1952 the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court declared the Act invalid. Almost immediately there ensued a flood of bitter attack on the judges. It came from Government spokesmen including Cabinet Ministers, in Parliament and at political gatherings. Mr. Paul Sauer talked contemptuously of "the five old men of Bloemfontein". Mr. Eric Louw said that Parliament "cannot be subjected to the whims of the courts." Dr. Dönges said "the people must now decide whether to trust a Bench appointed and paid by a government but which was not responsible to anyone, or the Parliament elected by the people which had to get a mandate from the people at least every five years". The Minister of Posts and Telegraphs said: ". . . the Afrikaner people will never be satisfied to remain in this inferior position whereby the court—and that court consists of five paid officials, whether they be judges or not—whereby the five paid officials occupy a higher position than the House of Assembly." Mr. Strydom (later Prime Minister) said that it was "a terrible mistake . . . to take

the view that because a man is a judge he is therefore like a be from heaven who only sees matters in an unprejudiced light. judges are ordinary people . . . It is very clear, according to repo which appeared in the newspapers and from the remarks of judges, that from the beginning they had already made a study the case and it was already decided what their judgment wo be".

Lesser lights of the Nationalist Party were even less restraine Mr. Abraham, M.P., accused the Appellate Division of act "irresponsibly". Mr. van den Berg, M.P., asked: "Are judg different from other people? Are they not just as partisan any other person?" Mr. J. H. Visser, M.P., said, "if I had a c in which thousands of pounds were involved I would not go the Appeal Court. I would rather try to settle the case on fifty-fifty basis with my opponent". Senator le Roux sai "I want to put them this question. Which is the greater, t owner of the shop or his clerks, the owner of the farm or l foreman, the clerk or the Minister. You are concerned he with an employer and an employee. In this case the employ is the Appellate Division. They are in the service of t Government. The Government is the master".

For lawyers, the implications of this onslaught upon the highe court in the land were disquieting. It was the first time in t history of South Africa that judges had been spoken of in th way. Everyone, it is true, expected the Government to critical of a judicial decision that thwarted its policy. B these were not criticisms of a decision. They were attac which impugned the impartiality and the good faith of the judg who had given it. Attacks of this kind, it seemed, could on serve to undermine public confidence in the courts. W South Africa, the lawyers asked, now faced with a comple departure from the traditional concept of the judiciary as group of highly trained men who could always be depended upo to dispense justice with complete impartiality? Did the attacks imply a new attitude on the part of the Governmen in the future, to the traditional independence of the court

There were fears in many quarters that the Nationalists ha displayed an attitude towards the function of the courts whic threatened the whole delicately balanced basis of custom an convention supporting a completely independent judiciar These fears were not allayed by subsequent events.

The Government replied to the 1952 decision of the Appella

ivision with the High Court of Parliament Act, in terms of hich Parliament, sitting as a Court, but boycotted by the pposition, held that the Separate Representation of Voters ct was valid. A few months later the Appellate Division eclared that the High Court of Parliament Act was "invalid, ull and void, and of no legal effect". The day before this ecision Mr. Swart, the Minister of Justice, had deemed it ecessary to administer another rebuke to the courts. "It eemed to be the fashion", he said, "for judges to criticize the ws of the land, and this was becoming a little tiresome".

The Government's next step was the Senate Act, which enrged the Upper House sufficiently to ensure the requisite wo-thirds majority required by the Act of Union. There llowed the appointment of a number of additional Judges of ppeal, and the passing of the Appellate Division Quorum Act, hich provided that appeals challenging the validity of an Act of arliament should be heard by the new full Bench of eleven idges. The reaction of the legal profession to these measures best conveyed in the words of the Hon. Percy Hugh Fischer, former Judge-President of the Orange Free State Provincial ivision, and son of the late Abraham Fischer, a former President f the Orange Free State. After referring to the "recent holesale appointment of members of the Court of Appeal", nd saying how important it was that "no government should ppoint any member of the judiciary in such a manner or in uch circumstances as to cast doubt in the mind of the public as o the integrity of the judiciary", he went on: "In the present ase the public has been faced with the appointment of five dditional judges to an existing court of six. As far as the public vas aware there had been no suggestion that the existing number vas not adequate for the work entrusted to it . . . With regard o constitutional matters, the public is of course aware that the resent Government, through some of their members, have epeatedly expressed their disapproval of recent decisions of the upreme Court. The public is also aware that the present overnment, through these Ministers, have threatened to take teps to prevent a repetition of such decisions . . . Essential to he due administration of justice is the reliance of the public n the integrity of the Bench. To raise a doubt as to such ntegrity, even if it be in respect of one class of case, will in ll probability raise doubts as to cases in general. It would eem that a greater injustice could not be done to the Bench of

the Appellate Division than the manner of appointment adop by the Government in enlarging the Bench and altering quorum''.

The Prime Minister of South Africa, Dr. Verwoerd, whil was Minister of Native Affairs, made this illuminating con bution to the catalogue of Nationalist comment on the judici ''I have had experience of judicial people and Heaven help if they ever have anything important to decide''. Dr. Verwo may perhaps be forgiven for feeling bitter about South Afri judges. One of them was responsible for enshrining in the reports a somewhat unflattering description of the Pri Minister's activities during World War II. Dr. Verwoe while Editor of 'Die Transvaler', was accused by 'The S of falsifying news in order to support Nazi propaganda in So Africa. He sued for damages for defamation and was successful. After a lengthy hearing and an exhaustive exami tion of the evidence on either side, Mr. Justice Millin, in course of a considered reserved judgment, said of Dr. Verwoe ''There have been proved 2 very grave cases of the publicat of false news in reckless disregard of whether it was true false; 6 cases, on the whole less serious but still clear cases falsification, where news, originally correctly reported, falsely restated for the purpose of editorial comment; and cases in which news was falsified by means of misleading he lines. He did support Nazi propaganda, he did make his pa a tool of the Nazis in South Africa, and he knew it''.

This judgment was referred to in the Senate in 1957. Extra from the debate on that occasion provide further evidence of t contemptuous attitude of the Nationalist Party towards courts.

'Senator Friend: . . . but how did the Hon. Minister try justify himself outside the court? He said that it was onl Jewish judge . . . I want to ask now . . . if the Minister convinced that the judgment was wrong. . . . that this was do because the judge was a Jew . . . why did he not appeal?

Dr. Verwoerd: Because I knew that there was no justice be found under your government.

Senator Friend: Some of our most competent judges are n being accused . . .

Senator Rossouw: Why did two of them become Liberali later on?

Senator Strauss: I ask how many judges are not appointed

le Bench from active politics? The People on the other side sire us to believe when it suits them that, as soon as a judge is cked in the robes of justice, all his political prejudices sappear; but what do we see, Mr. President? On the day hen they leave the Bench how many of them do not immediately turn to politics . . .

'Hon. Senators: Hear, hear.'

In his reply Dr. Verwoerd explained his refusal to appeal, by aking several charges of the gravest character against Mr. stice Millin, who had since died. These are examples: a substantially important exhibit had to remain out of court cause the judge was not prepared to accept it as evidence . . . was very strange for the Bench to direct accusations against e as a person in the manner in which it did . . . in my opinion e judgment was not a fair or correct judgment . . . I had deed to experience the unpleasant occurrence that it was parently difficult for the Bench to give an unprejudiced judgent''.

As to Dr. Verwoerd's reply to Senator Friend, this can only ean and have been intended to mean that if he had appealed ainst the judgment to the Appellate Division, he would not ve got justice—clearly, a gross reflection on the integrity of e judges of the Appellate Division at that time.

Appointments to the Bench during the last few years have en puzzling and disquieting, for lawyer and layman alike. On e one hand members of the Bar, of impeccable character, ility and experience, in some cases outstanding members of e profession, have been overlooked; on the other hand, wyers of junior status and with limited experience have been pointed. To an extent not known before in the history of uth Africa's courts, many cases are argued today by Counsel fore a judge who was several years his junior at the Bar.

The Act of Union empowers the Governor-General to appoint y ''fit and proper person'' as a judge of the Supreme Court. ere is no other provision in our law which prescribes the alifications, whether of ability or experience, necessary for ch appointment. The guarantee to the public that a person vated to the Bench will be a ''fit and proper person'' is to be und in well-established tradition. The distilled wisdom of nturies of experience in moulding an independent judiciary Britain, has combined with the teachings of the Roman utch law to produce a set of principles which govern the

appointment and tenure of office of judges. These have alw
been an essential part of the system of justice in South Afr
Some have been embodied in the Act of Union; others, tho
not enforced by law, have become part of established practi

Two of these principles are that the person appointed to
Bench must be a practising advocate of ability and experie
(judged as a rule by seniority at the Bar), and that once on
Bench, his further advancement in judicial office, e.g. appo
ment as Provincial Judge-President or Chief Justice, is de
mined by his seniority as a judge. These two principles h
served to maintain in the public mind the idea of the judici
as an institution of the utmost stability, resting firmly on co
pliance with the highest standards of character and abi
conceivable in public life.

Recent appointments show that the Minister of Justice
decided to ignore these two principles. Here are some ca
taken from recent press reports. The Hon. Mr. Justice Bo
was appointed Judge-President of the Orange Free St
Provincial Division 22 months after he had been appointed to
Bench, and at a time when he was junior to most of his colleag
on the Bench and to 28 other puisne judges in the count
Among recent appointments to the Appellate Division, on
junior to 15, another to 16, and a third to 23 puisne judges in
country. The present Chief Justice, the Hon. Mr. Just
Steyn, who had been law adviser to various government depa
ments, was appointed to the Bench in the Transvaal (in the f
of vigorous protest by the Transvaal Bar) in 1951, and to
Appellate Division in 1955. He is junior to 2 Judges of App
and in judicial experience to 17 of the 59 judges in South Afri
His appointment as Chief Justice overlooked Appeal Jud
Schreiner (17 years at the Bar, appointed to the Bench in 19
and to the Appellate Division in 1945, who acted as Ch
Justice) and Hoexter (called to the Bar in 1918, appointed
the Bench in 1938, and to the Appellate Division in 194
The Hon. Mr. Justice Beyers was appointed to the Bench of
Cape Provincial Division in 1955, and to the Appellate Divis
in 1958. In 1959 he returned to the Cape Provincial Divis
as Judge-President of a court which includes 3 judges sen
to him in judicial experience.

These facts reflect in no way whatsoever on the character
ability of the persons appointed. Their qualification or fitn
to sit as judges is not for a moment questioned. The critici

f the Minister of Justice for making appointments in defiance
well-established tradition in South Africa. It is a serious
icism because such appointments must cause public un-
ness about the motives which actuate the Minister in abandon-
a practice of such long standing; an uneasiness not likely
be dispelled by the frequent innuendoes about "liberalist
ges" which have been made by Mr. Swart's political sup-
ters.

A South African newspaper called upon Mr. Swart earlier
year to answer the following questions: (1) what was wrong
h the previous system of appointing judges? (2) what are
benefits of applying criteria other than seniority in ap-
nting judges? (3) what are these criteria? The questions
nain unanswered.

Shortly before the end of the Parliamentary session in 1959,
. Swart produced another example of the new attitude
played to the judiciary by the Nationalist Party. The Act
Union provides that "a judge shall not be removed from
ce except by the Governor-General on an address from both
uses of Parliament in the same session praying for such
noval on the ground of misbehaviour or incapacity". The
ne provision, recognized as the cornerstone of judicial
munity from arbitrary control by the executive, applies to
judges of Great Britain. It has never been invoked against a
uth African judge. In the Supreme Court Bill, the Govern-
nt now added to the existing power of removal a new pro-
on, empowering the Governor-General to suspend a judge
m office "on the ground of misconduct", with the right of
liament subsequently to approve or disapprove of the
pension. A South African Queen's Counsel condemned the
v provision and, referring to the use of the term "mis-
nduct" instead of "misbehaviour or incapacity", said:
Misconduct appears to have a wider meaning. I am thoroughly
picious of it, especially in view of criticisms which have been
ced by Government politicians of judges. The Minister of
tice himself accused a judge of not doing his duty. Is this what
isconduct' will mean?" There was widespread criticism,
the provision was dropped from the Bill. But South
ican lawyers were left wondering why it was ever considered
essary to publish and introduce a Bill containing such a
vision.

THE WHITE OPPOSITION SPLITS

STANLEY UYS
Political Correspondent of the 'Sunday Times'

THE annual congress of the official South African Parliamen Opposition or United Party in August last year, on the ev the Provincial Elections, resulted in the resignation of almo quarter of its Members of Parliament and the formation of a white political party—the Progressives. Amidst the exhu tions and excuses, analyses and adjustments that followed, highly significant conclusions emerged—the official Parliamen Opposition has swung substantially to the right, narrowing already narrow gap between Government and United Part the doctrines of race rule; and, for the first time in South Afi history, a substantial white Parliamentary Party with wide, i dominant, electoral support in many urban areas, had come existence specifically in order to propagate a more liberal p in race relations.

The origin of the Progressive break must be sought in right-wing "rethinking" resulting from the total failure of United Party to avoid a steady electoral decline during th years in which it has been in Opposition. In 1948, Nationalist Party came to power with a majority of fewer half-a-dozen M.P.s. Today, it has two-thirds of the Hous Assembly, partly due to the completely one-sided characte the electoral system (particularly delimitation methods) partly to the growing numerical superiority of the Afrika It did not take the United Party long to evolve the view there was no profit in battering its head against a stone wall, that the only chance of success lay in winning over "moder Nationalist voters.

After the General Election in 1953, when the U.P. suff its second successive defeat, a right-wing breakaway moven known as the Bekker or Conservative group, tried to swing U.P. away from its anti-apartheid policies towards some ent with the then Nationalist Prime Minister, Dr. D. F. M The movement failed, the group broke up, and the U.P. able to consolidate its forces again. In 1958, the U.P. suff its third big General Election defeat, and it is an indicatio how far right-wing thinking had advanced in the Party by that, instead of a small reactionary's group taking shape a a powerful movement was launched to expel the small,

ed "liberal" wing among the M.P.s.

is not necessary to trace the tortuous path of the developing flict within the U.P., except to mention that after the 1958 neral Election defeat, Sir de Villiers Graaff, the leader, ointed a secret committee, consisting of U.P. Parliament- ns, to study the Party's racial policy; and that the points of flict thereafter became more pronounced. During the 1959 liamentary session, rumours persisted of an impending move expel the "liberals" from the U.P. caucus, on the grounds their presence prevented "moderate" Nationalists from ning the Party. Sir de Villiers gave his considered reply to the vernment's Bantustan policies, and one of his categorical ements was that the U.P. was flatly opposed to non-whites ing in Parliament in any capacity. It was at this period that . H. G. Lawrence, M.P., a former Cabinet Minister and the ty's front-bench debater, clashed with Sir de Villiers over the P.'s racial policies.

The fateful Bloemfontein congress was preceeded by a congress the United Party Youth, which is firmly under the control of right-wing M.P.s. and which voiced its opposition to any eral sentiments within the Party. Even before the Bloem- tein congress opened on August 11, there were rumours me of which found their way into the newspapers) that the berals" were going to be "kicked out". Delegates from the al areas dominated the conference, and it appeared that a inite campaign had been organised against the Progressives. the first full day of the congress, Dr. Louis Steenkamp, P., a leading right-winger, introduced a resolution (which was on the agenda) thanking Sir de Villiers Graaff for having ted that the U.P. believed that the African population should oy its political rights on a separate, not common, roll. e Progressives protested that the resolution closed the door to future progress, and then the fur began to fly. Until late t night, the attack on the Progressives raged, with rural egates overreaching themselves in their excitement and coming positively abusive. One thing was made plain to the gressives at that day's discussion: they were not welcome in Party at all. Some observers believe that the plan was to d two or three Progressives into resigning, but that the mpaign got out of hand and led to a major split.

On the following day, when a number of delegates had left eady, Mr. Mitchell, the right-wing Natal leader, introduced

the controversial resolution declaring that the U.P. would
purchase any more land in terms of the 1936 settleme
by which further land had been promised to the African
return for their disfranchisement from the common roll in
Cape—if that land was going to be used for Dr. Verwoe
Bantustans. The Progressives protested vigorously. They k
that the reasoning was spurious: that it was a tactical, n
policy, resolution, and that it would be used to exploit
resentment of white farmers who objected to the expropria
of land for African use. In fact, two years ago, long before
Verwoerd announced his Bantustan policies, Mr. Mitchell
quote one of the Progressive M.P.s.) was "indulging in this
of propaganda, despite objections from some of his Parliamen
colleagues".

The protests of the Progressives left the congress unmo
and the break then became inevitable. In the days that follo
there was a series of meetings, or rather nostalgic farew
between the Progressive M.P.s. and Sir de Villiers, which sh
that far from being a hard-bitten bunch of politicians eage
launch out with a new Party, the Progressives were b
positively sentimental about their departure.

Sir de Villiers later issued a lengthy statement and, on be
of the Progressives, Dr. Jan Steytler, M.P., formerly leade
the Party in the Cape, replied with a statement that c
murmurs of applause from sympathisers all round South Af
"We believe", said Dr. Steytler, "the time has come w
white people should stop taking important decisions affec
non-white people without proper regard as to how the l
think and feel. Since the Bloemfontein congress we have
fact, consulted a number of responsible Natives and we
found that they deplore in the strongest terms this decision t
at congress. They most certainly regard it as a breach of
on the part of the white man. It is our view that South A
cannot afford political stratagems of this kind, which des
the trust and respect of the Native people in the guardianshi
the white man . . . We have come to the conclusion that
temper of the Bloemfontein congress showed a comp
unwillingness on the part of most delegates to face up to
challenge of contemporary events here and in Africa.
impression we have is of a Party congress reluctant to move
the times, unwilling even to interpret its own principles
forward-looking manner. From the tone of congress we be

many delegates want to fight the Nationalists with the pons of race fear and race hatred. The slogans of '*swart ar*' (black danger) and '*kafferbooties*' (kaffir-lovers) will be l against the Nationalists by people who should know better''. ven before this statement had been issued, Major A. Z. man, a U.P. member of the Cape Provincial Council and an a-rightwinger, had declared that the U.P. would fight the vincial Elections in October on the old Nationalist slogan of ''*swart gevaar*''. The departure of the Progressives was ed by the more vocal right-wingers as positive proof to ''our ionalist friends'' that the U.P. was now a purged, con- ative Party. In a Press statement on August 25, the Pro- sives observed: ''The delegates at congress showed an istakable tendency to go backwards rather than to go for- d . . . they felt that by making a minimum of progress the ty would become an acceptable political home for the derate' Nationalist, whose support congress was primarily cerned with getting''. Captain Jack Basson, M.P., one of least subtle members of the right-wing, predicted that for ry ''liberal'' who left the U.P., four conservatives (pre- ably ''moderate'' Nationalists) would join it. Unfortunately Mr. Basson, the results of the Provincial Elections have not ne out this prophecy.

The land resolution which was the cause of the trouble at the gress was passed by an overwhelming majority of the egates, although Sir de Villiers himself was opposed to it, in fact had made it known beforehand that he considered to be of dubious propaganda value. That the Progressives not gone to the congress with any intention of causing a it is proved by the fact that only a few were still in Bloem- tein when it was decided to issue a statement of protest. e others had already left the city, and they learnt only after- rds of the action of their colleagues, whereupon they mptly identified themselves with it. One of the Progressives sequently declared: ''I am certain that the delegates who oured the motion did not realise that its acceptance would d to a major split in the Party. Some of them may today be ndering if the possible gain of a few hundred votes in seats e Vryheid was a good exchange for 11 M.P.s. (now 12 with . Lawrence), five M.P.C.s., several excellent candidates for Provincial elections, and scores of the Party's best workers l supporters, and, not the least bad part of a bad bargain, the

further loss of confidence of the Natives in the white ma
word".

It was at the stage when the Progressives were having difficu
in persuading the Opposition public that their breakaway
been unavoidable and, in fact, desirable, that Mr. Ha
Oppenheimer, chairman (among other concerns) of the gi
Anglo-American Corporation and De Beers, controller of m
of South Africa's gold and all of its diamond industry, and h
self a former United Party M.P., resigned from the Pa
stating that he was "in general sympathy with the Progress
group". Although he has not formally joined the group, he
promised it financial support. Coming from South Afri
premier millionaire, with the reputation of being the m
enlightened capitalist in the country, this was a lucky break
the Progressives. Even if the announcement did not have m
effect on rank and file U.P. voters (their views have still not b
determined), it certainly had an impact on influential busin
newspaper, and other circles, where it was known that
Oppenheimer was not the kind of man to throw his considera
weight behind ineffectual splinter groups. For the first ti
probably, the business world, and many others, began to th
of the Progressives as a group with a future.

The next lucky break for the Progressives was the announ
ment by Mr. Harry Lawrence, M.P., that he, too, was resign
from the United Party. Mr. Lawrence, unlike most of
Progressives, was well-known to the public. One of the m
experienced Parliamentarians in the House, he had served
Cabinet Minister under General Smuts, and then, in Oppositi
had become virtual Parliamentary leader of the U.P.
significance of Mr. Lawrence's resignation was that he was
liberal; but in recent months he had displayed increasing conc
over the state of race relations and over the U.P.'s obvi
inability to frame a colour policy that faced the realities of
racial situation.

In his statement, Mr. Lawrence revealed that, before
debate in Parliament on the Government's Bantustan Bill, he
felt it prudent "to admit in principle the full implications of
acceptance of a multi-racial community . . . As a consequen
I had several full and earnest talks with the Leader of
Opposition and later made my views known to the Party caucu
After the debate on the Bill, Mr. Lawrence went so far as
write a letter to Sir de Villiers "making my own position q

xplicit''. In that letter, Mr. Lawrence told Sir de Villiers hat he was ''unable to agree that your Native policy statement vas an unequivocal acceptance of the implications which must low from accepting the multi-racial state in preference to Verwoerd's policy of partition''. At the time, Mr. Lawrence's Parliamentary colleagues were aware that the dispute between Mr. Lawrence and Sir de Villiers was a fundamental one. ndeed, it even seemed likely that Mr. Lawrence might break way from the U.P. These facts show that the conflict in the U.P., which led to the Progressive breakaway, had deep roots. As Mr. Lawrence explained in his statement, the resolution on he land issue at the Bloemfontein congress was only ''the proximate and immediate cause'' of the break.

I have dealt with Mr. Lawrence's position at length because it emphasizes two points: that the trouble in the U.P. was deep-seated and fundamental, and that the break, therefore, was inevitable; and that, essentially, what the Progressives represent is not a liberal flutter, but an alarmed reaction to a deteriorating situation by persons who, if they had lived in any country other than crazy South Africa, would be the respectable pillars of society.

The future of the Progressives, of course, depends on the United Party's breaking up further—that is, their future in Parliament. As Mr. Marais Steyn, M.P., expressed it, they cannot survive as a Party unless it is at the expense of the U.P. What, then, is the future of the U.P.? If the U.P. now intensifies its ''*swart gevaar*'' and ''*kafferboetie*'' propaganda, and concerns itself mainly with winning over ''moderate'' Nationalists, inevitably it is going to break up further. Up to the time of the Progressive break, Sir de Villiers had succeeded skilfully in holding the U.P. together, by balancing the right-wing against the left-wing, and vice versa. Now the left-wing has gone, and Sir de Villiers is left with a right-wing and the sprawling middle-wing, which contains several M.P.s who are not at all happy about the right-wing's manoeuvres. The Nationalists have been saying that Sir de Villiers is now Mr. Mitchell's prisoner.

The results of the Provincial Council elections in Natal were most heartening. The three Progressives (who stood as Independents) polled exceptionally well. In Pinetown, Mr. Lester Hall lost to the U.P. candidate by only 160 votes. In Durban (Gardens), Mr. Leo Boyd polled 1,954 votes against the U.P.'s 2,639. In Pietermaritzburg South, Dr. W. G. McConkey

polled 1,964 votes against the U.P.'s 2,692. These three candidates had less than two months in which to organise their election campaigns. The position in which the U.P. found itself in the Provincial elections was a disturbing one. It lost seats and votes to the Nationalist Party (apart from isolated successes here and there), and it also found that it was shedding voters to Progressives and Liberals on the other flank. The moral of the Provincial elections appeared to be that the political situation in South Africa is becoming more fluid, with an important section of the electorate showing a preference for Progressive and Liberal policies.

The next Parliamentary session will see the start of the class between the Progressives and the U.P. Assuming that the Progressives establish themselves as a cohesive Party, what role will they fulfil in South African politics? Why should they succeed where the United Party has failed? The answer is that the U.P. need not have failed. It could have remained as a powerful Parliamentary Party if it had persisted in its opposition to Nationalist policies, which would have crumbled sooner or later.

What will the Progressives represent in South African politics? Even if the U.P. is reversing its direction, it will not be sufficient for the Progressives simply to take up where Mr. Mitchell is leaving off. The Progressives have stated that they intend to interpret U.P. policy in a "forward-looking manner"—this could mean anything or nothing. The situation facing the Progressives is this: if they adopt a policy that is only a few shades different from the U.P.'s policy, they will fail to make any impact on the racial situation and the U.P. electorate will see no reason why it should vote for Mr. Lawrence and Dr. Steytler rather than for Sir de Villiers and Mr. Mitchell. If, on the other hand, the Progressives adopt a bold racial policy, their survival as a Parliamentary group will depend on a qualitative change taking place in the white electorate. If this change does not take place, then they fail at the polls; if it does, then the future is theirs. In other words, they have nothing to lose by adopting a bold policy. With a bold policy, they *may* fail; without a bold policy, they will *certainly* fail.

Some observers have suggested that the Progressives will represent, in the main, the views of enlightened industrialists. In the present race-obsessed situation, a white Parliamentary Party, expressing the needs of progressive industrialism, and

peaking boldly on matters like the industrial colour bar, pass ıws, living wages, influx control, the group areas act, job eservation, etc., could definitely serve a progressive purpose. o imagine that the Progressives will be liberal for the sake of eing liberal is unrealistic.

But, and this is the point I should like to make in this article, t is not essential in South Africa today to advocate universal uffrage and equal rights in all spheres to be progressive. An nlightened policy on the issues I have mentioned should be ıeartily welcomed by every right-thinking South African. The ituation is so grim in South Africa that a move such as that now eing made by the Progressives must be given a fair trial—and very possible support. After that, it will be up to the Pro- ressives to show their supporters and sympathisers that the aith in them has not been misplaced.

If South Africa ever reaches the stage where there is a clear dividing line between white supporters of apartheid and non-white victims, with nothing in between except a small and ineffectual group of white liberals, then there can be no peaceful solution to South Africa's racial problem. For helping to prevent this stage from being reached, the Progressives deserve thanks.

It is foolish to argue, as some people do, that between the Nationalist Government and the Congress Movement there is no room for a major political force; and it is just as unrealistic to insist that the Progressives must adopt radical policies which, while they would be welcomed by Congress supporters, would be rejected by 99 per cent. of white voters. The Progressives are not catering for Congress. They are catering primarily for urban white voters. If they can achieve something in this field, if they can keep a substantial number of white voters in the fight against the Nationalist Government, then they will have done considerable good.

The ultimate outcome of the struggle against apartheid in South Africa is foregone. Apartheid will be defeated. What is not certain is whether this victory will be achieved with the help of whites, and with the minimum of violence, or whether it will flow from a direct and bloody clash between the non-white masses and the white police state. If the Progressives succeed in their aim, and a section of the white electorate behaves sensibly, then South Africa will not be reduced to carnage and chaos. It will be a valuable victory.

RIGHTS AND RIOTS IN NATAL

LEO KUPER

Dean of the Faculty of Social Science, University of Natal.
Author of "Passive Resistance in South Africa", etc.

AFRICAN leaders face the dilemma of choice between violence and non-violence in their struggle against oppression. These alternative means of political action were debated at the Accra Conference in December 1958, and the final compromise resolution reflects the conflict of views. The South African delegation strongly advocated non-violence, and this is the policy of the leaders of the South African liberation movement.

The case for non-violence may rest on moral grounds, or tactical considerations, or both. Where there are no constitutional means of change, as in South Africa, and where non-violent techniques appear relatively ineffective, we may expect a questioning of the whole philosophy of non-violence, especially by the younger men. And their doubts are heightened by the patent successes of violent action. Who could have foretold the constitutional and social changes in Kenya, following upon Mau Mau, or the quick pace of constitutional reform in the Belgian Congo after the riots at Leopoldville? And in Durban, where the low level of African income has been acknowledged for many years, an improvement in wages, though small, followed rapidly on the recent disturbances. In making an appeal for increased wages, the Director of the Bantu Administration Department in Durban declared that this was an opportunity to speak out "which I may not readily find again, an opportunity to be heard, because minds of men have become apprehensive and responsive by recent events at Cato Manor".

The disturbances began on the 18th June at Cato Manor, in the vast straggle of shacks which house fully half the African families living in Durban, when African women voiced their dissatisfaction with the Durban Corporation in a demonstration outside the Cato Manor Beer Hall. The previous afternoon some 75 women had stormed the Beer Hall and driven out African men at drink. The following morning they again demonstrated outside the Beer Hall, their numbers mounting to thousands, and demanded to see the Director of the Durban Bantu Administration Department. Police reinforcements moved into the Beer Hall, converting it into an armed fortress. African men wanting to take part in the demonstration were

driven away by the women.

The Director arrived at about 2 p.m. and invited five women to state their grievances. The speakers were all self-selected, showing the spontaneous nature of the demonstrations. The Director heard their grievances, and replied that the matter would be discussed further; they must now go home. The women were dissatisfied with this answer. The District Commandant of Police ordered them to disperse, and when they failed to do so, they were driven by baton charge across the stream into the shack area. Stones were thrown, and shots fired, conventional gambits which we have come to recognise in South Africa as the precursors to destruction of property and loss of life. The men became involved, lawless elements took advantage of the situation, and by nightfall buildings were fired in Cato Manor and the adjoining Chesterville location. The main target was the property of the Corporation, administrative centres, community halls, trading centres, vehicles; but other property was also destroyed, church, school and welfare buildings. Four people were killed.

Earlier in the day, the demonstrations had already spread to other beer halls, and in the period that followed most of the African areas of Durban were affected. Women were the prime movers in the picketing of beer halls and the occasional stoning of municipal buses. Many were arrested, and the daily papers began to headline their trials: "43 Native Women, 6 Men Accused in Beer Hall Rumpus", "Court Told: Atmosphere in Cato Manor is Explosive". Eight beer halls closed down for a period and African welfare services were threatened, since they are subsidized by beer profits. A bizarre commentary on the whole situation was provided by the manoeuvres to get the men back into the beer halls, so that the profits might again flow into welfare services.

Now tension started to develop in the rural areas of Natal, as women began to demonstrate by the destruction of dipping tanks and deputations to government officials. The most serious disturbance was at Harding, where tribesmen marched on the town to free their women, convicted for destruction of government property. Some farmlands were burnt, and the white population armed itself against the tribesmen. About 20 miles away, large numbers of African women, some armed with shields and spears, gathered to voice their grievances. Saracen armoured cars were sent to control them; and one of the news-

papers carried a picture of an African woman, armed with a stick, threatening one of the armoured cars. At Maritzburg, meanwhile, African boys had set fire to schools in a minor reverberation of the Cato Manor disturbances. By August 21, according to a newspaper report, more than 10,000 women had been involved in the disturbances, and 624 Africans, mainly women, had been sentenced to a total of 168 years' imprisonment and/or fines totalling £7,130. The demonstrations still continue, the most recent being a peaceful deputation to the Native Commissioner at Ixopo. 'Golden City Post' (October 11, 1959) reports that about 25 white policemen arrived, armed with pickhandles, sjamboks and sten-guns: the women were ordered to disperse. When they refused, three hundred and sixty-six were arrested, convicted and sentenced, each to a fine of £35 or four months imprisonment, a total of 122 years imprisonment or a fine of £12,810.

How are these events to be interpreted? The women of Cato Manor are specific about their grievances against the Durban Corporation. The Corporation, we are told, had promised in 1949 to build a place where Africans would be given licenses to brew and sell beer. Then, when the Beer Hall was built, the Corporation decided to sell the beer itself and made huge profits. Permits are given to the residents to brew a limited amount of beer, but these proved to be traps, because relatives, even a son, with whom a resident enjoyed his drink, were arrested and charged a fine ranging from £2 to 10s. And since it is not the Zulu custom for men to drink on their own, they go to the beer halls, which take part of their very small earnings. On the way home they are picked up by the police, and what little money they are bringing back for the children goes in fines. The Corporation boasts of the great profits it makes from beer, and at the same time refuses to pay higher wages on the ground that Africans must be earning enough in order to waste so much money at the beer halls. Because the municipality has not given a lead, other employers have not raised wages. Many of the women in Cato Manor are widows, who make a living by taking in washing and brewing beer. The Corporation—the grievances continue—destroys the homes of the people without giving them other accommodation in neighbouring locations. If a man loses his employment, he may be deported from Durban. There is no employment for the young people, they get into trouble, and are sent away to the

rms.

The Director of the Bantu Administration Department in urban felt that the crucial issue was poverty. "I wish to make old and say that whatever reasons have been advanced are of a urely superficial nature. Even the women who started off his tragic course did not express their grievances in terms of are, basic and intrinsic facts. They have talked about Kafir eer and illicit liquor, transport and housing, shack removals and nflux control, the keeping of livestock and the keeping of usbands, gambling dens and of shebeens. They have talked bout those subjects as if they mattered for their own sakes. Only here and there did the real, naked reason break to the urface—money or rather lack of it . . . The basic and ultimate eason is an economic one. The poverty of the urban Bantu; he discrepancy between his earning capacity and his cost of iving; his inability to meet the demands of modern times in a ity modelled on the Western way of life; his inability even to neet the barest necessity of life, to feed, clothe, educate and ouse himself and his family".

This is certainly the core of the matter. The sufferings of poverty are aggravated by influx control. From the European point of view, influx control is a mechanism by which Africans re "canalised" to the areas in which there is a European demand for their labour. From the point of view of Zulus living in the rural areas of Natal, influx control often denies them the opportunity to alleviate their poverty by seeking employment n the areas traditionally open to them, more particularly Durban. For many urban Africans it creates insecurity in the hreat of deportation if their labour becomes redundant or if hey are declared illegal residents in the city.

Added to poverty are the many oppressive laws and adminis-rative procedures. In Maritzburg and at Cato Manor, antagon-sm was directed against the Bantu Education Act in the burning of community schools. In the Harding area, there was resent-ment over a land resettlement scheme, which would have involved the destruction of homes. Dipping tanks were a general source of grievance, and women complained that they were obliged to give their labour for the maintenance of dipping anks without reward. There were complaints against anti-squatter laws and against increased taxation.

Yet the African people have no effective means of lightening their burdens. Deputations are of little value, save to forge

unity, and to inform the world of the disabilities of the non-whites. As Chief Luthuli, President of the African National Congress, expressed it: "a child that does not cry may die unnoticed, carried by its mother on her back". When the Director of Bantu Administration in Durban reproached the women for not having come to him with their grievances, they asked of what use deputations could be. Had the Director consulted them before demolishing their homes? The Location Advisory Boards are purely advisory, and even then, Africans complain that little attention is given to their advice.

Mr. A. W. G. Champion, Chairman of the Locations Combined Advisory Boards of Durban, commented that "the African women of Natal have demonstrated that the sufferings endured by many families cannot be described in constitutional words. It is the voice of oppressed people who have no other means of voicing their grievances before the governments of the land . . I do not blame them. I lay the blame at the door of the multiplicity of the laws and their regulations, which are harshly administered by men who do not show sympathy. Men and women in urban areas and rural areas suffer and feel the same". One of the demonstrators expressed the point more graphically. In destroying a dipping tank, the people had written a letter which the Government would read. (Report in 'Drum').

There is nothing new in the forms of action I have described—the police baton charge and the subsequent destruction of property, the beer hall picket, the stoning of buses, the destruction of equipment in the agricultural betterment schemes, the deputation to government officials; and in the past, women have played a part in this type of demonstration. The extent of their participation is however something new, the deliberate exclusion of the men, and the determination to act and to speak for themselves. This is all the more remarkable against the background of the traditional subordination of the Zulu woman, which is reinforced by the provisions of the Natal Code. An unconscious expression of subordination emerged in an interview with one of the Cato Manor women who complained that the police had beaten them. "No one has the right to beat a woman, only her husband". In this context of the almost perpetual minority status of the Zulu woman, under the guardianship of her father or her husband or husband's relative, the militant emancipation of women in these demonstrations suggests the beginnings of a suffragette movement.

This was the viewpoint of one African who laid responsibility
r it on Government and Municipal authorities. They were
eating the women like men. They issued them with separate
egistration books. "Why not both husband and wife on one
rd, seeing that they are married?" The photographers had
moved the women's headgear, which only husbands are
ntitled to do. Officials had received deputations of women
nd listened to their grievances. Men resent the new emanci-
ation of the women, according to this commentator, but they
e behind them, because it is all part of the big fight against the
hites. Since the Government treats women like men, let
em behave as such.

I also believe that we are seeing the beginning of a suffragette
ovement, but arising from somewhat different causes. In the
security of the towns, and as a result of the migrant labour
stem and influx control, the stable core of the family is often
e mother and her children. The low wages of their husbands
blige women to take on an economic role. In nursing and
aching they often earn more than their men. One can hear
e phrase—"she is a woman, but she behaves like a man", or
she is like a brother to me"—indicating the new economic role
f the women. And these new economic responsibilities are
eflected in a growing emancipation.

Interwoven with the suffragette stirrings is the liberation
ovement. The laws bear heavily on the women. They are
qually affected with the men by "canalisation" under influx
ontrol. And the impact of government control has been
rought directly to them by the registration book (pass) system.
Most politicians would have despaired of the conservative,
ubordinate Zulu women. Their level of political consciousness
ould hardly have been higher than that of many of the women
ho support the Opposition United Party. Yet in a short
me, economic circumstances and Government policies have
ombined to awaken political consciousness.

The uniformity of laws bearing equally on the urban and rural
opulation partly accounts for the rapid imitative spread of the
emonstrations. To this must be added the fact that there are
ot two economies in Natal, a Zulustan economy and a white
conomy, but a single whole. The deportation of women
om Durban, on the grounds that they were not legally entitled
live there, has helped to spread resentment and political
onsciousness into the more remote areas. The homogeneity of

the population, predominantly Zulu, is a further factor. An finally there is the suffragette aspect, the curious telepathi contagion women seem to have for each other.

The involvement of the women has meant the deeper involv ment of the men. They are embittered by baton charges again the women, by their arrest and imprisonment. They a shamed by the militant role of the women, by the imputatio that they are allowing them to fight their battles because poli action will be less violent against women than against me But above all, the woman represents the home. During th Cato Manor disturbances, the women sang "You touch wome you touch grinding stones". The militancy of the wom threatens the family hearth.

In consequence political consciousness has been heighten among the Zulu people, a remarkable development given th general political backwardness of the population of Natal, bo white and non-white. Some attempt was made to fasten respo sibility on the African National Congress. This is a convention allegation. Any disturbance must be due to Congress Communists or both, and the allegation has the function deflecting analysis away from the ideologies of the Governmen Congress disclaimed responsibility—I have no doubt personal that the demonstrations were largely spontaneous—and i mediately sought to restrain violence. It has now set itself t task of guiding the new political consciousness in constructi non-violent action along the lines of Congress policy. The ta is made all the more difficult by the introduction of the ra inexperienced cadres of the women, and the deeper emotion involvements of the men. Peaceful development toward democratic society in Natal may depend in large measure on t ability of Congress to canalise passion, under conditions of gre hardship and provocation, into disciplined and effective no violent political action.

The conflicting ideologies and programmes of the Congress Movement and the breakaway recently-formed Pan-Africanist Congress will be dealt with in the next number, when we will publish an exchange between Mr. P. Nkutsoeu Raboroko, Africanist Secretary for Education, and Adv. Duma Nokwe, Secretary-General of the African National Congress.

TRAVELS IN TRIBALISM

ANTHONY DELIUS

Political Correspondent of the 'Cape Times'

'E can modernise the tribal system'', said Chief Frank serumule's son, a graduate of Witwatersrand University. He a well-tailored, quick-witted young man, who had obviously le a deep impression on the Bantu Administration officials. g before we had met him they had kept telling us about , emphasizing his education. Now we began to see why.

'We' were a party of South African journalists, who sat ening attentively in the neat little dung-smeared courtyard the Chief's house. Behind us the massive grey boulder, siding over the mud-walled compounds, was turning pale d in the late lowveld sun. Before us the massive grey head he most impressive chief we had yet met nodded approvingly his son's solution. He had, he confessed earlier, been remely nervous of us, thinking we were some official party ne to demand God-knows-what of him—but now he was ply a splendid old man, proud of his boy. The ragged band his councillors, sitting respectfully to one side like poor tions, rustled with something like applause.

None of us quite realised at the time that we had been present he birth of another one of those phrases that so hauntingly eal South Africa's split personality. Everything on our rney through the embryo Bantustans had tended to this very. Later we were to hear it repeated by others, mainly cials. But here it came out clearly, explicitly, for the first e. In a land of ''Bantu Education'', ''foreign natives'', ird-generation temporary sojourners'' and the rest, ''moder- d tribalism'' had now arrived to join the growing family of nological crazy mixed-up kids.

This was the moment of truth in our long trek trailing clouds dust and Information Officers. If we had not been so cted by the placidity of the afternoon and the nearby sounds women setting out the calabashes of beer, we would have ped up. We would have cried out, ''That's it! That's what ps worrying us!''

ll the way up from East London, as we zig-zagged through areas scheduled by Dr. Verwoerd to become, one day, dependent Bantu homelands'', these two conflicting concepts kept troubling us, nagging at us—this ''modernisation''

and this emphasis on "tribalism". They rode with us acr the Transkei's 400 miles of hut-pimpled, wimpling grasslan over the ant-bitten or cane-bristling hills of Zululand, past lakes and spreading new forests of Northern Maputala through the alternating thorn-scrub and paw-paw groves of lowveld Reserves, and among the trees and streams of Ven land's lovely mountains.

Everywhere we had seen the continuations or beginnings dedicated though desperately understaffed attempts to turn African tribesman into a modern farmer or forester. N crops, advanced methods, irrigation schemes, inland fisher proper use and control of such small plots as they have, bet techniques of meat-raising and dairy farming, the organisatio sales and shows, all these things were being demonstrated urged upon the Xhosa, Zulu, Shangaan, and so on. It was that this effort to stimulate change was massive or even adequ but that it was stretched so far and into such unlikely place a thin, sunburnt line of technical officers struggling to hold front of a life-time's work for modernisation. Like so m Davids they faced the Goliath task of having to set up two mil tribesmen on "economic units" of land, and shifting two mil others off the land into non-existent Reserve industries "rural villages". With a dogged, surprisingly hopeful sistence, they battled on to end the old fidgeting systems of tr agriculture and the collector's passion for scrub cattle characterizes tribal ranching.

All around them swarmed the new starry-eyed Informa Officers and administrative men—babbling of chiefs, ancient colourful ethnic ways, and battles long ago. For the task these officials was to shore up a tribal society that had long b in decay, and revive the traditional authority of chiefs fa slowly but ineluctably into history.

From the start we encountered startling juxtaposition modernity and tribalism. In the big Zwelisha rayon factor the borders of the Ciskei, Xhosa workers handled looms as as the average Lancashire worker; in the modern hou scheme on the opposite hill, a doctor and a bus-owner had themselves £6,000 houses. But this hardly interested white guide and Information Officer—he lectured us on Kw Ceremony under Peddie's big milkwood tree, on the 17 diffe ways the Xhosa have of making porridge, and recited songs by youths at the Abakweta or initiation ceremonies. We h

-scale press interview with Chief Botha Sigcau, the new rime Minister of the Transkei'', and then walked outside to ch his chief Mbongo, his head Councillor, and an enthus- ic commoner crawl in the dust to kiss his boots. We visited ission hospital and found an initiation hut in the grounds— oman doctor hygenically snipped off the foreskins and then youths, attended by African male nurses, sat out their time the hospital precincts.

Probably the most charming, yet curiously heart-rending, ne we saw in this conflict was during a visit to a very modernly ipped and designed T.B. hospital just outside Umtata. ere we found the four-year-old son of a chief sitting up in bed ong other solemn and bright-eyed black infants. At the xing of an official, he sang out all the traditional praises of his er as a rain-begetter and an intermediary with the ancestral its.

Thus against a background of gathering change we listened this nagging, almost desperate insistence on tribal ways and litions. It induced odd hallucinations in us. We began to pect that the Government must consist of distant ethnologists h a vested academic interest in keeping the Reserves as tural museums, in closing up the whole tribal system in glass es as we have done with the Bushmen in Cape Town. There med something more in all this than simply a political strata- n carried to extraordinary lengths and bizarre manifestations. ethnological note, the nostalgia to preserve fully the elder s and customs of the Bantu, rose to something like a dominant me rather than a theme of domination. It reached heights n of artiness in the zig-zag screens of African design, the tract tribal symbols, and the circular 'lapas' that were to ome the junior common-rooms of the new, hastily built tu Universities. But strangest of all was to stand where old lliam Shaw, where so many fine Christian missionaries had t announced the revolutionary truths of their religion to the es of Southern Africa, and now hear a queer new evangelical our. For there was a curiously dedicated, missionary tone ut many of our official informants.

ndeed, two of our Information Officers were ex-missionaries. e was nick-named 'Swazi' and the other 'Muruti' because of ir special backgrounds. They represented the great serious- s and sincerity that the Government taps in its ethnic approach African affairs. 'Swazi' was an intense fellow with a little

goatee, a dreamer, perhaps a poet, who sang us Xhosa roundel and talked almost rhapsodically about the rustic joys of unspoi tribal life. His spiel might have been even more charming it had not been so obviously intended to demonstrate that Africans were utterly different, remote from ourselves as hun beings. 'Muruti' was a bustling, insensitively honest, muscu Christian type, always urging us onward to fresh ethnic discov with rousing cries and imperious fanfares on motor-hoote His most ardent statement to us was: "I have spoken to Ba doctors and professors and A.N.C. leaders and headmaster but I have spoken to the real élite of the Bantu in the kra They are the men of great wisdom and immersed in the ways their people".

I do not give this quotation to draw the unspoken infere that advanced education necessarily makes for wisdom amo the Africans, any more than it does among the Europeans. doubt there are aged councillors among the illiterate tribesm who become sagacious beyond their generation. But emphasis of both 'Swazi' and 'Muruti' was that modern educat was dilution of the rich fund of traditional lore, a poor, ree artificial substitute for it. The source of all wisdom for African, they seemed to indicate, was in tribal immersi "They've got to go through a process of evolution, and t begins with the tribe", we were constantly told. To s thinkers it seemed that there had been an erroneous revoluti whose effects had to be undone. Way back, busybody liber over-civilised administrators and over-zealous missionaries crashed in among and wrecked social subtleties they wotted of. Africans had to be led back to the scene of the accident, the point of the wrong turning taken under the sudden pressu of the great European intrusion.

'Muruti', for instance, gave us a lecture on the simple sense justice in every African. The Europeans would put an Afri in gaol for stealing a cow. That was futile. Gaol, to African, was like a rather rigorous holiday in a free hos A chief, in the old days, would fine the man's family village—one cow for recompense, one cow to feed the co and one cow for his own services. The next time the man s a cow he would probably get a thrashing from the chie addition to the fine. If the man committed the crime a t time, he might even disappear, pushed off a mountain-top, something equally abrupt.

''Are you suggesting a return to these methods?'' we asked.
''No, no,'' said 'Muruti', ''I'm simply saying that they have ifferent outlook on dealing with crime''.
But there was a slightly wistful note about this denial.
More daring than 'Muruti' was yet another Information ficer—an engaging young Pretoria University graduate with R.A.F. moustache. He spent some time explaining to some us in the back of a bus how tribalism should be taken to its ical modern conclusion. Each tribe should develop its own nd of Christianity. Thus each tribe would be able to make Christian ethic part of its ethnic own. (We listened to this position in respectful silence. All forebore to point out t the African needed no encouragement to start his own ticular brands of Christianity. There were already more than oo of them in South Africa. Whether they were advancing pect for the Christian ethic as a result was debatable.)
The jealousy with which the authorities protect these tribal ssessions from prying eyes was several times demonstrated for
Once our Pretoria University guide took us off the road to w us some white-painted Abakweta youths recovering from ir initiation in front of their hut. An American tourist, a mber of the Byram caravan trek, joined the straggle of rnalists down the hill-side and raised his camera with the rest.
'Are you one of these American tourists?'' demanded our rmation Officer sharply.
'Yeah . . . I . . .''
'Don't you know you are not allowed to leave the road in this ritory without permission?''
The American disregarded this greeting and took his photo-phs.
f Abakweta initiates are officially difficult to encounter, the efs are even more so. None stay alongside the road, but ide on their farms mostly tucked many miles off the beaten ck behind hills and red-tape. When we asked to see one ticularly outspoken chief, great difficulties immediately arose. there were other, bigger chiefs towards whom we were fted on dust-clouds of official approval. For these men nonstrated the progress of the great tribal revival. They od at the summit of the achievement, on the pinnacle of the vernment's most recent statistical triumph.
The beginning of the new orientation is the acceptance of a ntu Authority'. This system removes the white magistrate

to the outer orbit of the tribal system, although he is still th final authority. The chief or headman is promoted to a mor active role at the centre of the group's affairs, and is advise by a mixture of hand-picked and government-nominate councillors. Where permitted by the commissioner or magi trate, he collects taxes and levies for administration revenue ar specific projects—new schools, clinics, offices and so or ("I'm letting my chiefs collect the dog-tax this year", said or Commissioner. "Next year maybe they can bring in th personal tax".) The system of authority is pyramidal and star from just above the grass-roots level—the grass-roots themselv have a kind of power-vacuum interposed between them and th base of the pyramid. The authorities rise from district regional to territorial. Aided by his council, the chief supposed to give the sense of the popular feeling in his dete minations. Thus "the chief's decision is final"—unless, course, he happens to contradict a Government decision.

Recently the Government announced that already 80 per cen of the Reserve tribes—nearly 4,000,000 people—have accepte Bantu Authorities. What is even more astonishing is that the is not one demurring tribe in the Transkei, long regarded politically the most sophisticated of all the Reserves. Not o of the 123 districts of the area have held out against the ne system. They have made the first grand-slam territor acceptance of apartheid.

This reversion to Bantu Authorities in the Transkei is certain notable. For more than 60 years, the Xhosa-speaking peopl have been toying with more representative forms of governme than the tribal system. There the commissioners and the chi have had to deal with councils on which the majorities r presented the taxpayers. The summit of the council system w the Bunga, a debating club in which at least half the membe were taxpayer representatives. Many Bunga members could ther fore speak directly for the people. In the new Transkei Territor General Council, however, this elected element almost disappea

The puzzling fact is that the old Bunga members in 19 passed a resolution asking that nothing so primitive as the Ban Authorities system be applied to the Transkei. Yet by 1955 t Bunga members had accepted the system. We asked a leadi administrator, one who was believed to have invented Ban Authorities, why there had been such a rapid change of min "Probably they got news of how well the Bantu Authorities we

king in the Transvaal," he said.

his must have been detected by remarkable powers of antici-
on amounting practically to second-sight. When we arrived
he Transvaal, we found the most successful of the Bantu
horities there only seemed to have got going tentatively by
, two years after the Bunga switch. Of course, teams of
u Affairs Department Information Officers might simply
brought forecasts of how well things were going to go in
hin selected areas of the Transvaal. Mr. Chris Prinsloo,
f B.A.D. Information Officer, is often mentioned in back-
nd reports as having been present at meetings where a Bantu
hority was accepted—after preliminary difficulties. The
culties themselves were often great. Shootings, burnings
strong police retaliation took place in Zeerust and
ukhuneland, a Government-appointed chief was shot dead
he Ciskei, and so on. There was, and still may be, much
easantness in Tembuland. Even after the chiefs had
pted the Bantu Authority system for the Transkei, they had
ake a request to the Government for arms to protect their
ons.

'e asked a senior official in the Transkei whether it would
have been possible, instead of reimposing the tribal system
ts ethnic purity, simply to have made the councils more
esentative and given them greater local powers. He shook
ead. "An old councillor once confessed to me that in the
ears he had worked with it he had never once understood
the Bunga operated", he explained. Then he added, "the
ble with the old council system was that it was too Western,
foreign to Bantu tradition".

hief Botha Sigcau, head of the Transkeian Teritorial
hority, is a very large man with an impassive face. I would
st call him poker-faced. He reminded me, as he sat before
his natty executive's suit, of the head of a big car sales firm
y acquaintance. As his three chief councillors crept about
bobbing obsequiously and uttering muted cries of 'Bayete!',
impression grew stronger.

'e had entered his court-room by way of his office. On the
tlepiece of this ante-room stood two life-size, eye-catching
raits of Dr. Verwoerd and Mr. de Wet Nel, the Minister
Bantu Administration. Hanging shyly about in the far back-
nd was a much smaller signed photograph of the British
l Family. Whether the Chief normally kept the pictures

of the Cabinet Ministers so well to the fore, or whethe simply placed them there for official visits, I do not kn Perhaps he follows some new version of Bantu tradition, keeps them permanently there to ward off ill-luck and suc visitations.

"The Government", said the Chief, "is our Father".

There was not a word he uttered about Bantu Authorities would not have drawn enthusiastic applause from the next r had Dr. Verwoerd and Mr. Nel been there in the flesh.

We asked if there were any African National Congress activ in his area. The chief passed the question over to his councillor, rather as an ancient monarch would hand ov suspicious dish to his taster.

"We do not know the A.N.C. here", said the head counci

"What if A.N.C. members get sent back here when chief's subjects from Johannesburg are returned to his count

"We shall ask the Government to deport them—as in past", said the councillor promptly. It seemed that an good old tribal tradition was building up.

"You mean you cannot have two bulls in one kraal?" a one of us, remembering a favourite analogy used by Mr. de Nel.

"Yes, yes, that is it! We cannot have two bulls".

In the Transvaal we asked Chief Frank Maserumule's whether he did not foresee African people wanting some r representative system.

"The tribal system *is* representative", he said. "All v and interests are taken into account".

"Would you allow the A.N.C. to organise here?"

"No, the A.N.C. is too one-sided".

"But why do so many of the better educated Africans join A.N.C.?"

"They are misled".

"Before your representation in Parliament was aboli this year, why did you consistently return people to the Se and House who agreed with much of what the A.N.C. sa

"We were misled".

"Do you intend with all these new developments in Afri maintain the tribal system as it is, then?"

"No, we can modernise the tribal system", said Maserumule's son.

The technical officers believed that the restored trib

going to be of some assistance to them. "Dealing with a
ıbling society is like trying to pin down quick-silver", said
"Now we have officially definite groups to work with, and
ast one man, an effective chief, through whom to transmit
s". Whether or not it was lastingly good to restore a
l system which had so long before begun to decay, the
nical officers were too busy to consider. In any case it
ıed to them a temporary expedient. One, looking ahead
ıat distant time when his plans had produced numbers of
l peasant farmers on 'economic units' or even bigger ones,
ırked, "Of course, they'll be the first to throw off the
ority of the chiefs".

'e heard many annoyed or despairing references to the
ple's indifference to instruction, precept, prescription.
y stories were told us of how all sorts of efforts to impart
om or stimulate change had drained away into a desert of
ılar listlessness. Administrators told us that this was due
ıe old system of "spoon-feeding", and now the Government
putting everything onto a do-it-yourself basis. The
ıration of the tribal system was in itself an attempt to prime
ıumps of popular initiative. It seemed to the authorities a
hier way of organising popular dynamism than through the
.C. which the Africans themselves had begun to develop.
we discovered in the course of our journey that ex-Chief
rt Luthuli, now exiled head of the A.N.C., was one of the
organisers of modernisation in his region and had built up a
y viable cane-growers co-operative.

we went along through the Reserves we began to form a
ge impression. The people were somehow absent from
cene. Of course, there were thousands of Africans about
We met chiefs, African agricultural demonstrators, clerks,
ıers, even a radio announcer. But the people seemed
ıte from us, always at a distance. They never thrust
selves into our attention, possibly because the most thrusting
of the population, 70 per cent. of the men between 18 and
is always away earning a supplementary living among the
ı,000 Africans working on the white farms and in the cities.
few of us could speak their language. They always
ıred politely dissociated from us, busy in their languid way
other business. Chiefs, councillors, interpreters were
ıently articulate, but we were surrounded by the silence of
ommon man. The silence was eloquent too.

THE BANTUSTAN FANTASIA

JOHN NIEUWENHUYSEN

Research Fellow, Department of Commerce, University of Natal

Dr. Verwoerd is faced with two pressures which bear form ably on his policy formulation. Firstly, since his Party been the governing one for eleven years, there is a need justify the continued suppression of the non-White major Secondly, the pressure of events in Africa requires that he a front on which to fight world opinion. Both pressures l him to make a show of sincerity and achievement in the direct of apartheid.

The struggle for the control of Parliament now well truly won, the new struggle is for a more difficult and explo type of control, namely that over the sullenly suffering mas the population. For this, many unprecedented powers an great number of new legislative devices have been adopt in addition, however, a more definite front is required on wh world opinion can be fought, local opposition dealt with, through which an image of integrity and Christian-like purp can be presented to the *volk*.

This need for practical contributions to the "goal of sepa development" is nowhere more clearly evidenced than in Government's attempts to present itself as economically dev ping—and granting political independence to—the Rese (certain scattered and often individually small areas, in t about seventeen million morgen, set aside under the 1913 1936 Land Acts for exclusive African occupation).

Various pieces of legislation were rushed through last year wh are plainly intended to show that the Reserves are to be m into viable political and economic entities. There are nov be eight "Bantu national units" and four or five "Bantu colleg in terms of the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act the University Education Extension Act. In addition, the the Bantu Investment Corporation Act, which is suppos designed to promote industrial and financial undertakings in Reserves. It is as much an exercise in 'newspeak' to call an investment institution however, as it is to call the "units" self-governing, or the new "colleges" universi

Describing the objects of this new Investment Corpora in Parliament, Mr. de Wet Nel stated that they had been wo "so widely that the Corporation can serve all the interes

Bantu in those (i.e. the Reserve) areas''. The Government starting the Corporation with an initial capital of £500,000. hough this was admitted to be a small beginning, the Governnt would be quite prepared to vote new funds if this was med necessary. However, the Minister of Bantu Admination and Development added, he was ''most confident once funds and the potentialities of the Bantu himself e been mobilized, we may perhaps for a long time find it ecessary for the Government to find further sums.''

The channels into which this investment is to flow are deceply termed ''industrial, financial, and other undertakings''. e enquiring mind will ask whether any industrial or financial dertakings exist now, or are likely to exist in these areas in foreseeable future. It is very likely that the only ''underings'' worth speaking of are those which are in the distributive de, and an expansion of African participation in this direction probably only be experienced at the expense of existing ropean concerns. This change-over can hardly be said to be ronomic development'' as we understand it to-day.

The value attachable to the Act may be well judged by conering the extent of the capital sources which will be available the Corporation. These are:- 1. the Government; 2. reign or local) extra-Reserve inhabitants; and 3. Reserve abitants.

The Government's meagre £500,000 (which is about onentieth of the amount that the proposed change-over to a imal system will cost), is in any event not a new or original tment, for the money is simply to be transferred from that ount which has *already been voted* for the purchase of new serve land under the 1936 Land and Trust Act, now due to scrapped.

As far as local or foreign extra-Reserve investors are conned, we must take note of Clause 13, which *inter alia* provides t ''no dividend shall be paid to the shareholder''. With the fit motive absent, it is extravagantly absurd to expect that monies will be forthcoming. Besides this, one must take account the semi-dictatorial nature of the Corporation; e, although a so-called Board of Directors will run the itution, such is the extent of Ministerial control that these l be, in the words of an Opposition M.P., ''a board of office s''.

nvestors will not be lending money to a group of financial

experts with the chance of earning dividends; they will
lending it to the Minister for the purpose of pursuing his o
misguided aims.

As for the third group of potential investors, the Rese
Africans, a quick glance at any of the large number of authoritat
investigations into the conditions of these people and th
areas will show plainly that the amount of saving which can
expected from them is negligible.

Mr. de Wet Nel should have known better, having him
been a member of the Tomlinson Commission which iss
in 1955[1] the Government-sponsored and then Governme
snubbed "blueprint" for the socio-economic development
the Reserves.

Amongst the estimates in this Report was one which h
that the average income per family unit of a little more t
6 persons is £42 0s. 0d. per annum, when calculated by "c
ventional" national income methods. This figure is l
"adjusted" somewhat unsatisfactorily. In any event, compa
with the *per capita* income of £99 4s. 0d. for the Union
whole in 1950/51, the adjusted £12 9s. 0d. *per capita* income
the Reserves stands in sharp contrast; and Mr. de Wet N
expectations of investment from such a source are grotesque
the extreme.

The newly proposed "Bantustans" are designed to conj
up in the mind's eye multi-coloured pictures of the Ba
national homes, where the African will enjoy self-governm
in an idyllic setting of racial pride and progress. Seen aga
the grey reality of the true position in these areas, the pict
becomes considerably less vivacious. Indeed, it gives the f
lie to the possibility of such "separate development in sepa
areas".

The Reserves are imprisoned in a vicious circle. I
productivity is due to over-population, over-stocking, ineffici
farming, and the prevalence of poverty and ignorance. Pov
and ignorance are themselves powerful hindrances to progr
Poverty, besides negating investment possibilities, gives
to ill-health and inertia, which in turn lower productivity
so intensify want.

Over-population, coupled with the tribal tradition that ev
married man is entitled to land and grazing, has led to the si

[1]See "Africa South", Vol. 1. No. 2 — 'The Significance of the Tomlinson Repor
Professor D. Hobart Houghton.

where family holdings are so small that no improvement gricultural practice is possible, and the custom of "lobola"[2] s to bring about an excess of inferior and unproductive e. The small-holdings and overgrazed veld yield in- quate subsistence, so that each family seeks to augment its me by sending members of the family to work in urban s. According to the Tomlinson Report, the remittances migrants account for about half the family income. The lt is that the average African male divides his working between spells of work in the industrial centres and spells ome in the Reserves; and agricultural productivity declines further because it is the most active adult workers who go y.

he Tomlinson Report estimated that practically every able- ied African at some time in his working life leaves the erves, and that at any given time 40 per cent. of the male ulation between 15 and 64 years of age is absent in employ- t outside these areas. Labour migrants are probably nomically active outside the Reserves for over 60 per cent. heir working lives. At a generous estimate, migrant workers spend a third of their time in the Reserves working on the or maintaining their homes.

n awareness of these facts places in its correct perspective Government's talk of the potential of these areas as permanent mes" for the greater part of the present and the future ected African population.

he areas are denuded, over-populated, and at the same time rived of an able-bodied labour force. Moreover, it is likely that the continuance of the system of migratory our will emphasize this position. If it were Government cy that urban Africans could *settle* their families with them, have permanent residence with the right to own land in an areas, the Reserve position might be alleviated. A more le and so productive labour force might then have a chance of blishing itself in the Reserves.

s it is, the Government's policy of not wanting Africans to sess tenure rights in the so-called "White" urban areas s it to pursue the policy of migratory labour at all costs, that a permanent, able-bodied working population in the ntustans" becomes impossible of establishment.

may well be that current debate on the development of

[2] buying of brides, usually with cattle.

''backward'' areas has tended to exaggerate the importanc the capital factor. This may have been done for no be reason than that since the ''developed'' countries have l capital resources, the ''under-developed'' countries are sumed to require large capital resources if they are to e progress on any significant scale. · The argument ignores point, however, as Professor Jack has put it, ''that capita itself, unsupported by the requisite technical knowledge skill to use the capital, will be little effective''.

For an evaluation, therefore, of the Government's atte and proposals to develop the Reserve areas, one must not look at the pitiful sums alloted to the Bantu Administra Department, or to the ''butter-on-your-conscience'' am which goes to the establishment of the Bantu Investm Corporation from the Native Trust. One must look r closely at the people in these areas, their present position, the Government's proposals for bringing them into a mo economy of free enterprise and modern industrial organizat

The Government has burdened itself in its stated policy the contradictory aims of maintaining on the one hand a ' ditional'' or ''tribal'' culture, and, on the other, with encouragement of modernisation in the economic sph Nowhere in the Parliamentary debates, now so degraded by arrogance of Government speakers, can one find a stater which comes to grips with the problem of what type of Afr culture is envisaged as consistent with Christianity and techniques of industrial production and an exchange econo The acceptance of individualistic methods of productio implicit in their assumptions concerning industrial developm yet nowhere is it stated whether these can be incorpor into anything which can be called ''Bantu culture'', or preservation of the 'ethnic soul' which is the pulse of apart

At the outset, therefore, the Government is confronted an impossibility, namely the reconciliation of incompati and this accounts for the lack of sociological sense in its poli the numerous inconsistencies with which these policies riddled, and the startling contradictions into which they betrayed. When one sums up the factors mentioned as Gov ment policy, such as industrialisation to save the soil, buil townships, culling cattle, and technical education, it bec impossible to see how Africans will be expected to dev ''along their own lines''.

is impossible for change to a modern Western economy to ur in the context of the primitive African agricultural, social political system. For industrial development, not only is icipation in a world market required—the social and political nework which goes with the modern economy has also to be blished. The development of a modern economy, the ing of income levels, requires a change in social structure, in the individual outlook of the people concerned. And, ed, despite Government mutilations, the African people e at all times shown that this is a change which they most nestly desire.

One is led to the conclusion that all thoughts of separate elopment should have ceased abruptly with the discovery of d and diamonds in South Africa. Before then, as Professor rnlé himself has said, territorial segregation might have been arded as an equitable solution, for it would have been within realms of possibility. Before 1860, our population was a tiny fraction of what it is to-day, and we may note with fessor Frankel that the great population increase in the last years has been made possible only because, with much orted capital, "labour could be applied to an ever-increasing ent to the exploitation of natural resources in those particular ces where, on the whole, they yielded the greatest economic urns". The main consequence of the transformation which occurred since the discovery of gold and diamonds is that ated African and European economies which supported ll, scattered populations, have been replaced by the relatively ge population of to-day, which is dependent for its standard living on the highly integrated operations of a modern ustrial community. Whereas 100 years ago, the European African economy could exist alongside one another, to-day se peoples are indispensable to one another in the country ich they irrevocably share.

The Government's pronouncements may be providing it with a *ltanschauung* for purposes of display, but the delusion which it presenting is resulting in incalculable misery for the people ose present economic plight depends on Dr. Verwoerd's asure. Whilst they are now suffering what is avoidable nomic misery, the country's future is being even further pardised by this policy, whose only real investment is in the velopment of rightful bitterness and resentment on the part the African people.

THE ABYSS OF BANTU EDUCATIO

PHYLLIS NTANTALA

When the African people in the Union of South Africa oppo Bantu Education and rightly called it "Education for Slaver they little thought that so much havoc would be wrought it within so short a time. Most people thought that at le those children who had reached the fourth standard wo escape the holocaust. But it was not enough to attack the peo from below; and the Government soon opened its second fro from the top, with its Bantu Junior Certificate syllabus, introduction of the mother-tongue as a medium of instructi and—when the Bantu Matriculation syllabus was rejected as entrance qualification to the free universities—the deba education of the new tribal colleges.

The mutilation of Fort Hare and the establishment of tribal colleges are, of course, a logical conclusion of Ba Education—a fact that was ignored or played down, if forese at all, by those universities in South Africa that claim to guardians of education but which are only now awakening to dangers of Nationalist education policy for the country as whole.

On the 1st of April, 1955, the Department of Bantu Admin tration (BAD) took over African education from the Provinc without any programme and without any trained administrat staff. As was to be expected, the immediate result was cha Teachers worked for months without pay, the salaries of teach in one district were sent to teachers in another, teachers a principals never received any replies to urgent corresponden sent to the Department, and—without any regulations governi the conditions of service having been drawn up and promulgat —teachers were made to enter into contracts with their n employers. This confusion lasted two years, during which number of teachers were dismissed for opposing Bantu Educatio and many schools disestablished to be re-established in mo pliable forms. At the end of the period, eight types of scho emerged, claiming to provide:

(a) Lower and Higher Primary Education;
(b) Secondary Education;
(c) Teacher Training at Secondary and post-Matriculati level;
(d) Vocational Training;

) Night School and Continuation Classes.

) **Government Bantu Schools** are schools under the ct control and administration of the Bantu Education Depart- t and are mainly concerned with teacher and vocational ning, though they also number a few other schools situated government property. The Mission Board Schools fall under category and that is why they had to be disestablished, ring drastic changes in the process of their re-establishment. g-established co-education centres like Lovedale and St. thew's in the Cape were made single sex schools; important cational centres like St. Cuthbert's in the Transkei have to close down their primary and secondary schools.

ovedale was re-established as a school for boys only, for her-training and secondary schooling, while St. Matthew's limited to girls only, for post Std. VI teacher-training and ndary schooling. This has meant the closing down of the erent branches of learning that had been provided at both es. The whole of the Industrial Department at Lovedale for h boys and girls has had to close down, while teacher-training girls at the post Std. VI and post Junior Certificate levels has n discontinued.

At Lovedale the fine collection of books in the Cuthbert rary, one of the biggest and best school libraries in the ntry, was put up for sale; and today the former Cuthbert rary building is used as a storeroom for BAD books. The whole racter of Lovedale has been changed, Lovedale the fount and ine of education for non-whites throughout Southern Africa, ere the dreams of so many Africans have sprouted and rished. If Bantu Education was ever to achieve its aims, it imperative that Lovedale should be destroyed and all these ams uprooted. And so today, Lovedale is no more, and only shell still stands.

At St. Matthew's, teacher-training for boys and post Junior tificate teacher-training for girls have been discontinued, ether with the music courses. Teacher-training standards e thus been deliberately lowered, and Std. VI plus a three-year rse of training made the normal qualification for African chers throughout the Union. In sane education it is *quality* ner than *quantity* that counts, and if the education of the ican child is going to be worth anything at all, the standard the teaching profession has inevitably to be raised. But Bantu

Education is not sane education; its object is the lowering—
not the raising—of standards. In some schools teacher-train
and secondary education have been merged into a single compos
department under one principal and with the same staff.

Now what has happened to all these displaced girls and b
from Lovedale and St. Matthew's? Their parents were advi
sometime in August 1956, five months before these chan
were due, to find their sons and daughters accommodat
either at Lovedale or Healdtown if they were boys, or at
Matthew's or Healdtown if they were girls. But Healdto
which has always had a surge of students clamouring for adm
sion, could take only a limited number, and neither Loved
nor St. Matthew's, which have also always had long wait
lists, could accommodate the new refugees. For most of
displaced, the streets have become the classroom.

The boarding schools have deteriorated beyond recogniti
The maintenance staff, except for the cooks, have been
missed and their work given to students to do. Compuls
manual work intrudes everywhere—before and after clas
everyday; corporal punishment provides the only discipline
a whole 'gestapo' system has been introduced, by which
profiting from the poverty of the African people and th
desire for education—the authorities are offering scholarsh
to some students on condition that they spy on their fello
A letter published in '*New Age*' of May 21st, 1959, is a conf
sion from one of these victims of careful corruption. It is no
unique case; in any one institution there are usually three, f
or more of such paid spies.

Inevitably these boarding schools seethe with student
content and staff repression. In 1957, some 30 senior girls
Shawbury in the Transkei were sent home, allegedly for inciti
trouble; and towards the end of the same year, on the eve
their examinations, about 200 men students at St. John's Colle
Umtata (Transkei), were sent packing. Early in 1957, at
Ndamase Secondary School, Buntingville (near Umtata),
student was shot during a disturbance; and while the result
student trial was still in progress, the principal, who in co
had admitted firing shots to "frighten" the students, was fou
shot in his house. No foul play was suspected. At Adam's Colle
(Natal), during the second session of the school year, over 2
students were sent home in 1958; and in February of 1959, o
300 students at Lovedale (Cape) chose to go home. Such m

ulsions are not, of course, reported by the State Information ice in its circulars abroad.

2) **Community Schools** were formerly the day mission ools scattered throughout the rural and urban areas, built the various communities and handed over to the churches management. Even though they were under the management the churches on whose glebes the schools stood, it was the mmunities, irrespective of faith or sect, that had constructed l maintained the buildings through various forms of fund-sing. Now, without consulting any of these people, not even members of their congregations, some church leaders agreed lease the schools to the Government. A number of such ools in a given area were now to fall under the administration l control of a School Board, with a School Board Secretary—ne of its members to be elected by the community and others ointed by the local representative of the Government.

It is notable that, in most areas of the Cape Province, the ople have been too hostile to Bantu Education to elect the ool Boards, while many have refused to serve when appointed them by the Government. Those who are to be found serving these Boards are Government nominees and do not enjoy e confidence of the people—they know this, and the Govern-ent knows it too. In several places, however, ministers of the urch broke the people's boycott of the BAD School Boards by reeing to serve on them—forgetting no doubt that He whom ey profess to follow and serve did not find it expedient to nounce the truth for which He stood when He was faced with ath. Indignant at this betrayal, asserting their rights as com-unities and not as members of any religious denomination, the ople turned quickly against them. In Peddie, in the Eastern pe, they locked up the schools they had built with their n money and labour and told the minister-in-charge to build s own schools if he wished to hire them out to the Govern-ent. In Port Elizabeth, members of a certain church called on their minister-in-charge, who had accepted the Chairman-ip of the local Bantu School Board, to resign, reminding him at he depended on them for his livelihood. In Mt. Ayliff ast Griqualand, Cape) the people burned down the schools ey had built rather than lease them to the Government, and en told the minister who had agreed to the lease to hire out s own schools. The hostility continues and grows.

(3) **Farm Schools** exist only on farms belonging to Europea Every farmer, with the permission of the BAD, may start school on his farm for the children of his employees; he m not admit children from adjoining farms unless his neighbo have indicated in writing that they do not object to the attendan at his school of the children of their own employees. T managers of these schools are the farmers themselves or th deputies; and as a result of this comfortable and inexpensi arrangement, a large number of such schools has come in being. In the Free State, for example, there are today mo farm schools than there are government and community scho put together—544 farm schools as against 312 government a community schools. The reason is obvious—such schools provi free child labour for the white farmers.

(4) **Mine and Factory Schools** are established by t owners of the mine or factory concerned, with the approval the BAD. They must lie on the property of the mine- or facto owner and are intended for the children of *bona fide* Afric employees of the mine or factory. The owners erect the buildin and the BAD pays the teachers. As with farm schools, a mine factory school may not admit children from adjoining mines factories without the permission of their owners and the appro of the Government.

(5) **Unsubsidized Private Schools** are schools register with the Department but receiving no subsidy. These inclu the remaining mission schools (mainly Roman Catholic) whi follow the Bantu Education Syllabus and write the Bantu Edu tion examinations, and the Seventh Day Adventist Schoo which have always been independent and conduct their o examinations.

A gloomy future faces the 600 odd Roman Catholic Chur schools from which government subsidies have now been wit drawn and many of which have been refused registration. "(the 662 schools, only about 150 have received definite regist tion—subject to restrictions and withdrawal", reports t '*Daily Dispatch*', of 8th January, 1959. The newspaper th continues: "In the near future, only two of the Church's s teacher-training colleges will remain, and their degrees are n recognized by the State. The implementation of the Ban Education Act has only just begun, but its stranglehold on teache

ining institutions and secondary education will soon take its avy toll. By the end of next year, there will scarcely be any these institutions in the hands of the Church''.

(6) **Scheduled Schools** comprise a small number of schools ich for some reason or other have not been classified—like spital schools—and which, for purposes of administration, are naged by approved bodies or persons. This is not a new type of hool; many big hospitals, for example, have for years been nning schools to teach their young patients and those who nted to improve their qualifications. These schools are run groups of individuals or organizations who now and again peal to the public for funds to continue their work.

(7) **Night Schools** (8) **Continuation Classes**—The BAD ves the figures for such schools as 6 in the Northern Transvaal, in the Southern Transvaal, 5 in the Free State, 22 in Natal, 2 the Transkei and 26 in the Ciskei, Cape. But these figures were mpiled before the BAD banned private bodies from running ght Schools and Continuation Classes for Africans. In 1957, those bodies running classes for Africans were required under e Bantu Education Act to obtain the permission of the Depart- ent in order to continue: many applied at once, but no reply as received until the middle of 1958. In the Western Province, e Cape Non-European Night Schools Association—which had en running night classes for Africans and other non-whites— st four of its ten schools, all of which offered classes for fricans. When it at last resumed classes in 1958, only two anaged to continue; the subsidy applied for through the proper'' channels was not granted, and no reasons were given. The tendency throughout the country, of course, has been to nore all those bodies and persons who have been at this work r a number of years and have learnt more or less all the prob- ms involved: the School Boards which are now supposed to n the schools are not only unsympathetic, but generally norant; and the officers of the BAD are indifferent, where ot actually hostile. Just how many of these schools still exist the various Provinces—and how many have been uncere- oniously banned—only the Government knows, and it has not ublished figures. It is improbable that the publications of the ate Information Office will provide any enlightenment.

UNEMPLOYMENT BY RACE

ALEX. HEPPLE

Former Parliamentary Leader of the South African Labour Party

UNEMPLOYMENT in South Africa rose in July to the high level recorded for over twenty years. After a long period full employment, workers are again being tormented by t fear of losing their jobs. The number of registered unemploy is double what it was two years ago: in October 1957 the were 14,445 White, Coloured and Indian workers registered unemployed at all government labour exchanges; by July 195 the number had risen to 28,722.

It must be noted that these figures do not cover Afric unemployment, although Africans comprise more than h the total labour force in manufacturing industry, 90% mining, 80% in construction and 48% in transport. The offic records of unemployment take no account of African worke who are considered outside the scope of the unemployme problem for which the Department of Labour is responsibl The official records are thus grotesquely misleading—not on because they are incomplete, but because the very worke excluded are those most liable to become unemployed. Africa occupy the jobs where labour turnover is highest and whe permanency is rare.

The government of Africans falls under the control of t Department of Bantu Administration and Development; Afric workers, both employed and unemployed, are under its jur diction. Its approach to labour matters, however, is qui different from that of the Department of Labour; it does n keep the same type of unemployment register, for its intere in unemployment is one of control and discipline, not of welfare problem. It is consequently unable to give reliabl comparable figures for the number of Africans out of work, eith generally or in respect of specific industries. It cannot suppl ment the Department of Labour's monthly figures for White Coloureds and Indians, so as to provide a reliable record of t over-all unemployment position.

An estimate of the number of Africans out of work, bas upon returns from regional labour bureaux throughout Sou Africa, was released by the Chief Information Officer of the Ban Administration Department, Mr. C. W. Prinsloo, last May

[1]'Rand Daily Mail'—23rd May, 1959.

He said that reports from regional labour bureaux[2] showed that there were 95,000 Africans seeking work, "*which was a normal figure, representing about 4% unemployment*". In the absence of proper statistics, this is probably an optimistic estimate. It becomes interesting, however, in the light of the Government's constant claims that South Africa enjoys full employment.

"Full Employment"

The Minister of Labour said in Parliament on the 21st May, 1959 that unemployment at the end of April had risen to 2.06% of the working population, which was still hardly more than the generally recognized measure of "full employment", viz. 2%. He made it clear, however, that he did not include Africans in this calculation, as they fell outside the scope of his Department.

The use of partial statistics to prove "full employment" has become commonplace in the field of political propaganda and is accepted without comment by the experts who report upon the state of the nation's economy. It was not surprising, therefore, that the Minister of Labour had not the slightest compunction in taking statistical apartheid a stage further in order to present the employment position in an even better light. Speaking to a Nationalist Party Congress at Bloemfontein in September, where White party stalwarts were preparing for the Provincial Election campaign amongst White voters, the Minister said, "*The unemployment figure for July was 28,722 of whom 14,534 were Europeans, representing 1.45% of the employable Europeans. According to international standards 2.5% was normal.*"

These figures not only excluded Africans, but Coloured and Indian unemployed as well. The Minister of Labour, in applying apartheid in this fashion, was merely following his leader, the Prime Minister, Dr. Verwoerd, who bluntly stated in Parliament,[3] "*. . . in my opinion the Indians are not our problem in the first place, but the problem of those who are so anxious to take the care of the Indians on their shoulders. If other people are worried about the Indians, let them take the Indians back there, where they would have better opportunities of employment.*"

Dr. Verwoerd did not identify "those", "them" and "there." Most of the Indian workers at present unemployed are descend-

[2]Many of these bureaux are controlled by municipalities who are not required by the central headquarters in Pretoria to submit monthly returns of unemployed Africans, such as are collected by the Department of Labour in respect of workers of other races.

[3]Hansard Col. 9420—29th June, 1959.

ants of the Indian labourers brought to Natal 100 years ago at the behest of the sugar planters, who suffered an acute shortage of labour.

Unemployment Insurance

Statistical separation of the workless is the cold record of the practice of discriminating between workers of the different races. Africans thrown out of work not only lose their livelihood but find their very survival in jeopardy. Social security in the form of unemployment insurance is denied to all but an infinitesimal number of them.

Under the 1946 Unemployment Insurance Act, African workers in commerce and industry were covered in the same way as all other workers. The scheme was a contributory one but soon became unpopular amongst farmers and the mining companies. The farmers, who had been suffering a shortage of labour for some time, resented the fact that Africans in the towns could draw unemployment benefits, instead of being forced by hunger to work on the farms. The mining companies complained to the Government that: "*At a time when so many employers are in need of Native labour, it is illogical that large numbers of Natives should be able to draw unemployment benefits and live in idleness at the expense of the State.*"

At the time the mines were short of some 20,000 African underground workers. The pay offered was 2s. 8d. per day plus food and quarters, and it was a requirement that the workers should "live-in" in the special compounds provided.

One of the first things which the Nationalist Party did after coming to power in 1948 was to amend the Unemployment Insurance Act so as to exclude from the benefits of unemployment insurance all Africans earning less than a £3 10s. 0d. per week basic wage. As 90% of African workers fell within this category, the change amounted to a virtually total exclusion of Africans. Then, in 1957, the Act was re-phrased to make it clear that only those Africans earning a total wage of more than £5 3s. 3d. per week (£272 per annum), inclusive of cost-of-living allowances, qualified for membership of the Fund.

The removal of Africans from the protection of the Unemployment Insurance Act exposes them together with their families to utter destitution, and so produces pressures upon them to accept work on the farms and in the mines. These pressures are vigorously reinforced by laws and regulations

which limit the rights and opportunities of Africans to seek work. They are not free to go from factory to factory, from town to town, from one area to another in order to look for employment.

Once out of a job, an African becomes the pawn of the local labour bureau, to which he must report within 72 hours. There he is issued with a permit to seek work, for a limited period and only within the magisterial area where he is registered. The purpose of this control is to ensure a regular supply of cheap, disciplined labour. It was conceived a long time ago—long before the Nationalists ruled South Africa. It has been defined by the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development, Mr. de Wet Nel, with patriarchal simplicity in these words:[4]

"*There will always be thousands of Bantu on the Whites' farms, in the mines, in industry and also as servants in the Whites' homes . . . They will be there not as a right, but at the bidding and by the grace of the Whites. At best, they will be visitors in the White area.*"

In practice, this means that Africans cannot expect the protection of social security measures in the White (i.e. urban) areas. As long as there is work for them, they are welcome; but once they fall victims to unemployment, their presence becomes objectionable. Dr. Albert Hertzog, one of the Government's specialists in labour affairs and now Minister of Posts and Telegraphs, emphasized this relationship between unemployment insurance and labour control when he said,[5] "*. . . this must be seen from the point of view of the Government's whole policy of apartheid . . . (which) means that Natives are no longer to be allowed free and unhampered entry into the cities . . . and means that there need not be a single unemployed Native in the city.*"

The Racial Remedy

In tackling the problem of unemployment, racial considerations are of prime importance to the South African Government. While it would prefer to see the entire population gainfully employed, the Government believes that when there is not enough work for all, steps must be taken to ensure that Whites receive preference in the allocation of jobs.

A somewhat crude long-term plan has been devised to give effect to the racial priorities of the ruling political party; and this doctrinaire solution to the unemployment problem expresses

[4] Addressing the Nasionale Jeugbond—5th September, 1955.
[5] Hansard Col. 6798—1st June, 1949.

the real spirit and intent of the racial policy now being peddle at home and abroad as "separate development". It falls int three parts: (i) job reservation on racial lines; (ii) deportatio of "foreign" Africans; and (iii) farm and mine work for Unio Africans.

In terms of the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1956, th Minister of Labour has power to reserve jobs for workers c racial grounds alone and make it a criminal offence for worke of one race to perform work which has been reserved f members of another. Several such decrees have already bee issued, affecting employment in the clothing, building, enginee ing and transport industries, where a number of jobs have bee reserved for White workers only.

As unemployment grows, so will job reservation. If th situation becomes serious, the Government is determined th the main burden should be carried by the non-Whites. If ther are to be long unemployment queues, the Government hop to keep as many Whites as possible out of them.

The State-owned railways, which at the moment are exper encing some slackness, have begun to get rid of non-Whi employees. During the recent session of Parliament, the Ministe of Transport, Mr. B. J. Schoeman, stated,[6] "*Where it is foun that there is a job being temporarily done by a Native that a Whi man can do, then the White man is placed into that job.*" The Natio alist Member of Parliament for Vasco, Mr. C. de Villiers, boaste at a Party meeting on the 3rd September, 1959[7] that "*durin the past year, 13,000 non-Whites were ousted from the Railway in keeping with the policy of the National Party to protect the Whi worker.*"

The second part of the Government plan to combat unemplo ment is also discriminatory, placing Union Africans in a differe category from those who have come from Nyasaland, Basut land, Swaziland, Bechuanaland, and other parts of Africa. Ma of these "foreign" Africans are already being deported; a only those working in the mines or on farms are being allowe to remain.

The Prime Minister, Dr. Verwoerd, feels very strongly th workers from outside the country are an unnecessary burde for he said in Parliament:[8]

[6]Hansard Col. 2443—12th March, 1959.

[7]'Evening Post'—4th September, 1959.

[8]Hansard Col. 9420—29th June, 1959.

"We are still saddled with approximately 400,000 foreign Natives, o are not our concern and responsibility. If those Natives were to be shed out of South Africa—because preference must be given to Union itives when there is unemployment—then there would be no suggestion unemployment amongst Union Natives."

A peculiar situation would develop in international affairs the Prime Ministers of other countries adopted this extra-rdinary attitude towards workers who had immigrated into eir territories. What would happen, for example, if the Prime inister of Australia, faced with an unemployment problem, ddenly declared that the Hollanders, Germans and English-en who had flocked there and helped boost production in good nes, were no longer Australia's concern and responsibility? A month before Dr. Verwoerd's statement to Parliament, the hief Information Officer of the Department of Bantu Adminis-ation declared that large-scale unemployment among Union fricans would not eventuate, "*because the 750,000 foreign Bantu w working in the Union could, and would be moved to make way for employed Union Africans.*"[9] The Minister of Labour claimed the 2nd October, 1959[10] that, since coming to power in 948, the Nationalist Government had deported no less than 00,000 "foreign" Africans.

If this is correct and a further 750,000 are to be deported, the resent government will have succeeded in expelling more than ne-and-a-half million Africans from South Africa. Surely this ust rank as one of the major feats of mass removal in history. The policy of deporting "foreign" Africans is likely to ewilder thoughtful people who take note of the persistent mplaints of shortages in mine and farm labour. The contra-ction can be explained by the general belief amongst Whites at if every Union African could be compelled to work, there ould be no shortage of labour anywhere in the country. The nemployment Insurance Act was bitterly resented precisely ecause it ran contrary to the traditional policies for the control d direction of African labour; the very idea of Africans drawing nemployment pay was regarded as outrageous by most Whites. Despite the stringent control exercised over the influx of ral Africans into the towns, in order to bind them fast to the ral areas, there is a chronic shortage of unskilled farm labour. nd the mining industry, which enjoys special facilities in the

[9] Rand Daily Mail'—23rd May, 1959.
[10] Die Transvaler'—3rd October, 1959.

employment of Africans and draws vast supplies of migrant labour from the rural areas and the neighbouring African territories, experiences persistent difficulty in maintaining an ample supply of unskilled African labour.

In promising to give Union Africans the jobs now held by "foreign" Africans, the Government is in fact telling the Africans that their future lies in farm and mine work. "Surplus" Africans will be removed from the urban areas and made available to the farmers and mining companies. There are sufficient laws on the Statute Book to make this a simple task.

An African qualifies for permanent residence in an urban area only if he has been there continuously since birth, or has legally lived there for an unbroken period of fifteen years, or has worked for the same employer continuously for ten years. In addition, he must possess the further qualification of never having been sentenced to a fine exceeding £50 or to imprisonment exceeding six months.[11]

As unemployment spreads, those who fall out of work or are displaced by the application of job reservation will be deemed to be surplus to White needs in the urban areas and summarily ordered to leave. Steps will be taken to remove them from the towns to the rural areas or Reserves, where they can be induced to sign contracts of service with farmers or with the mining companies as migratory labourers.

In terms of the Natives (Urban Areas) Act, any unemployed African is exposed to the danger of being declared "an idle or undesirable person", to be thereupon sent to a work colony unless he agrees to accept work with an employer (usually a farmer) approved by a Native Commissioner or Magistrate. As Dr. Albert Hertzog knowingly said, "*there need not be a single unemployed Native in the city*".

Will the Government solve its unemployment problem by applying its racial remedy?

The possible economic effects cannot be examined here although they are obvious. The simple expedients of job reservation and mass removal are bound to shrink the internal market and invite boycotts in the export field.

Remedies of this kind can have nothing but harmful effects upon industry and trade. Nevertheless, they are already being applied; and thousands of workers are already suffering their effects.

[11]The maximum penalty for taking part in a strike is £300 and 3 years' imprisonment

THE ETHICS OF BOYCOTT

DAVID MILLER

One could not help remarking, during the last few months, that ertain Nationalist spokesmen have shown an admirable concern or their non-white subjects. Referring to the action of the maican government in refusing to buy S.A. goods, Mr. Eric ouw roundly condemned the boycott as an unethical means of oercion which all decent people must regard with distaste. le, and many another pious Minister, warned that such mon- rous action, which constitutes in any case interference in the omestic affairs of a sovereign state, would react upon the very eople whose cause the Jamaican government is concerned to spouse.

All up and down the country admonishing fingers have waggled ke twigs in the breeze, warning of economic hardship that ust follow; and though one normally reacts only with suspicion hen Nationalists champion human causes, the second part of ie argument at least is so plausible as to require some examina- on.

To begin with, is the boycott unethical? Here one should orrect a misconception. It is a fallacy to regard the technique f boycott as a rare or extreme form of economic sanction or olitical protest. It is, on the contrary, one of the most wide- read and inescapable features of our economic life. Consider ie following hypothetical case: I have been planning a tour of urope and I am concerned to limit its cost. I elect, after due nsideration, to include England, France and Italy in my inerary. Shall I include Switzerland? I investigate the rate of xchange and find that it operates heavily in my disfavour. decide that, despite its many attractions, I shall not visit the ountry until its rate of exchange becomes more favourable. In every sense of the word, I have decided to boycott the urist industry of Switzerland. My reason for doing so is no ss precise for being implicit; it is to induce the Swiss govern- ent to reduce the high price of tourism in its country. If the xternal revenue from tourism is an appreciable proportion of otal revenue and if the tendency to shun Switzerland is fficiently widespread, the Swiss government will in due course e compelled to devalue the Swiss franc or take other steps to ompensate the bad rate of exchange, and the object of the

boycott will have been achieved.

It does not make any difference to the principle involved th there has been no formal call to boycott. The agreement to d so may be tacit; the boycott remains a fact.

And this form of boycott occurs daily; it is an approved mean of exerting economic pressure to a given end. No one wou question the ethics of such action, nor ever has.

But let the matter not rest there. Suppose that I learn th YOU are planning a trip overseas and I say to you: "Whatev you do, avoid Switzerland like the plague. The exchange ra is prohibitive, and it will cost you the earth!"

Now I have not stopped at the mere act of boycott—I am no inciting you to boycott too. I have asked or induced you t join me in protest, and although the end at which I aim is sti purely economic, the means I employ have become quas political. My opposition has become explicit; the means employ have invoked elementary organisation; I have witting or unwittingly taken the first step towards a 'Boycott Switzerlan movement.

Once again this sort of action is a common everyday occu rence; people repeatedly embark upon such rudimenta campaigns, and no one would dream of questioning the eth of even this extended action. Yet it has been the repeate thesis of government and business spokesmen alike that th boycott as such is bad in principle, is ethically reprehensibl and so on.

This point of view seems to rest then not upon the act boycott, but upon the end towards which it is directed. The have in recent years been frequent and organised calls to boyco in South Africa—for example, the National Council of Women call to women to boycott nylon stockings—which have n upset the delicately balanced ethical sense of the powers that b presumably because the object of the boycott has been pure economic, i.e. a protest directed against unsatisfactory quali or price.

Perhaps then, a boycott is 'bad' only when the end as well the means is political? But is it always possible to distingui between these two ends? Returning to the example of Switze land, suppose that the boycott, whether individual or organise whether implicit or explicit, is designed not as a protest agai the unfair rate of exchange, but as a protest against inadequa wages paid to workers in the Swiss cheese industry.

The object of the boycott is again clearly defined—to induce he Swiss manufacturers to pay their workers a higher wage. uppose that here in South Africa the boycott is organised on wo fronts:—

(*a*) by the trade union movement, which is concerned with the plight of workers everywhere, and

(*b*) by the Union government!

es, indeed, by the Union government, for the Union govern-ient does frequently indulge in boycott! Of course they do ot call their action "boycott", what they say is something like his:

"In view of the fact that the Swiss manufacturers, by main-aining a level of wages lower than the norm, are able to compete nfairly with the local industry, an *ad valorem* tariff of 150% hall henceforth be levied against Swiss cheese". And Dr. Dönges, Minister of Finance, will smile nicely at the cameramen nd preen himself on having done his patriotic duty.

Of course, apart from the difference in the technique em-loyed, the objects of the two groups are not identical: the overnment is primarily concerned with the price of cheese; he trade union with the wages of workers. But in fact, the ifference is not as great as would appear superficially, for both re really concerned with price, the one with the price of cheese, he other with the price of labour, and if the one motive is economic' then the other is 'economic' too.

At this stage, the Swiss authorities would hit upon a nice point. On the one hand, they say to the government of the Union, 'How foolish is your action! By raising a high tariff, you are ompelling me to reduce my price still further; and I will hen not only be able to compete with you again on your domestic narket, but in the export field I will be enabled to knock your heese off the market entirely!" And to the trade union they night well say: "By refusing to buy our cheese, you are causing recession in the industry which will force us to reduce wages till further and even to shut down our factories, thus creating nemployment."

This argument of course is not altogether groundless. The oycott of German goods in pre-war years may, if it had been t all effective, have inflicted hardship on good and bad Germans like. Similarly, should the Congress boycott directed at ertain firms cause their financial collapse, Africans employed y them will suffer hardship. The broader the terms of the

boycott, too, the broader the ranks of those who might suffer as a consequence. Suppose the hypothetical boycott to be directed not only against Swiss cheese, but against all Swiss products; then, if those groups conducting the boycott represent a large proportion of the export market, the Swiss people—those workers whose low wages touched off the campaign—might suffer real poverty.

This is so, but consider three points. Firstly, it is universally accepted that sacrifice towards the achievement of some good in the future is proper in a virtuous community. For example, Mr. de Klerk, in reserving the work of liftmen exclusively for Europeans, might calm the Africans who are about to lose their jobs, with the words, "Be patient now, it is for your own good. You will be doubly rewarded in the future by attending your own skyscrapers in Bantustan!"

Secondly, implicit in a decision to boycott, or to take any sort of political action, is the choosing of an acute hardship of comparatively short duration in preference to chronic hardship with little prospect of alleviation. Those boycotters who chose to walk between Alexandra Township and Johannesburg morning and evening during the bus boycott had clearly shown just such a preference and were suitably rewarded in their choice.

Thirdly, inseparable from an act of opposition is an element of risk; the more determined the opposition, the greater the risk involved. The crux of the matter is that the risks involved are calculated. If by the agency of the boycott, both domestic and foreign, the people of South Africa are made to suffer acutely, the blame lies with the Nationalists whose policies have been and will be, for as long as they continue, the cause of the chronic hardship which burdens the bulk of the population of the country. The people of South Africa know very well that only when the Nationalists are finally removed from office, will an end to hardship be in sight. In the meanwhile, once again faced with the choice of acute hardship of measurable duration or chronic hardship induced by the policies of those who profess to be so concerned with the effects of protest, the non-whites are unlikely to hesitate long in choosing the temporary rigours of the boycott.

JACOBUS AND THE BARRICADES

ARNOLD BENJAMIN

Staff of the Argus Africa News Service

rly this year a reporter was sent to Johannesburg's Non-uropean General Hospital to check on Kangweni Singwo, a ven-year-old African boy who had caused a little to-do in the itish press. In a photograph captioned "The Picture that ocked South Africa", the child's inert form was shown lying the road where he had been run over by a car—while an ruffled policeman, instead of getting him to hospital, proceeded ith his official task of taking measurements.

In the rumpus that resulted, the authorities claimed at first at the boy was dead when the picture was taken. The reporter as sent to the hospital to produce the evidence that Kangweni ngwo was still very much alive. And while he was there he umbled across a story that shocked South Africa much more.

Another young African boy, in the same ward for a tonsil-ctomy, had a regular visitor each day—an elderly white man ho brought him sweets and presents and kissed him goodbye ter each visit. It turned out that the boy was his "adopted n". The old man and his wife, a wealthy Afrikaner couple, ere bringing him up as their own on their fruit farm outside hannesburg. The boy, Jacobus, slept in their bedroom, ate their table, even went visiting with them. Unable to adopt m legally, they had left him £2,000 in their will; planned to nd him, after he had finished school, to train as a missionary the Dutch Reformed Church.

It was an amazing story, and "Oom Thys" and "Tant hanna" Heyneke were persuaded with not too much difficulty reveal it. Both simple and devout church-people, there was othing cranky about them. They said they had similarly dfathered the education of several other African youths for e church. But for nine-year-old Jacobus, "given" to them ven years ago by one of their farm servants, they had developed special fondness. "The little fellow is shy with strangers," ey said, "but we have taught him not to be embarrassed by is colour." What reaction did all this have on their fellow-hites? "We have lost some friends," the Heynekes said.

After this they nearly lost Jacobus as well. The unheard-of ory, with pictures to prove it all, made a nine-days' talking

point in Johannesburg. Behaviour like that from a white ma
and an Afrikaner! Inevitably the Heynekes began to ge
abusive letters and 'phone-calls. It seemed that the Grou
Areas and a fistful of other Acts could be invoked to put paid t
such non-conformity. Then gradually the furore settled down
and the curtain closed on this curiosity of South African life

A freak, certainly—but also a convenient jumping-off poin
for some interesting questions. Is colour prejudice alway
going to remain the implacable force in South Africa we suppos
it to be? Liberals have always assumed that it would take
revolution in white thinking, more than any other kind, t
establish a harmonious multi-racial society here; some impossibl
brain-washing of an entire nation. "The Afrikaners woul
rather die than accept social integration," we have always tol
each other. How true is this? Is it not just conceivable tha
prejudice may be growing weaker and not stronger, as events i
South Africa move to their 20th-century climax?

These are questions, not assertions. The continent is in suc
a state of flux today that it is hard to be certain about anything
What *is* certain is that the Union is not remaining immune t
these changes. On the political surface, yes: we remai
static in the face of the great African face-lift. But other form
of change have been affecting the Union as surely as anywher
else.

Today's South Africa can boast what is perhaps the mos
elaborate legal machinery ever devised for keeping two section
of a single community apart. It is not remarkably efficient, a
machines go. Inexorable social, economic and human law
keep clogging up the works.

At one end of the scale, apartheid is made a monkey of ever
day by the Coloured who "plays white", by the African wh
takes a drink, by the man who beats the pass laws throug
remaining illegally in a white area. At the other end, the mos
sacred colour taboo of all is flouted persistently despite heav
criminal sanctions.

Sex relations are reputed to be the last sticking-point of colou
prejudice. White liberals, otherwise sanguine about fu
integration, sometimes confess to a shamefaced doubt whethe
they, personally, would care to go to bed with an African. Bu
the whites who regularly come before the courts on Immoralit
Act and "black rape" charges seem troubled by no suc
inhibitions. Mostly, from the names, they are Afrikaners

morality prosecutions have become so frequent that the utch Reformed Church in the Cape has appointed special ommittees "to fight this evil." (The contraventions, not the ct).

There ought to be even more alarm and despondency over the es that get away. In parts of white Johannesburg, elegantly oomed black prostitutes ply their trade more or less openly r whites. And just over the Mozambique border—where morality is just immoral, not illegal—there are more examples. nce you have seen ordinary white South Africans in the dives Lourenço Marques, fraternising with the mulatto hostesses d enjoying a holiday from the Union in every sense of the ord, you are bound to change your ideas on Africa a little.

White and black may travel in their segregated trains from eir segregated living areas, pass through their separate station ntrances. But after that, they are walking the same streets, orking in the same factories and offices, spending the same oney in the same shops. All the time this means contact—rubbing together which may lead to friction, but also to an evitable exploration and discovery. No whites and few fricans can avoid it today.

All the time the African is becoming more like those he serves, cquiring Western tastes and interests, gaining new knowledge nd confidence. Not even the blindest of whites can fail to otice these changes, and how spectacular they have been over e last decade in particular. Outwardly they make him irritble and uneasy. Deep down, he may be learning and changing s well.

Certainly once profits get directly involved, the white boss suddenly stung out of his torpor. The last two or three ears, years of boycott and strikes, have seen his first uneasy wakening. Chambers of Commerce and Industries have paid eir first serious attention to the voice of the A.N.C.; they re spurring their members to pay better wages, to *talk* to their orkers and find out their views. The white employer who, fter ten years, calls his tea-boy in to ask him how he feels bout the 'stay-at-home' is unlikely to get a straight answer; ut at least it is an attempt, a start.

# # # #

So much for the long-term war of attrition on the frontiers of hite exclusiveness. In one or two fields there has already

been something of a spectacular frontal assault. One is ja music—the same point at which Negroes made their first b break into the white man's world in America.

Quite suddenly, the best jazz in South Africa today is played b Africans. "King Kong", the first African jazz opera, playe for many months this year to some 80,000 Europeans in fou principal cities of the Union. With music by an African, ar starring the cream of local non-white entertainers, it created sensation wherever it went. The critics raved, in both Englis and Afrikaans; the tunes headed the record hit parade for mar weeks; the queues for seats were the longest in memory.

This impact is worth analysing a little. Part of it was th novelty of seeking black faces on a hitherto all-white stage there were the heavily patronising ("Aren't they sweet?") an the sentimental ("Let's give them a jolly good hand.") Bu the real acclaim, it is clear, came from those who sat up sudden with surprise to enjoy the show on its merits—notably th astonishing vigour and drive with which it was performed A straight human contact was established across the footlight a gap opened in the cultural colour bar.

All of which may sound pretty tenuous, but if you were in "King Kong" audience you could not miss it—a deep warmth an excitement and sense of discovery. It was a unique an historic thing to happen on such a mass scale in the Union.

Sport was another break-through point for the Negroes i America; and here, too, things are starting to move in Sout Africa. I remember the shock only seven or eight years ag when the news leaked out that Vic Toweel, South Africa world bantam-weight champion, had been knocked out in trai ing by an African, "Slumber David" Gogotya. Discoverin that the idol boxed with blacks seemed to cause as much publi alarm as the fact that he had been toppled. Today it is an ope secret that every white boxer of note in Johannesburg use non-white sparring partners; the sessions are still supposed t be held behind closed doors, but nobody troubles much t enforce this.

The peculiar absurdities of sports apartheid have long bee manifest. Official white teams compete against all and sundr outside the Union, but a champion like Jake Tuli has to do a his fighting overseas. Now, with half-a-dozen internationa bodies threatening boycott of the Union, white sportsmen ar becoming resigned fairly quickly to impending changes in th

d order. Rather multi-racial sport—to a nation that loves ort even more than it loves politics—than no international ort at all. If not for the special toughness of Government licy on this point, probably a start would already have been ade in the Union by now.

# # # #

To return for a moment to jazz. It is interesting to note at African capabilities were first discovered, a good few years fore "King Kong", by a rather unlikely bunch—Johannes-rg's lower-class white teenagers and ducktails (the local brand juvenile delinquent.) It was they who brought the word *wela*' into English usage—together with other bits of African got—long before it became a popular dance craze. It is ey who are the most appreciative audience at any jazz concert at happens to be given for whites. Jazz-happy, hand-clapping, omping, yelling encouragement, they appear troubled least of l by the colour of the performers. Much the same thing ppens whenever black and white jazzmen get together in a session". For the time being the common absorption over-des all barriers.

Crowds of long-haired, long-jacketed youths would turn up at e "King Kong" stage door, wanting autographs and a word ith the performers. Others would sometimes have to be eared from the orchestra pit, where they had infiltrated for a at about jazz and perhaps a spot of quick improvisation with e players.

The remarkable thing, of course, is that these are teenagers the lowest white classes, the group we have always supposed be the most prejudiced and vicious of all. There is certainly one of the liberal's fuzzy sentiment involved here, probably ttle conscious thought at all; they come simply to hear the st jazz going, and it leads in the most natural way to social tercourse with those who make it.

The strolling penny-whistle bands that play in Johannesburg's hite suburbs invariably collect a small crowd of Africans and ten set an impromptu kwela session going in the street. hite suburbanites watch from a tolerant distance. But the duckies" are apt to be right in the middle, and occasionally—zz being a sociable religion—carried away by the rhythm, d with no white "sheila" handy, they have been known to ize any African girl who happens to be around and dance with er.

There is a bunch of such youths that goes out on Sundays to the huge Government township of Meadowlands, complete with motor-bikes and molls and leather jackets, for a multi-racial kwela session and party. And the most liberated society I have ever heard of in South Africa is the crowd that used to meet regularly at a house in Bertha Street, Sophiatown (since demolished) for an all-week-end party. It consisted of white ducktails, black *tsotsis*—who had commandeered the place in the first instance—and some Indian and Coloured equivalents. The whites used to supply the liquor, the non-whites the dagga, and there was some loose mutual arrangement about girls.

This instance, of course, takes us well into the underworld, where there has always been a notable absence of race barriers. A common disregard for the law and a common way of life transcend them easily.

When it comes to the less disreputable white teenagers, one can find various explanations. They are attracted by the vitality and gaiety of African city culture, the casual way it merges with the underworld. They are in rebellion against the other restraints of society, so why not the racial one too? And of course there is the great unifying influence of hot jazz.

But it is still a most remarkable phenomenon, this instinctive belonging across the colour-bar. How did those jazz-happy teenage fans talk to the African players? I asked one of the white liberals who staged "King Kong." Did they seem to get on and feel at home with them? "More so than us," he answered.

# # # #

I think the truth we may discover at some not-too-distant day is that Afrikaner and African have a lot more in common than we might think; that the relationship between them even now is a curious two-faced one alternating between hate—I say this with all due circumspection—and a kind of love. Often there is a strange rough companionship between them—in the way they can talk and joke with each other, in a similar way of thought. Certainly the unsophisticated majority of Afrikaners share this understanding. There are the Afrikaners who go to witch-doctors for cures, and those who wait in the country surgery of Dr. J. S. Moroka for consultations. Even in the police force the bond persists. A recent newsreel showed a senior officer actually *shaking hands* with the non-white police to whom he was presenting medals.

ne two races have roughly similar backgrounds, after all. are vigorous pastoral peoples still coming to grips with the ness of city life, still not far removed from the soil. Each been going through the throes of its own crude nationalism. talk the same sort of language.

Writers like Sampson and Van der Post have remarked on this ge bond between oppressor and oppressed. It is a relation- which usually excludes the English South African; partly use he feels himself less native to the country, partly I ld suggest because of his lingering Englishness. Though his ical attitudes may tend to mild humanitarianism, his l ones are still overlaid with some ideas of class and breeding cultural attainment. He may be harder than anyone to nilate in the new South Africa.

ou might find straight antagonism among the Afrikaners, but snobbery. The leaders of Afrikanerdom remember that l segregation has not always been part of the local ery; a million Coloureds are sufficient reminder of that. after all is the driving fear behind apartheid, the fear of act. Hence the severity of the laws to prevent it. Not laws can make a good job of it; hence the final desperate of total separation and the Bantustan dream. The leaders see no middle way, and they are probably right.

one more pointer to the future, we ought not to forget Nationalist "liberal revolt"—still for the most part a pain- guarded semantic rebellion, but slowly assuming signifi- e. Afrikaner professors and some of their students are ng openly about the "human rights" of Africans. So is Government, as part of the "new thinking" about Bantu- . How much *this* means is, of course, another matter; ient that it at least has the rank-and-file of the *volk* a little used.

eanwhile we must reckon as decided progress even such nt of multi-racial tea-drinking—whether of the drawing- or round-table variety—as has been done lately by Afrikaner ectuals in their "consultations" with non-white leaders. years ago—or even two or three—it would have been nkable.

t us remember too the increasing discomfort being caused ne pressure of events elsewhere in Africa. These are cal and economic pressures principally, but also social ones. ne memorable occasion at least we have officially accom-

modated a visiting Ghanaian dignitary in the best hotels Johannesburg and Cape Town. This V.I.P. treatment was Government instructions—and complete with "white" liqu

In any event I believe there still remains in the Union toda all things considered, a miraculous amount of goodwill betwe the races. You can see it in a hundred small ways in the Cap where the old easy-going traditions still cling, and even in t rough-and-tumble of the Rand. For most of this tolerance not all—we have to thank the almost indecently good spir which the average African seems to preserve. If they can ke it up a while longer, further miracles may not be impossib

The curious and touching case of Oom Thys Heyneke and African "son" can be written off as an isolated eccentricity. is still notable as a cross-current in the highly fluid sub-surfa of life in South Africa in 1959. Dying on the barricades m sound all very fine in the abstract, as a rallying-call to threaten white mastery. When it comes to the push, living on is sur a better idea; how much more preferable to extinction, sim to let the barricades fall.

DEVLIN IN SOUTHERN RHODESIA

TERENCE RANGER

Lecturer in History at the University College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland; Co-Editor of the Rhodesian broadsheet, "Dissent"

ASUAL observer might be forgiven for supposing that Southern odesians had taken very little interest in the Devlin Report. Edgar Whitehead has made no comment upon it; neither has Roy Welensky; nor has the Opposition; nor, even, has that ative elder statesman, Lord Malvern. The Southern Rho- an Assembly has not debated it; nor has the Federal Assembly. public has maintained an almost equally complete silence. re have been a few letters to the Press; but not nearly as y as were provoked, for instance, by the cost of living con- ersy or by the need for level crossings on the railways. Yet impression of indifference is a false one. Rhodesians feel strongly about the Devlin Report—perhaps too strongly trust themselves to talk about it.

his emerges from the editorial comment of the various spapers. The right-wing *Citizen* was the most outspoken in condemnation. It described the Report as "worthless rub- " produced by "nosey parkers steeped in the tradition of a which would rather free nine guilty men than convict an ocent one". The more restrained comment of other papers ck a similar line of criticism of the "precise distinctions" wn by the "legalistic" and "donnish" Commissioners. "It uld have been cold comfort", wrote the *Rhodesia Herald*, r the relatives to inscribe on the tombstone: 'Here lies n Citizen, died March 1959, not the victim of a massacre t but a loose plan'." The *Central African Examiner*, while nding "no criticism of the Commissioners", summed up general reaction of the Southern Rhodesian Press: "Most ple with any long experience of Africa who take the trouble tudy the facts in the Report will, we believe, draw the con- ions so far as the murder plot is concerned, that Sir Robert his Government drew, rather than those drawn by the mmissioners".

he attitude of the Southern Rhodesian Government to the lin Report has to be deduced less directly. The chief clue ms to be the publication of the Beadle Tribunal Report. Beadle Tribunal was set up under the Preventive Detention to review the continued detention of some 100 Africans

after the end of the Southern Rhodesian emergency and to ma
recommendations on each case to the Government. They we
not appointed to make a report; their proceedings were by l
secret in order to protect Government informants; they we
under no obligation to examine the general Southern Rhodes
situation. No report of any kind was anticipated—the most t
was expected was a Government statement to a secret session
the Southern Rhodesian Assembly on any case where the Gove
ment had decided not to accept the recommendations of
Tribunal. Much to the general surprise, however, the Bea
Tribunal presented a report to the Government and that rep
was published. It was hard to escape the conclusion that
Beadle Report was intended to be a counter to the Dev
Report. And this impression strengthened when it was noted t
the Beadle Report devoted some 6 of its 32 pages to an eval
tion of Dr. Banda's reliability as a witness. Dr. Banda's evide
before the Tribunal was of very little significance to its wo
this detailed appraisal seemed to have no meaning unless it
intended as a contrast with the Devlin Commission's attitu
to Banda.

Although the Beadle Tribunal's findings differed from
findings of the Devlin Commission only on this point of Banc
reliability and although its report could not in any way
compared with the Devlin Report in length or depth or imp
tiality, it was generally hailed in Southern Rhodesia as in so
sense an "answer" to the Devlin Commission. This came
very clearly in the debate on the Beadle Report in the South
Rhodesian Assembly. Mr. Aitken-Cade, then Leader of the Opp
tion, congratulated the Tribunal for having "cut . . . (
Banda) down to size", and continued: "Another point t
emerges is the difference between an informed Tribunal, bas
its opinion on local knowledge and on the local scene, an
Commission that does not have that advantage". Mr. Pichani
the U.F.P. member for Highlands, made the contrast even m
explicit: "When a previous report was published", he s
"the whole of the Press overseas and the local Press, and
broadcasting authorities and the television and everybody
fact, made tremendous fuss of this Report. Now what
happened as a result of the publication of this Report . . .
Beadle Report) . . . simultaneously in this country and Lond
There has been no comment whatsoever that I have seen in
local Press coming from overseas papers. It is significant

nce must mean something. It must mean that they are izing that the findings of this Commission have brought out ething that another commission could never find out. The on is that the standing and reputation of this Commission is ond question. It means this, that they understand the mentality he African, but people who come from overseas, no matter long they stay, can never really get to the back of their ds the mentality of the African''. The clear suggestion is that can accept either Devlin or Beadle, but not both, and that dle would have come to very different conclusions about saland than those reached by Devlin.

What is the explanation of this rejection by public and tician alike of the Devlin Report? Why has it become an cle of Southern Rhodesian faith that there was a massacre plot Nyasaland and that Banda was implicated in it? The general lic, it would seem, believes in the massacre plot because it ts—because it needs—to believe in it. It has not, in most s, read either the Devlin Report or the Nyasaland Govern-t's White Papers. It believes not because of the overwhelming s, but because a massacre plot seems more likely on the of it than no massacre plot. The allegation that Congress planning mass murder fits in with the stereotype of African aviour that many Europeans have constructed for themselves. attitude of these Europeans found an ugly expression in the *ly Mail's* leading article of August 23rd. The *Mail* asked why cans in Natal had destroyed clinics, schools, dipping tanks so on. ''We believe'', its editor wrote, ''that the answer is e found in the people themselves—the Bantu, not only in l, but throughout the sub-continent. For what has happened atal has had its parallel in Nyasaland, in Uganda, in the Congo. ll these places the mob, once excited, picks, almost as its ber one objective for destruction, all those things which are he benefit of the African. . . . Had drastic action not been n in Nyasaland, missionaries would almost certainly have slaughtered. . . . But looked at over a broad canvas it is ssible to avoid the conclusion that what the Bantu as a le is seeking is not an opportunity to advance or to become ized. Rather does he seem to have an atavistic longing to rn to the days of Chaka and Lobengula; to the days of the kerrie and the shield, to the witch-doctor and the blood-ng''.

You are to be congratulated on your excellent leader last

Sunday'', wrote one of the *Mail's* enthusiastic readers. expresses the thoughts of many people living in the Federat today''. And it certainly does seem to reflect one of the fun mental beliefs of the Southern Rhodesian European. Rhodesia not a fear-ridden country, but it is a country where the m rumour of an African strike causes a panic rush to buy guns. It country where a Sunday paper divorce report can begin qu unselfconsciously: ''A man left his young wife alone one ni at their home in a remote part of Southern Rhodesia and as sat in the bedroom reading, terrified of the dark and Natives . . To the Southern Rhodesian, African Nationalism means Mau-M It is not for nothing that every new immigrant is at once advi to read Robert Ruark's *Something of Value* and then Nich Monserrat's *The Tribe that Lost Its Head*. This, the South Rhodesian European knows, is what the Africans are like. matter how apparently civilized, they are always on the brink relapse into savagery. And so it is not in the least surprising an elder of the Church of Scotland should have plotted massa —it is, indeed, only to be expected.

Another reason for the public belief in the massacre plot is feeling of solidarity with the Nyasaland settler population. To average Rhodesian the Devlin Commission appeared as the type of the ''nosey parkers'' from outside, the men who ''d understand our problems''. The ''men on the spot'' belie in the massacre plot—therefore it must be true. And so, thro fear and loyalty, the Southern Rhodesian European is commi to a belief in the massacre plot with all its implications belief which will distort his vision of events much as it disto the vision of the District Commissioner at Nkata Bay, and likely with similar tragic results. It is not, after all, a very hop sign that many Europeans are venturing into the multi-r future ''terrified of the dark and the Natives''.

But what of the politicians? No doubt many of them share fears and loyalties of their electorate; no doubt for them the belief in the savagery of the African serves at once as a j fication of the past and a warning for the future. Yet this is the main reason for the politicians' rejection of the De Report. They reject it not so much because it dismisses Nyasaland massacre plot allegations as because it threaten undermine the case for the Southern Rhodesian emerge Even to the right-wing politicians, the need to believe in reality of the emergency is much more urgent than the nee

ieve in the savagery of Africans in general. And for Sir Edgar
nitehead—whose chill clarity of view is not distorted by the
rs and prejudices which dictate the reaction of many of his
low Rhodesians—the need to believe in the emergency, or to
ve it believed in, is crucial.

Now, the Devlin Report does not at first sight appear to
nage the Southern Rhodesian Government's case. Its findings
Nyasaland are much the same as Sir Edgar's assertions about
uthern Rhodesia, assertions now upheld by the General
port of the Beadle Tribunal. But the instinct of the politicians
right—the Devlin Report and the Beadle Report are incom-
ible. They are so for two reasons—one of matter, the other
method.

In the first instance, the very identity of the findings of Devlin
Nyasaland and Beadle in Southern Rhodesia is suspicious.
one disputes, after all, that the crisis was very much more
ite in Nyasaland; that the Nyasaland Congress was very much
re efficiently organized and enjoyed very much wider public
pport; that its leadership was more desperate and its member-
p more militant. It is hard to believe that the danger in both
untries was much the same. The Southern Rhodesian answer
this is that Mr. Justice Beadle would have found a much more
ious situation in Nyasaland than Mr. Justice Devlin found.
equally good answer—and one that is likely to find more
our outside Rhodesia—is that Mr. Justice Devlin would have
nd a much less serious situation in Southern Rhodesia than
. Justice Beadle found.

Both answers depend, of course, upon a consciousness of the
ference of approach in the two Reports. The Southern Rho-
ian says that Mr. Justice Devlin and his colleagues were
orant of local conditions and of the Bantu mind, while Mr.
tice Beadle and his colleagues understood both. Elsewhere
ple are likely to say that the Devlin Commission showed an
onishing degree of detachment while showing also an under-
nding of the peculiarities of the African situation, while the
dle Tribunal, in all honesty, were prisoners of their assump-
ns. A few illustrations of these differences are needed to make
s point clear.

The Devlin Commission notes as a fact that in Nyasaland "a
strict Commissioner cannot afford to be jeered at or insulted
public; if that is tolerated, it would lead to a loss of authority
ich would be fatal. Many unofficial Europeans consider that

the same thing applies to them." The Devlin Commission saying that in a colonial situation it is natural for Europeans take "disrespect" as seriously, almost, as actual breaches of t law or violence. But the Commission is perfectly clear in its ov mind that there is a very important distinction between "d respect" and criminal action. The Beadle Tribunal, with solemn listing of Congress statements designed to "Ridicu and Undermine the Authority of (a) Native Commissione (b) Land Development Officers, (c) Chiefs, (d) Police, African Members of Parliament", has allowed that distinction become blurred. Similarly, the Devlin Commission realizes tha is likely that loose talk about beating and killing will be taken the equivalent of a planned intention to beat and kill in a ter colonial situation, but it preserves its own keen sense of t distinction. This, again, the Beadle Tribunal failed to do.

There are many other such differences of approach. The Dev Commission so distrusted the evidence of informers that chose to base its findings on the other evidence available and test the evidence of informers against it. The Beadle Tribun on the other hand, based its findings explicitly on the evider of informers, and remarked that the other evidence availab though not in itself indicating planned violence or subversio fell into this pattern in the light of the secret evidence of t informers. The Devlin Commission examined the reasons the tension between Congress and Government and the gene background to the emergency: the Beadle Tribunal, although Report deals with the general issue of the guilt of Congress a whole, deliberately refused to ask or to answer these gene questions. In short, it is hard to imagine two investigations mo differently conducted, or two Reports in which the conclusio drawn from a certain type of evidence were more dispara

To proclaim belief in the Devlin Commission's findings, th and to express admiration for its approach is tantamount Southern Rhodesia to expressing grave reservations about reality of the Southern Rhodesian emergency. Yet this emerge is the foundation of all Sir Edgar Whitehead's policy—both frankly "undemocratic" emergency legislation and the "libera measures which balance it. It is also the foundation of Opposition's very different deductions about the policy nee in the future. Finally it is the foundation of the ordinary Rh desian's approach to African politics.

PORTRAIT OF AN AGITATOR: PATRICK MATIMBA

JOHN REED

Lecturer in English at the University College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland; Co-Editor of the Rhodesian broadsheet, "Dissent"

On Sunday, July 26th, 1959, Patrick Matimba was driven er guard from Salisbury Jail to the airport outside the city, re his wife and young daughter were waiting for him. At airport he was released from an imprisonment which had d five months, on condition that he directly boarded a e which would take him to Holland. The fares for himself his family had been paid by the Government. He was told he was not being deprived of his Southern Rhodesian citiship; he was not required to undertake that he would stay y from his homeland. But he was told that as soon as he ossed the frontier he would be rearrested.

We must suppose from this that the Government formally eves Matimba too dangerous a man to be allowed to live in thern Rhodesia, and that his presence as a free man there ld constitute some kind of threat to the safety and the order he State.

Matimba came back to Rhodesia about three years ago, after e time spent in England. While there, he had earned his g by working in a café and had continued his education at ning classes. At an International Club he had met a young chwoman, Adri van Hoorn. They had married, and there now a baby girl. Matimba's earliest activities after returning Rhodesia were in search of a home to which he could bring wife and daughter. The Land Apportionment Act in Southern desia prohibits Africans and Europeans from living together he same area, and he was not able to obtain a house in any ican township. After a long unsuccessful search for some way which he could set up home, it became clear that he could live with his wife in some place where the provisions of the d Apportionment Act did not apply. They do not apply to sion land. Matimba's father, an Anglican priest, was living etirement at St. Faith's Mission, near Rusape. He approached Mission authorities on behalf of his son—and they agreed that imba and his wife should come to live at the Mission.

o Matimba prepared to bring his wife to Rhodesia, and

Rhodesia prepared to receive her. Mr. Straw of the Uni Rhodesia Party, the Territorial M.P. for Rusape, was applau by his audience when he declared that her arrival was not in public interest. The Federal Government of the day, howev granted Mrs. Matimba permission to come and live in Rhode Many thoughtless people considered that she should have b refused entry. They were properly rebuked by the Federal M in whose constituency St. Faith's falls. "Any action of this kin he said, "would have delayed the achievement of Domin Status and upset the tobacco market. Let them think of before deciding that the Federal Government was wrong granting a permit to Mrs. Matimba." Both these comme were made at a meeting called by Federal and United Rhod Parties in Rusape Cinema Hall to discuss the situation. At end of this meeting, 350 people passed an almost unanim resolution calling for legislation against mixed marriages demanding a general election on the issue, if such legislat were not passed.

So Mrs. Matimba joined her husband at St. Faith's. A wor at the meeting in the cinema hall had spoken of the recep she might expect. "When she walks down the street in Rusa the whites and the blacks will, of course, look the other wa Yet Mrs. Matimba was not made unhappy. Africans do not fin easy to persist in that remorseless hostility towards mi marriages which is attributed to them and expected of them Europeans. It was decided not to hold a party to welcome M Matimba in the African township at Rusape—but only becaus was felt this might exacerbate the Europeans. In the mon that followed, no party or wedding in the local African commu was complete without the Matimbas. On the Mission itself, couple lived in an atmosphere easier for them than could h been found anywhere else in the Colony. They had no nee desire to walk hand in hand down the main street of Rusa The Mission stands several miles away from the town, and w a wife goes shopping she does not take her husband; whe husband does his business or buying in town he does not take wife. Only now and then did difficulties arise: when M Matimba took her husband's trousers to a dry-cleaner; when had to go to hospital and her husband was not permitted visit her.

At St. Faith's, Matimba kept the books for the co-opera store, and did the buying. But there was hardly enough work

him busy, and nothing to stretch his powers. It is true that co-operative experiments at St. Faith's were interesting, there was intellectual stimulation in the courses which e held at the Mission—there was one held early in 1958 n politicians and university teachers gave talks on various cts of democracy. There were also many visitors to St. h's, some of them eminent people; for St. Faith's has a world- e reputation, as well as its reputation in Rusape. But Matimba ambitions of his own, and the knowledge that he could not and live elsewhere made him restless inside the Mission. ile he was in England he had bought a small printing machine; he was always talking of having this sent out to Rhodesia starting a printing firm of his own.

n September 1957, the Southern Rhodesian African National ngress was founded. Mr. Guy Clutton-Brock, the farm manager St. Faith's, became one of the few European members. imba also joined. A branch was formed at Rusape. The man cted as secretary was soon found to be unable to do the job, Matimba was persuaded to take it over. It is not easy for us build up a very clear picture of Matimba's activities as an ator, or to discover the exact steps by which he became one he few hundred men whose activities by February 1959 were, ording to the Prime Minister, threatening the whole security he State. None of the inflammatory extracts from Congress eches quoted in the Southern Rhodesian Parliament, or later, he report of the Review Tribunal, has been attributed to him. l the charges brought against him by the Government in the ret proceedings before the Review Tribunal, even if they ew light on the matter, could only be inserted here if the ter were willing to brave penalties of up to three years risonment under the Preventive Detention Act. Certainly timba had a passionate interest in politics. He read news- ers and Hansards, government papers and books on political jects, incessantly. He loved to talk politics and, during cussions held at St. Faith's, would make long meditative tributions in his quiet voice, using the terms of political nce carefully and illustrating attitudes and situations in a urely roundabout way with the proverbs and fables of his ple. For Matimba, politics was an intellectual passion. He interested—as who can help being?—in the strange wonder- l of Rhodesian politics; he was interested too in the reactions re had been in Rhodesian society to his own anomalous

position. He was certainly less disturbed by the attention was given than some other men might have been. He was al less embittered by it. The source of his political feelings was h own desire to lead a happy life, move where he wished, and d work that he felt worthwhile; rather than any larger passion f reform, personal political ambition, or all-absorbing dedicati to a cause. He loved discussion, but he seems never to ha addressed public meetings. He is said not to have been a ve efficient branch secretary. He was often in talk critical of t Congress leaders. He felt Congress affairs were sometim incompetently administered. He attacked the policy of maki speeches deliberately in order to provoke the Government. A he was concerned to get his printing machine out from Engla and to set up his own business.

He tried once more to get a house in Highfields, one of t townships at Salisbury. The Southern Rhodesian Parliame discussed whether the wife of an African should be consider an African for the purposes of the Land Apportionment Ac One of the difficulties of such a solution, however, was that a legislation to effect it would clearly have been discriminator unless the African wife of a European could similarly be regard as a European. The legal position remained as it had been. T printing machine arrived. A shop was rented in one of t humbler parts of Salisbury in Mrs. Matimba's name, and a bu ness was established. Technically, Mrs. Matimba employed h husband. There were rooms above the shop; and there, surre titiously and illegally in a European area, the Matimbas liv together. And it was there that Patrick Matimba was arreste when the police burst into the bedroom at 2 o'clock in t morning of 25th February, 1959. He was taken first to Kentuc lock-up and then—with the more dangerous prisoners— Khami Jail, near Bulawayo. Mrs. Matimba kept the printi business going, carrying out the few orders that came along, f cards and headed notepaper. She visited her husband at Bulaw when she could, and helped in making transport arrangemen from Salisbury to Bulawayo to enable the wives of detainees see their husbands. The little printing shop in Market Squa became the point where cars going to Bulawayo at the week-en picked up their passengers. Her courage, in the strange situati where she found herself, was at this time very great. But as t months went by and her husband was not among the seve hundreds of detainees released, as it became increasingly cle

the Government intended to safeguard the safety and order he State by keeping many men imprisoned without trial for years, she found it more and more difficult to face the future. printing business had to be sold. She was expecting another d. In her great difficulty, the Government's behaviour ards Mr. Guy Clutton-Brock suggested a course of action. had been arrested at the same time as Matimba. A few weeks r he was offered his freedom by the Government on the dition that he immediately left the country. These terms he ised, and soon after, he was released unconditionally. Mrs. imba now approached the Government with the suggestion her husband be released if he promised to go with her ctly to Holland. The Government agreed to this. Matimba, r some hesitation, also agreed.

o the man who had done something or other which was not the public interest, the man whose unconditional release uld have imperilled the safety of the State, went upon his . It would be unfair to the Government not to mention the s it took in enabling Matimba to rejoin his family and enjoy freedom elsewhere. It undoubtedly ran the risk of inviting ilar appeals from the relations of other detainees, many of om could probably find asylum in other parts of the world. ere seems no doubt, of course, that these would be rejected. clearly Matimba is not appreciably less dangerous than the t—or why is he to be rearrested if he returns? Already the vernment has suffered whispers that Matimba was released ause he was an acute embarrassment to it. Further, the vernment had appointed a Tribunal to inquire into—and ort upon—the case against each detainee. The hearing before Tribunal is, of course, in no sense a trial, nor is the Govern-nt necessarily bound by its findings. But still, in deciding release Matimba and yet refusing to give him his freedom hin the country before it had received the Tribunal's report him, the Government showed scant courtesy to a body that is own creation. The awkwardness of the Government's position s increased by the ungrateful behaviour of Matimba himself, the perhaps over-officious zeal of a warder at Salisbury Jail, ere Matimba spent the night before his release. The warder covered two letters from Paul Mushonga and Robert Chikere-, detainees in Khami Jail, to "sympathizers" in London, ich Matimba had smuggled out with him and which he ended to take to Europe. Smuggling letters out of prison is an

offence. The letters were taken from Matimba, but his rele and departure were not delayed. Later Mushonga and Chikere were sentenced to sixteen days solitary confinement and puni ment diet as prescribed by the Prison Act.

For Matimba then, the story ends happily enough. To ill trate the suffering caused by the actions of the Southern Rh desian Government, there are many other stories that can told. Not that Matimba has been shown any mercy. There c be no mercy where there is no justice. But he has been, compar with others, rather lucky. His story is not told here because he an outstanding political figure, a man of destiny. On the co trary; though as an African married to a European wom Matimba was a strange anomaly in the Southern Rhodesian scen yet as a man looking for his happiness—not in dedication to a cause, but in the building up of a life for himself around wo which gave him his independence—in this he is typical. Wh the political leaders of the great mass of the population have be imprisoned by government in order to secure the State, the has been a fundamental political failure in the society. When m like Matimba cannot be left to live their lives, the failure, thoug is less easy to name, goes much deeper. Matimba will proba make a happy life for himself in Europe. It is easier for us to f more concern for the political martyrs, for the men tota devoted to their cause, than for him. It is also easier for us feel more indignant about governments openly devoted to e ends than about governments taking at every moment w seems the easiest way out, unconcerned with principle a appearance, or consistency, paying lip service to this and th escaping from one embarrassment carelessly into the ne abrogating law in the name of order, and promoting the insecur of the individual in the name of the security of the State. I the ease with which we feel concern and indignation is not alw the best measure of the danger that threatens.

THE BELGIAN TREASURY

VELLA PILLAY

Economist

as for long remained something of a mystery how Belgium, e of all the European countries, was able to emerge from the war with a stable currency, with a volume of foreign exchange rves as large as that held in 1938, and with little experience ny of the inflationary stresses that otherwise would have owed the reconstruction of the war-damaged Belgian eco- y. The official Belgian explanation has invariably been in is of the determined domestic economic policies that were sued from the moment of liberation.

he events of January last in the little-known Belgian Congo , however, exposed much of the myth in this explanation. ook a week of riots and disturbances in Leopoldville to re- blish what has always been the basis for the post-war status strength of the Belgian economy. For no sooner had these s broken out than the European exchange markets became scene of sustained attacks on the Belgian franc. Colonial ks on the Brussels bourse fell heavily in value, and a climate risis swept over the whole Belgian economy. Within a fort- it Belgium's external monetary reserves fell by 100 million cs, or just under 10%, and the franc reeled under the sibility of devaluation. While the crisis was averted in time the engagement of Belgian troops in the suppression of the go disturbances, what had for once become clear was the lamental importance of the Congo to the metropolitan nomy of Belgium.

or a small country like Belgium, with a population of less n 10 million, the size of its capital stake in the Congo is kingly large. Between 1885 and 1956, the net inflow of capital into the Congo has been estimated at about 50 ion francs. But this capital inflow has about trebled itself ing that period as a result of the continuous reinvestment of emitted profits, so that by 1956 the value of foreign invest- nts in the Congo was in the region of £1,000 million (or e 20% greater than the 1956 value of direct foreign invest- nt in the Union of South Africa). Of this capital value some- g like 80-90% is held by a small group of extremely large gian finance houses which, ever since the period of the 'Con-

cession regime' of Leopold II, have gradually enlarged thi
Congo interests—till today they occupy major monopoly positio
over the whole realm of production, distribution and expo
in the Congo.

What is equally striking is the way in which the colon
administration has participated in the activities of these monopo
organizations. The *Charte Coloniale* of 1908 vested power ov
the Congo in the hands of the King of the Belgians; indeed, t
Belgian Parliament possesses little control over Congo affa
except in financial matters and the grant of concessions. T
King, working through the Minister of Colonies, is advised
all Congo affairs by a small but influential group of businessm
and officials—the celebrated *Conseil Colonial*. In practice t
latter body not only formulates colonial policy for Belgium, b
suggests laws to be decreed by the King. What is pertinent he
is that this system has imparted to the colonial authorities t
unusual function of guaranteeing the profitability of Belgi
capital; or, as a recent official British report put it, "the Con
administration, which retains a large measure of financial par
cipation in the important monopoly companies, ensures th
Belgian capital receives a good return for its investment . . .

This system necessarily conditions the nature of the Congo
economy. It is a vast interlocking scheme of extremely lar
and influential private and para-statal interests operating in t
exploitation of the rich raw material and labour resources of t
colony. Something like 60% of the African wage-earning popu
tion are employed in little more than 3% of the commerc
undertakings; and these undertakings possess some 86%
the total capital investment in the colony. These undertakin
further operate over a variety of industries and activities, so th
even the provision of transport facilities and public utilit
remains the prerogative of the great Belgian financial house
The *Societé Generale*, probably the largest metropolitan enterpr
to operate in colonial Africa, predominates everywhere in t
Congo. It controls the only producer of Congo copper, t
Union Minière du Haut Katanga; and the whole of the Katan
region is within the concession area of the *Societé Genera*
The production of cobalt, zinc, uranium, manganese and t
is fully monopolized by the group, which is also overwhelming
present in the manufacture of chemicals, textiles and constru
tion, as well as in plantation farming, in commerce, bankin

† Board of Trade, Overseas Economic Survey, Nov., 1956.

surance and transport. What little remains of economic tivity in the Congo is shared by about four other financial oups (one of which possesses a strong British connection). The fundamental aims of Belgian investment in the Congo ve always been—and remain—the enlargement of the export ctor through a systematic exploitation of those resources ssessing markets abroad and in particular meeting the needs the industrial economy of Belgium. Thus exports continue absorb one-third of the national product. More than that, e persistent application of foreign investment funds into those imary industries which serve the needs of the overseas markets s tended to confine the range of export products to a relatively nall number. This tendency towards primary product specialiation has been a critical obstacle in the growth of African terprise and of indigenous capital accumulation.

This does not, however, mean that there has been no develop-ent in secondary economic activities. According to indices industrial production published in the Congo, the output manufactured goods increased three-fold between 1947-56, hile that of mineral production only doubled. But in absolute rms, the value of pure manufacturing production is small. s development has been motivated largely by the immediate quirements of the mining industry and the ancillary fields of ansport, communications and distribution. Hence the secondary dustries that have developed in the Congo are concentrated in e Katanga mining region and export centre of Leopoldville.

There are perceptible signs that the involvement of an ever-owing number of Africans in the monetary framework, i.e. e African movement towards the towns and the mining areas search of a money income, has resulted in growing local oduction of various consumer goods and some foreign invest-ent of funds in what might be termed 'light industry'. Those dustries nearest to mining and agriculture—construction and emicals—predominate, however, in the manufacturing field. 1956, mining and agriculture generated 30 billion francs, about 55% of the ascertainable aggregate money income in e Congo. That of manufacturing industry amounted to no ore than 7 billion francs, or about 10%.

The consequences of the Congo's dependence on exports and Belgian capital are clearly demonstrated by the profound anges that have occurred in the occupational distribution of e Congo people and in the distribution of income and capital

ownership. Since the first entry of Belgian capital into the Congo in 1887, it is estimated that some 50% of the adult African male population have been drawn away from subsistence activity into the mines, the plantation farms, and various other wage-earning activities. The more one looks at the history of land concessions in the Congo, the more one must be impressed by the compulsions under which the African has had to find alternative employment in the concession areas and the towns. A Belgian Minister claimed in 1955 that about one-third of the Congo land area had been alienated for "non-African occupation". He did not state, however, the size of the non-alienated land area in which African produce had to be compulsorily sold to the monopolies at pre-determined prices. In any event, there is some evidence to suggest that even today the division between alienated and non-alienated remains vague and indecisive. It is this which in part explains the 5% annual growth in the numbers of wage-earning Africans.

What is crucial is the fact that the increased integration of the African population in the money economy has not resulted in any parallel African participation in what appears to have been a particularly rapid rate of capital formation and investment. Between 1950-56 the average share of the national income accruing to the African wage-earning population increased from about one-sixth to one-fifth. This increased share, however, does not appear to represent any absolute improvement in African income standards; it rather tends to suggest the rate at which the number of Africans drawn into wage-earning occupations has increased. Indeed, in so far as any substance can be given to the available statistics, the *per capita* income of the indigenous population remained about stationary during the period at around £40 per year, or about one-tenth of that in Belgium. The generally low level of African incomes (in relation to the substantial pace of capital formation) is also illustrated by the paucity of African savings in the total stream of savings in the Congo. In 1950, the mobilizable savings of the African sector amounted to £5 million. By 1956, in spite of the increased integration of the African in the money economy, these savings had fallen to only £4 million.

In contrast to all this, the share of the metropolitan element in the economic activity of the Congo is striking. Of the 100,000 resident whites, well over half appear to be in the service of the Belgian monopolies. No more than 9% are "colonists" in the

ditional sense, i.e. owning capital and engaged as resident nters and merchants. (The rest of the white population are nost equally made up of civil servants and missionaries). Thus e Belgian share of the Congo's national income can fairly be ributable to that going to the monopolies and their employees. tween 1950-56, this share was almost as much as one-half all accountable incomes. The actual surplus accruing to Belgian pital (in the nature of profits) in recent years has averaged 12 lion francs (about £85 million) a year, or about the same as e African wage total.

These characteristics portray what is perhaps the essential ntent of contemporary colonialism in the Congo. There e what might be called two sectors of commodity exchange the Congo: the export sector and the domestic market sector. nd it is the export sector that is the measure of almost every vestment decision and of all economic policy. Indeed, when ne examines the current Ten-Year Development Plan—volving, as it does, a capital expenditure of 70 billion francs bout £500 million) between 1959-69—the emphasis continues be placed on the provision of a broader infra-structure of ansport and communications for the more effective exploita-on of the raw material resources of this colony. But this is not l. The Congo's export trade is directly and wholly in the hands the Belgian monopolies. Thus the surpluses from the export ade accumulate not directly to the Congo, but to the metro-olitan economy of Belgium. In so far as a part of this surplus nds to be reinvested in the Congo, the reinvestment develops recisely those resources which enter into the needs of the etropolitan economy, rather than the needs of the Congo such. This then goes a long way towards establishing the rmanent dependence of the Congo on exports and hence on ne decisions of Belgian capital.

It is, of course, true that Belgian capital has also entered the anufacturing field in the Congo; and this, to a certain extent, as been prompted by the growth of the domestic market rovided by the wage-earning African population. But here, oo, the surpluses continue to accrue to the metropolitan conomy, if only because the Belgian monopolies control most f the field of manufacturing production and distribution. urther, the type of manufacturing undertaken tends to comple-ent rather than compete with imports from abroad; since the ndamental consequence of Belgian capital has been the develop-

ment of the Congo as an adjunct to the metropolitan economy of Belgium.

It is against this background that the colonial element in the Belgian economy needs to be seen. During the last war, when the Belgian Government retired to London, the Congo's exports, particularly metals to the United States, earned a considerable volume of foreign exchange which inevitably became available for the reconstruction of Belgium after the war. Since the end of the war, the Congo's export of raw materials has continued to earn a surplus of dollar and sterling exchange which, through a complex arrangement between the Congo's central bank and the National Bank of Belgium, is added to Belgium's exchange reserves. In the period between 1948 and 1956, the Congo's surplus on trade amounted to 64.4 billion francs (£460 million) with all countries. The trade with Belgium also reaped a surplus of 1.7 billion francs. It was the Congo's wealth that enabled Belgium to become a major creditor nation in Western Europe and to hold a particularly 'hard' currency.

As the data in the following table suggest, Belgium's most direct interest in the Congo for its balance of payments position is the income received on 'invisible' account, i.e. of profits received and income derived from the Belgian provision of transport, insurance and other facilities to the Congo.

Net Receipts of Belgium in its Invisible Transactions with the Congo
000's million B. Francs

	1949-56
Transport and Insurance	17.2
Profits and Dividends	15.4
Foreign Travel	2.9
Other	8.9
Private Remittances of migrants ..	4.6
	49.0

The income on these 'invisible' transactions has grown rapidly—from 3.3 billion francs in 1939 to as much as 12.3 billion in 1956. Something like 35% of this income is represented by the actual transfer of profits from the Congo—though this transfer is by no means a measure of the total profits earned by Belgian investments in the area. The central bank of the Congo recently

imated that for the period 1950-56, the gross profits of lgian enterprises operating in the Congo amounted to 61.6 lion francs (about £450 million); of this about 14.1 billion ncs were remitted abroad. In the same period the net Belgian port of capital amounted to about 10.1 billion francs. Thus e Congo's remittance of investment income to Belgium is nning at a rate higher than net new Belgian capital inflows. spite of this, the fact that about five-sixths of the profits rned are retained in the Congo for reinvestment makes the lume of the Belgian capital ownership grow at an extremely gh pace. The substantial income on "transport and insurance" ises from the fact that the Belgian shipping and insurance mpanies virtually run a monopoly in the provision of these rvices in the Congo.

What stands as possibly the most important and significant ature of Belgium-Congo economic relations is that concerning e financing of Belgian investments in the Congo. The whole of e foreign exchange surplus of the Congo (with the exception a small nominal gold reserve which is held in the Congo for iat appears to be a 'backing' to the local currency issue) is nsferred to Belgium, by a technical device whereby these change surpluses are sold to the Belgian central bank for lgian Government bonds. Next, commercial banking in the ngo is wholly in the hands of the large Belgian finance houses d banks; here a proportion of the deposits in the Congo are ld in Brussels (again in the form of Belgian bonds and other sets). Further, the monopolies operating in the Congo tend hold a substantial proportion of their more liquid assets at eir Brussels head-offices. Finally, the Congo administration, nich appears to have a habit of running budgetary surpluses ar in and year out, employs these surpluses for holding assets Belgium. In fact, what this day-to-day transfer of funds nounts to is a real disinvestment in the Congo with the added ality that it is in the nature of forced 'loans' to Belgium. Thus, in effect, the system of financial relations presently actised is such as to enable the Congo to finance a large part of lgium's capital exports back to the Congo. Congo surluses placed in the "equalization fund" and held in Brussels nounted to as much as 8.1 billion francs at the end of 1957. t the Congo authorities borrowed 9.4 billion francs in medium d long-term loans on the Brussels capital market between 50-56. Belgium takes in order to lend.

Capital Movements: 000's million B. Francs

	Total 1949-56	
Private Capital		
Outflow from Belgium	19.0	
Inflow from Congo	11.1	7
Public Capital		
Outflow from Belgium	13.2	
Inflow from Congo	10.5	2
Net Capital Outflow from Belgium		10
Belgium receipt:		
Profit income on investments in the Congo		15

The Congo Basin Treaties of 1885 and 1919 had specifical imposed upon Belgium the condition of the "open door" to a investors and traders. And in so far as legislation is concerne the Belgian authorities have scrupulously accorded equality treatment to all nations wishing to operate in the Congo. Ar yet, after some seventy years of Belgian administration, th preponderant share of the trade of the Congo remains in Belgia hands. More than that, the investment share of Belgium in th colony is almost complete. The British investment stake in th Congo amounts to no more than 1.7% of the total, while th of the U.S. is less than 0.5%. Indeed, the British Board of Trad noted in a recent official report, ". . . the tendency has been t regard the Congo as an exclusively Belgian investment preserv with the result that it has never been easy for foreign busine to establish itself."

This investment preserve has in the course of time provide Belgium with a source of income sufficiently large to constitu an important item in the metropolitan economy. More than tha the character of the massive investment made in the past and th system of financial and currency relations that have been esta lished, clearly have had the effect of converting the Congo into a appendage of the Belgian economy with little or no opportuni for independent development. In the Congo itself the one sign ficant social consequence has been the rapid entry of the indig nous population into the money economy. There has, howeve been no movement towards the Africans' acquiring the status capital owners; the highest point in the scale of African advanc ment has been that of skilled artisans. Is it to be wondered that African impatience with such a system is growing so fas

MINORITY RIGHTS IN KENYA

J. M. NAZARETH, M.L.C.
Asian Elected Member, Kenya Legislative Council

ITHIN the last nine months there has been a remarkable ansformation—or, perhaps I should say, clarification —in the itude of the Asian communities towards minority rights and feguards. Clear evidence of their present attitude is the emorandum submitted by the Central Council of the Indian ssociations in Uganda on behalf of the Indian community to the ommittee of Constitutional Enquiry set up by the Uganda overnment. It declares plainly: "We consider ourselves an tegral part of the Uganda community. We therefore cannot stifiably ask for minority rights". A step in the same direction as taken immediately after the General Election in Tanganyika st year, when the Elected Members declared their opposition a racial allocation of three ministerial seats to Elected African embers and one each to Asian and European Members. They manded instead that the five Ministries for Elected Members ould be filled on the recommendation of the Elected Members ithout reference to race.

In Kenya similar rapid strides have been made in the thinking the Asian community. The Constituency Elected Members rganisation, which had made such a promising start—conining as it did all the Elected African, Asian and Arab Members, ith the addition of Mr. S. V. Cooke, the most senior of the uropean Elected Members—has branched off into the Kenya ational Party and the Kenya Independence Movement, the tter recently having ceased to exist as a body by the refusal of ie Government to grant it registration under the Societies' rdinance. The KNP contains eight out of the fourteen African lected Members and all the Asian Elected Members, while the IM was supported clearly by four African Elected Members. he remaining two African Elected Members signed the policy atements of both the KNP and the KIM and successfully joined oth bodies.

In its constitutional proposals, the KNP does not go as far as ie Uganda Indian Associations in wholly abandoning communal epresentation. Instead it recommends the retention up to 1968 a limited number of Reserved Seats for each of the comunities, African, European, Indian, Muslim, and Arab, to be lected on a common roll with a restricted franchise but low

qualifications. Thus even on the new restricted roll, it expected that African voters will greatly outnumber voters other races. In addition, it is proposed that there should be large number of Open Elected Seats, to be filled by voters on common roll with universal adult franchise, so that if the votin went heavily on racial lines all or almost all these seats would g to African candidates. Under the proposals of the KNP (t which all the Asian Elected Members are party), the few seat reserved for the minorities will quite plainly not operate as safeguard; indeed, as minority rights, their actual voting valu will be slight. The function of the Reserved Seats is thu essentially to give expression to the democratic principle tha minority sections must have a voice in the Legislature. Bu there is nothing in these proposals of the KNP seeking to give th minorities a privileged position or to give them anything in th nature of control or unfairly large influence in the Legislature

With the same principle of representation in view, and t prevent candidates elected for minority communities from bein persons wholly unrepresentative of opinion and wholly lackin support in their own community, from being, as it were, mer stooges of the majority community, the KNP recommends tha candidates for Reserved Seats who do not secure a prescribe proportion of the votes cast by voters of their own communit should be disqualified, even if they secured an overall majorit of the total votes cast. The prescribed proportion is to be kep low; so that while minority sections retain a measure of influenc in the elections for these seats, separate electorates are no brought in by the back door. The minority communities ar thus given representation, without much power or influence i the Legislature or the Executive.

It is plain from an examination of the attitude and policies the Asian communities in the three mainland East African terr tories that they have abandoned the idea of racial or communa rights or safeguards and that they are fully prepared to accept representation based on democratic principles. But as politica parties, which are essential for the realisation of parliamentar democracy, have yet to become established, the Asians hav realistically, at least in Kenya, proposed measures to ensure during the transitional period that must intervene before th racial parties which now operate are replaced by effectiv political parties, that the constitution should provide for repre sentation of minority communities, though nothing like contr

power over the Legislature.

The history of the European and Indian communities in Kenya ounts for the differences in their present attitudes to issues as the question of minority rights and safeguards. The an community has in the past been the victim of serious rimination in matters of land rights, the Civil Service, nigration practice, political and local government representa-, and so forth. The struggle of the Indian community for ality of rights has been based on an appeal to democratic nciples. When, therefore, Africans appeal to the same nciples, the Indian is already attuned to respond; and, if the ican appeal is genuinely based on and genuinely follows nocratic principles, it meets with no substantial resistance or position from Indians. With the Europeans the position has n different. They have always been a privileged minority Kenya, politically, economically and socially, and they are from prepared to accept democratic claims or democratic ctices which would mean the loss or diminution of racial vileges.

The attitude of Asian communities is based not merely on ir inability to justify ethically safeguards and rights for them-ves as racial or communal groups. From a practical point of w, they are satisfied that safeguards and rights for numerically y small minorities based on or related to membership of a ial or communal group are illusory, and that such differences seeming privileges will in effect relegate their communities to manent membership of permanent minorities. They know t they have never in the past enjoyed control or substantial wer or influence and that they are not losing privileges or wer possessed in the past. On the other hand, if genuine and ective political parties, in place of exclusively racial parties, be built up, the bulk of whose members would, of course, Africans, but of which Asians and Europeans would be mem-rs, Asians could well find themselves members of groups or ties which could command a majority in the Legislature and form the government of the day. From within the party or up they could thus influence—though not, of course, ntrol—policy; and they would thus not merely be better off n if they had the right to elect or be represented by a small nority of members of the Legislature or Executive, but would promoting a much healthier and more lasting political system, sed on the principles of parliamentary democracy.

Asians have in the past taken the view, and they are becomi increasingly satisfied, that safeguards and rights based on ra have no lasting value unless they are founded on the goodwill and full acceptance by the majority community. They are ful aware how in the Union of South Africa minority rights, sma and almost negligible though they were, have been washed awa and of the strenuous efforts and unscrupulousness that characte ised the destruction of relatively unimportant safeguards.

The real danger to minorities is the danger of demagogues power-seeking politicians in the majority group attempting buttress themselves by diverting attention from their own weal nesses to members of minority communities. That could easi lead to persecution or victimization of minorities. How is th danger to be effectively dealt with?

The only protection of any value against that danger is entrench as strongly as possible fundamental rights in the Co stitution. The protection must, however, be accorded persons as individuals, not as members of a race or commun group. A Second Chamber can be useful in that directio since the delaying and revising powers given to such a Chamb may bring about a cooling of passions and give to tempora majorities time for second thoughts. If the bulk of the majorit section entertain permanent or enduring feelings of ill-wi towards the minorities, even a Second Chamber could not affo lasting protection to members of minority sections. Speci provisions ought also to be incorporated in the Constitution t ensure that alteration of fundamental civil rights can be made on by a special legislative process requiring a special majority an by compliance with special conditions designed to prevent eas or hasty alteration of vital minority safeguards.

It will, of course, be of the utmost importance not merely t entrench fundamental individual rights in the Constitution, bu to ensure that they cannot be washed away by the lack of a adequate judiciary. Special provisions will, therefore, need t be incorporated in the Constitution to secure the appointmen and maintenance of a competent, impartial and independen judiciary.

Safeguards and protection for fundamental rights are a important to individual members of majority communities as t members of minority communities. For the majority com munity is bound sooner or later to split into political partie (indeed the first steps in that direction have already taken place)

l there is no assurance that some day many members of the ajority community in the majority party may not find themves in a minority party, potential victims of political persecun. The majority community will itself contain minority ctions, tribal differences will not die overnight, there will be rger and smaller tribes with politicians ready to exploit tribal fferences, and minorities, like the poor, will always be with us. ery individual thus has a strong interest in the safeguarding of e rights of minorities against the abuse of power by a majority. While preparation of the ground cannot be too early begun, e latest time for the entrenching of these safeguards against e oppression of minorities or individuals by a governing ajority will be before independence is accorded to the country. fter independence is attained, it will be too late to expect an nmature majority to act in the highest traditions of a mature rliamentary democracy. But before independence, the country ill be sufficiently disposed to accept such safeguards, for even the majority community there will be substantial numbers ho would then be members of a minority party and who would elcome and might soon need such protection. Even the ajority party may then be not strongly opposed to such safeuards and rights, since it must face the possibility that it may nd itself some day in a minority, unless, like the Nationalists in outh Africa, it is placed in the position of being able to take eps, having once secured rule, to entrench itself permanently power. The British Government which will have to make he final surrender of power will be in a position at that time to mpose such conditions, for which it will have complete moral nd political justification. To fail in this regard, and to surender power without precautions against the destruction of arliamentary democracy and its early conversion into a petty utocracy, whether by an individual or a group, would be the reatest breach of duty that the British people could commit gainst every inhabitant of this country.

In the ultimate analysis, the problem of minority rights and afeguards resolves itself into the problem of safeguarding the ights of the individual. That is the final problem of a contitution, and that essentially is the problem of minorities, whether racial, religious or political.

WEST AFRICAN UNITY

PHILIPPE DECRAENE
Author and African Correspondent of 'Le Monde'

MONROVIA, capital of the Republic of Liberia, served as th setting during July of last year for the first meeting of Kwam Nkrumah, Sékou Touré and William Tubman, the government heads of Ghana, Guinea and Liberia. The meeting was a sig of the great acceleration in the steady change of Africa; fo since the accession of the Gold Coast to independence in Ma 1957 under the name of Ghana, the historic evolution of th Continent has altered its rhythm. On the morrow of the Secon World War, the only independent States in Africa were Egyp Liberia, Ethiopia and the Union of South Africa. Today ther are six more: Libya, the formerly Anglo-Egyptian Sudan Morocco, Tunisia, Ghana and Guinea. In 1960, Togolanc Cameroun, Sierra-Leone, the formerly Italian Somaliland, an Nigeria—the largest and most populous of the territories sti under British rule—will achieve their independence. TH Constitution of the 5th French Republic makes—in Article 86— provision for the right to independence.

Pan-Africanism is clearly on the march. The formation

French Community, the two Accra Conferences, the opoldville riots, the creation of the Mali Federation and the ana-Guinea Union are each a step on the road towards the terialisation of the Pan-African ideal. Whether or not it is ely to be consummated in our time, Pan-Africanism is never-less one of the most powerful forces at work in the second f of our century. And the meeting of the three African tesmen, unthinkable less than three years ago, proves clearly t African unity has become a positive reality. Yet the diffi-lties encountered at the meeting show too that, in spite of the ll to transcend national barriers, there remain significant stacles in the way of the ideal.

It was on September 23, 1958, that M. Sékou Touré and . Kwame Nkrumah decided to unite Guinea and Ghana and this way form the nucleus of a United States of Africa. ciprocal technical and administrative aid was promised; d Ghana made £10,000,000 available to Guinea for essential velopment. Coming as it did at the time of discussions on e European Common Market and the Free Exchange Zone, e union was seen in France as a manipulation of the British reign and Colonial Offices; it is believed that no such union ould have taken place had the tension then existing between uinea and France not forced M. Touré to turn eastwards.

Be that as it may, the Ghana-Guinea Union exists so far only theory. No legal document has as yet given it concrete rm; and there exist many factors which may yet prevent the alisation of a real and complete fusion of the two States. ne journey of Dr. Nkrumah to Guinea in May, 1959, has hieved no positive results beyond a communiqué inviting the aders of other African States to join their efforts to those of cra and Conakry. The very fact that Ghana and Guinea main in their respective monetary zones must compromise e efficacy and efficiency of the Union. Perhaps the real planation of the Union's inadequacy lies in the lack of under-nding between French- and English-speaking Africans. The nsiderable differences between the British and French colonial stems seem to have resulted in the creation of two West fricas which remain fundamentally foreign to one another; ough how fundamentally, history must decide.

Four months after the proclamation of the Ghana-Guinea nion, 44 representatives of Senegal, Dahomey, Sudan and aute-Volta met at Dakar and decided—on 17th January, 1959

—to regroup these four republics into a Mali Federation. T presidency of the Federal Assembly was entrusted to M. Mobi Keita. The 62 articles of the constitution—voted unanimous and by acclamation—stipulated Dakar as the capital, French the official language, and Dahomey, Senegal, the Sudanese a Voltaic Republics as the four member States. The Feder institutions were to be three in number: the Executive w placed in the hands of the Federal President, who chooses Ministers, two from each member State. The legislative pow was vested in a Federal Legislative Assembly, elected for fi years and made up of 12 delegates from each of the membe States nominated by their respective legislative assemblie Any West African State was made able to join the Federatio at any time, provided it was a republic and respected th separation of powers.

The Mali Federation, as it was then conceived, was an ir portant African entity. But, both economically and dem graphically, the dominance of the Senegal-Sudan axis w crushing. Moreover, Dahomey and Haute-Volta were not on "poor" partners, but reluctant ones. For Haute-Volta greatly dependent economically on the Ivory Coast, whi Dahomey is traditionally more closely linked with Lagos Niamey. This explains why ratification of the new constitutio met with great difficulties at Ouagadougou and Porto-Nov The referendum organized in March, 1959, in the Haute-Vol Republic was a defeat for the federalists; and the Dahom leaders, since the decision of the French government to bui a harbour at Cotonou, have grown more antagonistic to th Mali Federation. Both republics have passed from the camp M. Senghor to that of M. Houphouet-Boigny; they are no long looking towards Dakar, but towards the Ivory Coast.

After the conference at Dakar on March 25, 1959, at whic the *Parti de la Fédération Africaine* was born, a new Mali Unio was formed, uniting Senegal and Sudan into a Federal Stat within the French Community. The Presidency of the Gover ment has been entrusted to M. Mobido Keita, and the Presidenc of the Assembly to M. Léopold Sedar Senghor. By limiting, fo the moment, its territorial ambitions to Senegal and Suda this new Mali Federation has gained both in economic balanc and in cohesion; though differences of opinion exist betwee the various leaders of the P.F.A., Dakar being less intransige in its attitude to France than Bamako.

ince the proclamation of the Mali Federation, a further itorial regrouping—that of Senegambia—has become likely. 270,000 inhabitants of Gambia belong to the same ethnic uping as the Senegalese, and historically the countries have e links. In December, 1958, M. Mamadou Dia, head of Senegalese government, went to Bathurst to propose the ation of a customs union, the use of the Gambia river for the sit of Senegalese goods, technical and financial co-operation hin the framework of a common organization, the fixing of groundnut price for both countries, and cultural exchanges. annot be long before the British possession and the formerly nch one are linked together.

n April, 1959, Paris learnt that the governments of the Ivory st and the Voltaic Republic had signed an agreement in reply the new Mali Federation. Dominated by M. Houphouet-gny's allegiance to the French Community, the agreement s politically more flexible and much less basic. The harbour Abidjan in the Ivory Coast became a common establishment, ministered by a board on which both republics are represented. e Abidjan-Niger railway was to be used communally by both ntries, and road transportation was to be co-ordinated. e communal exploitation of postal services was to be studied, l a complete customs union was instituted, with provision for equitable distribution of the duties and taxes received. *Conseil de l'Entente* was to regulate all affairs concerning both vernments, and an inter-State Convention would create the onds de Solidarité'' provided for in the constitution of the ory Coast. Finally, a common Court of Appeal would sit in idjan until the Haute-Volta could acquire its own.

Although the Niamey-Abidjan economic axis seems less solid n the Ouagadougou-Abidjan one—mainly because it is longer a formal agreement was signed soon afterwards by Niger, the ory Coast and the Haute-Volta. Dahomey in its turn, after e fall of the Apithy government, gave its consent; and the hel-Bénin Union or the United States of the *Conseil de l'Entente* s born.

Finally one must mention the *Etats Associés Africains* launched t February by President Tubman, a ''friendly Convention'' gulating navigation and commerce among African States eady—or soon to be—independent. Sufficiently flexible to ow each of the signatories to retain its national sovereignty d identity, the Convention rejects any idea of political uni-

fication and is regarded with grave doubts by the orthod Pan-Africanists, who see in it an American manoeuvre to su stitute for a United States of Africa a flexible association mo acceptable to the European powers.

Yet, despite the enormous advances in Pan-Africanism in short a time, serious obstacles remain in the path of the idea The newly independent African States are jealous of their har won national sovereignty and reluctant to surrender any part it. It is for this reason that the leaders of Mauritania keep the distance from other black African States; and that Nigeria, soo to be independent, shows no signs of wanting to delegate son of its powers to Ghana in any immediate West Africa Federation.

Within the States themselves, unity must first be accor plished. Togo and Dahomey are sharply divided into a Nor and a South; and in Guinea, the Christianised Soussous of th coastal zone keep strictly apart from the Islamised peoples Fouta-Djallon. In Ghana, the better-developed coastal str lives in uneasy partnership with the neighbouring Ashantis an Togoland, and more uneasily still with the underdeveloped an politically retarded "Northern Territories". In Nigeria, th Hausas of the North, with their Moslem Emirs, fear the hegs mony of the "Men of the South"; while the Baileke of Souther Cameroun revealed their particularism in the elections January, 1958.

Much of the disunity results, of course, from the collision entrenched chiefly privileges with the establishment of univers suffrage. Dr. Nkrumah's principal difficulties have been wit the Chief of the Ashanti; in Haute-Volta, those elements mo hostile to the Mali Federation are found mainly in the entourag of Moro-Naba, who reigns over 1,700,000 subjects living aroun Ouagadougou; while the Ivory Coast authorities face a deman by the king of Assinia, H.M. Amon Ndoffu III, to rule indepen dently over his tiny kingdom of 8,000 kms. and 45,000 subject The king and his councillors are now in Abidjan prison awaitin judgment on the charge of having "threatened the security the State". In Guinea too, the very first move of M. Séko Touré has been to suppress the chieftainships and strip all politica power from the chiefs of Fouta-Djallon. M. Ahidjo, however promulgating on January 1, 1959, the new Statute of Camerour inserted a clause entrenching the rights of the chiefs; and th Nigerian authorities have created a Chamber of Traditional Chief

ie clash of political personalities also plays a part. The ion of French Africa into two political clans is something than a quarrel between "federalists" and "anti-federal-; it is the result of the rivalry between Dakar and Abidjan, nore exactly between M. Senghor and M. Houphouet-ny, for the political leadership of French West Africa. itish Africa, this struggle for leadership is focussed in the ict between Dr. Nkrumah and Mr. Azikiwe, and, within ria itself, in the rivalry for leadership of the State by Mr. iwe, Mr. Awolowo and the Sadurna of Sokoto. Those who d over-emphasize the significance of such collisions, ver, must have been amazed by the visit of Dr. Nkrumah to ria in February last year. Pan-Africanism is a living force ghout West Africa; though personal rivalry must tend to en it, and nobody can predict how the principal actors in West African Confederation—Dr. Nkrumah, M. Touré, Tubman, Mr. Awolowo, M. Senghor, M. Dia, M. houet-Boigny and M. Mobido Keita—will submit to making f their number the star.

nguistic obstacles cannot be ignored. Knowledge of both ch and English is extremely rare in West Africa; and, for mmediate future, the unity of French- and English-speaking munities, as in the proposed merger of the British and h Camerouns, is likely to encounter severe practical ulties in administration.

nomic obstacles are most significant; and a United States rica will doubtless create a number of problems of economic etition, both in the fields of production and investment. difference in economic prosperity between Ghana and ea, for example, is likely to put Guinea under the economic ge of Accra. For Ghana is today the world's first producer coa, the third of industrial diamonds, and the fifth of nese. It has, moreover, a population twice that of a's, a reserve fund of £200,000,000, important bauxite its and an export trade ten times that of its partner. field of African investments, difficult but inevitable choices ave to be made; and it will not be easy to decide which t should be given priority over another. In the field of the o-metallurgy of aluminium alone, four projects are in etition: the 'Volta River Authority' in Ghana, the ouré' in Guinea, the 'Kouilou' in the French Congo, and nga' in the Belgian Congo.

The young African States, weighted down by heavy und development, are reluctant to add to their burdens. Some them request financial aid from France while rather shameles refusing to link their fate with that of their less prosper neighbours. The Ivory Coast, thanks to its coffee and toba exports, has an annual foreign currency surplus of 16 milli francs; yet the middle classes, mainly African small-holde who govern at Abidjan refuse to share these profits with members of a federation the very functioning of which may strike them as too onerous. Neither Lagos nor Ibadan wis a compromise of its existing prosperity by the integration of local economy into a larger unit; and this doubtless accounts the lukewarm attitude of Nigerians towards West African un

Over and above the purely African obstacles to be overcor there is the influence of the great powers and more particul that of France and Britain, each of which countries attem in its own interests, to regroup the African units around its Great Britain, faithful to its fifteen year old policy of 'leavin order to stay', tries to establish African federations; w France, which has always rejected indirect rule and still posse a vague nostalgia for assimilation, dreams of a federal repu 'from the Rhine to the Congo'.

The British colonial system has often—not unreasonabl been compared with that of Carthage, the French with tha Rome. The British always placed their commercial inter above any humanitarian responsibilities, discouraging economic and social development of their colonized peo where such was not to their clear economic benefit. If t practised indirect rule, it was mainly to avoid the high cos administration and concentrate on high investment retu Yet not only was the British government the first to grant dependence to a colonial territory; but, having once ag to independence for the Gold Coast, it released Dr. Nkru from jail to offer him the premiership. And by subordina Nigerian independence to the retention of those federal l which Britain herself had created, it successfully prevented balkanisation of the huge territory. By playing off local rival the British government could have split the country up into t or four separate and competing units; but by having full fidence in its African élite, it worked for its own inter leaving intact one of the greatest economic and political u of Africa and assuring Britain's own economic future. Re

ng the intensity and potential of Pan-Africanism, the British e joined—and so strengthened—the current. The policy lready paying dividends. Since Ghana achieved indepen- ce, its white population has doubled; and the Governor- neral at Accra has more effective authority than the High mmissioner of the French Republic at Lomé, while at the same e being less severely criticised by the people he administers. he legalistic turn of the French mind, accentuated by the ns' trust of lawyers who govern the 5th Republic in ignorance African realities, has formulated the concept of the *Com- auté*. Faithful to the assimilationist idea, France wants is—and not Dakar or Abidjan or Tananarive—to be the tre of the Community. To the Pan-African ideal she replies the ideal of Eurafrica, a project which has already been ngly condemned by the majority of responsible African ers. The greater degree of autonomy that the French ernment has recently given to the territories under its trol, the existence of an important French-speaking élite, the easing economic investment by France and the encourage- t she is giving to social development—all this will greatly the maintenance of the *Présence Française* in Africa. But one or has roused suspicion against her—that France refused to *de facto* independence to her former colonial possessions, ing them to choose between independence and continued mbership of the Community. The authors of the 5th ublic have chosen a federal system around France and look nce at any inter-African regrouping; in the minds of many rance's present leaders, the desire for unity in Africa masks itorial or personal ambitions at variance with the interests rance. It is this defensive reflex which explains, at least art, why the appeal by Mali for an effective regrouping of ch West Africa awakened no response in Paris.

is easy to conclude from this that France favours the balkan- on of Africa, and Britain the unity. But the present French titution permits any number of political arrangements, the most rigid federal system to a loose confederacy. The itable head-on collision between M. Senghor and M. phouet-Boigny has not yet taken place; and there is no on why French common-sense should not come to terms with Africanism, and the partisans of a French Commonwealth ail over the defenders of a strict federal orthodoxy.

TORIES AND THE COMMONWEALTH

LORD ALTRINCHAM
Editor of 'The National and English Review'

It is wrong to think that the British Conservative Party has peculiarly bad record in Imperial, or Commonwealth, affair The myth has gained currency for various reasons which I w examine later; but first I must state quite categorically tha while no British Party has any cause to be proud of its recor the Conservative Party has done no worse than its rivals. some respects it has done better.

The Liberal Party in the 19th century believed in econom mastery, without obligation to the weak. The industrial midd class on which it was based wanted only cheap raw materia and easy markets. Disraeli's imagination, and Joseph Chambe lain's prophetic business sense, enabled the Conservative Par towards the end of the century to acquire an interest in t Empire. There were grave flaws in both Disraeli's and Chambe lain's type of imperialism, but they were at least preferable the short-sighted cupidity of the Manchester School. Gladston it is true, had some inkling of what was later to become t Commonwealth idea, and he saw the moral and practical nec sity for coming to terms with Irish nationalism; but even was capable of sending an expeditionary force to crush a national rising in Egypt. Moreover, Liberal policy towards South Afric which, like the Labour Party's towards India, is often parad in shining contrast to that of the Tories, does not appear have been very virtuous on closer inspection. The Boer W was simply a fight for supremacy between two white tribes: t Tories (supported at the time by many Liberals) won a cos victory for the British tribe, but the Liberals, when they came power, made a settlement which ensured the ultimate dominati of the Boer. Campbell-Bannerman, not Milner, was responsi for the present tragic situation in the Union of South Afri

The Liberals cannot claim to have championed the rights the Africans and Asians: they exploited the so-called "Chin slavery" issue for electoral purposes, but in the long run th dispensation was more injurious to the oppressed majority South Africa than that of a Tory Government would have be

After the first World War the Liberal Party was ousted by Labour Party, which also depended upon sectional support the United Kingdom. The captains of industry gave way to

-commissioned officers—the trade union bosses. What did mean, in terms of British Imperial policy? As spokesmen the underdog at home the Socialists also proclaimed their cern for the colonial underdog, but their words were not ched by deeds. The 1945 Labour Government "gave" ependence to India, Pakistan, Ceylon and Burma, but it is r from all the evidence that Britain *could* not have held the ian sub-continent, even had the Government been willing to Attlee and his colleagues were making a virtue of necessity, Attlee himself was going back on the principles which he had ped to lay down as a member of the Simon Commission. I am te sure that he was right to do so, and that his earlier views e absurdly cautious and conservative. But I am equally sure his mind was changed by the logic of events, rather than by belief in independence for its own sake.

his is corroborated by Labour's record in Africa. They had years in which to bestow democratic rights and grant self-ernment to the African colonies. By 1951 only the most dest progress had been made, the position of the European lers in Kenya was virtually unchanged, Seretse Khama had n exiled after contracting a mixed marriage, and Dr. Nkrumah been incarcerated. The radicalism of the Labour Party was fined to winning a place in the sun for British trade unionists. as been well said that a Labour man is a Conservative without ney. The Labour rank-and-file is insular and mildly jingoistic, the Labour leadership looks above all to the underdogs o have votes in a British General Election.

Economically, no British Party has shown anything like erosity towards the overseas territories. Every penny spent the Labour Government outside Britain was more than ered by American loans and grants, so it would be strictly to say that between 1945 and 1951 the United States was ncing the Commonwealth. Even now the Americans are ng far more than the UK to help the independent Common-lth nations; but what the UK is doing is at least being paid out of its own earnings and savings. The Colonial Welfare Development scheme, initiated during the War by a Tory onial Secretary, Mr. Oliver Stanley, as a means of helping dependent territories to acquire basic amenities and services, so far involved less money all told than is spent *each year* providing subsidies for British agriculture! The Labour Party ounced in its Election manifesto that it would spend one

per cent. of the national income on underdeveloped countries more than this is, in fact, already being spent by the Tor Government, but it is pitifully inadequate. I should like to se the figure raised to five per cent. or more, and there is reason t hope that Mr. Macmillan, fortified by his victory at the poll will take more drastic steps to narrow the gap between th "haves" and "have-nots" in the Commonwealth as a whol He has recently been talking about the problem—notably in h television discussion with President Eisenhower last Septembe —and I shall be surprised if he does not act accordingly over th next five years.

The Tory Party has two handicaps in regard to the Commo wealth—the legacy of what I will call romantic-strateg imperialism (of which Disraeli and Winston Churchill have bee the arch-protagonists), and a tendency to support Europea minorities against indigenous majorities. The former has bee no more than intermittent, and it must never be forgotten th Baldwin pushed through Indian reforms in the 1930's in th teeth of opposition from Churchill and a strong faction of th Tory Party. The vindication of Churchill's views on foreig policy, and the enormous prestige which he gained as Prim Minister during the War, had the unfortunate effect of revivin the influence of his Imperial daydreams, which would otherwis have died a natural death. Much that has happened since—mo especially the Suez catastrophe and the futile struggle again Cypriot nationalism—may be attributed to a Churchillian moo in the Tory Party, though it must be said that Churchill himse had the genius and magnanimity to avoid, while he was in offic such errors as lesser men have committed in an attempt t resemble him.

The other Tory handicap stems from Joseph Chamberlai and is a preoccupation with the economic aspects of imperialism to the exclusion of political, and at times of moral, consider tions. The latest example has been the imposing of Federatio in Central Africa, combined with blatant favouritism for Eur pean settlers in the Rhodesias and in Kenya. Despite the lesso of the West Indies—that European economic interests can be be preserved by the timely concession of political rights to no Europeans—the Tories have until now been trying to mainta European political control in East and Central Africa. I believ however, that the Nyasaland Emergency and the Devlin Repo have caused a profound reappraisal in Whitehall, superfici

earances notwithstanding. The immediate official reaction he Devlin Report (as to the historic Durham Report in the century) was hostile; but the Devlin Report has, like the ham Report, a compelling quality, which no Government permanently resist.

lready the signs are hopeful. Mr. Iain Macleod has succeeded Alan Lennox-Boyd at the Colonial Office. Mr. Macleod is ral-minded, ruthless and intensely ambitious. He must know a last-ditch fight for the old structure of European privilege frica would be his own political undoing: he will therefore ke the best bargain he can with African nationalists, and dis- oint the extreme Right of his own Party—as President de lle has disappointed the Algerian *ultras*. Lord Monckton accepted the chairmanship of the Central African Commission, paratory to the constitutional review. As Minister of Labour r 1951, Monckton had the job of convincing the trade unions a Tory Government was their friend, and he succeeded irably—because he was always prepared to give way and mpromise. A sharply intelligent man, he will not allow nos- ia for the past to cloud his judgment of contemporary realities. cmillan himself is a composite character: he has suffered, in time, from both the Churchillian and the Chamberlainite tudes towards the Empire. He actively encouraged the assault Egypt in 1956—but he was quick to withdraw from the roglio when he saw how disastrous it was, and he will bably soon be shaking hands with President Nasser. As eign Secretary he refused to discuss self-determination for prus—but he has since agreed to it. No doubt he will soon be eting Dr. Banda as he lately greeted Archbishop Makarios. is a pragmatist with a reforming instinct, and he is not weighed vn by scruple. As Chairman of the Conservative Party he has ointed Mr. R. A. Butler, who as Under-Secretary for India ped to pilot the Government of India Bill through the House Commons despite all that Churchill could do, and who is erally felt to epitomize the Tory Left. By giving him control he Party organization, Macmillan has shown that he intends esist any Rightward move which might follow the electoral mph of October 8th.

The 1955 Tory Government made mistakes and even, in my nion, committed one or two crimes of an imperialist nature. paradoxically Mr. Lennox-Boyd has been an outstanding onial Secretary. He is completely innocent of racial prejudice

and has mixed very freely with people in every part of i Commonwealth. He has also been responsible for major co stitutional advances—the independence of Ghana and Mala the birth of the Caribbean Federation, the successful negotiati of terms for Nigerian independence, and much else. His o weakness has been in dealing with European settlers: he neither communicated to them his own enlightened view race relations, nor has he had the temerity to overrule the But the value of his work will be recognized long after mistakes have been forgiven and almost forgotten.

The Tory Party has the advantage of refusing to take t "Little England" view that its opponents have, in their differe ways, been inclined to adopt. That refusal has, as I have tried suggest, a dangerous and undesirable side: it can go with imperialism which is either predatory or vainglorious. But t good side must not be overlooked. When all the cant a hypocrisy have been discounted, there remains a residue philanthropy which, together with a traditional shrewdness a adaptability, may lead through crisis to co-operation. But t Party must shed its belief in the entrenchment of Europe political power; must take the risk (which Disraeli took in t country) of mass enfranchisement in advance of mass educatio and must lose its paternalistic tone, which is irritating to th who are up-and-coming, both at home and abroad. Macmil was much improved by his Commonwealth tour at the beginn of 1958, and he seems to have been further improved by t chastening experience of Central Africa. His authority is u challenged, his team is united, and the country is so absorb with its own affairs that it will pay little attention to what is do outside. One may therefore hope that the present Tory Gove ment will gradually calm the understandable fears of libe observers who were shocked by events during the last Parliam and have noticed only the defects of Tory thinking on t Commonwealth.

AFRICA AND THE BRITISH ELECTORATE

JAMES CAMERON

Foreign Affairs Correspondent and Columnist of the 'News Chronicle'

ROUGHOUT that lowering night of the General Election I was he radio studio on a long circuit to North America, "inter- ting", as the fulsome phrase goes, whatever trends appeared. task, however dispiriting, was at least simple. As the hours gged by, one felt rather like one of Napoleon's junior officers ng a running commentary on Waterloo.

t one point in the debacle the remark came from our side that dissolution of the Labour Party's hopes "would be taken as low by great numbers of people in Africa". There was a oo-mile-off pause at the other end, and then the interlocutor : "I don't get you. How does Africa come into your tion set-up over there?"

low indeed, one might have replied. The next few days not provide much of an answer. One of the extra pangs of post-election hang-over was the broad satisfaction, even ltation, with which the result was hailed overseas by such as Roy Welensky and Winston Field, who lost no time in king clear their relief at a narrow escape. To be sure, this ne as no surprise to those who pay some heed to the African ne; and to those who do not, it passed unnoticed. The fact , and is, that Africa as an election issue had wholly failed. ed is perhaps not the right word. In the broad picture of campaign, it never got off the ground at all.

There were some commentators, chiefly myself, who came in some pained and occasionally angry reproof from the Labour for criticising the campaign as trivial at the best, and some- es even evasive. I said myself before the polls that for the t Parties of Britain to present the case for the future in terms City share-pushing or the purchase tax on washing machines to treat the electorate as a crowd of solely avaricious and -interested introverts, a fantastic state of affairs in the world oday. The Tories set this rather contemptible pace with r slogan of "Prosperity", but Labour fell only too readily line. The high commands of both sides actually appeared take pains to avoid emphasis on the great contemporary rnational theme, of which Africa was an essential part—not

by any means the only one, but in some ways the biggest.

There were regional exceptions; some of the candidates chose on their own responsibility to point out that every elector was simultaneously giving a vote in trust for the voteless Africans who, in their anxieties, could look for help to nobody else. There were constituencies where the word "Hola" was something more than just an easy heckling-word to interject. But on the whole Labour failed to challenge the Conservatives on the issues where they were palpably vulnerable—Suez, Kenya, Central Africa—insisting instead on competing in fields where the Tories were pretty well impregnable: fiscal matters, domestic stability, and so on. In other words, the broad strategy of the campaign ignored or avoided most things that could be considered moral issues or questions of fundamental human principle. To the evergreen argument that "no election is ever won on an international or colonial issue" one can only say: of course not, since these issues are never properly presented.

It surprised some of us, for example, that a really vigorous effort was not concentrated with all the top-level Socialist resources on Mid-Bedfordshire, where Alan Lennox-Boyd was balanced on a majority of less than 4,000. To have defeated the Colonial Secretary in his own constituency would not only have compensated greatly for having let him get away with Cyprus and Kenya and Nyasaland in the House but would, one cannot help feeling, have been quite possible. Instead, he was permitted to boost his majority by more than 1,000. The fact that he has finally shifted his activities from the Colonies to the Breweries does not diminish the unhappy effect of this.

So Labour lost, crushingly. That it probably deserved to can be small consolation to those in Africa who had so eagerly hoped otherwise. The question must arise now: does Africa mean anything at all to the broad mass of the British electorate?

Of course it is an impossible question to answer objectively: I myself have been told over and again that I am the last person to try to do so; preoccupied as I am with overseas affairs and indeed earning my bread and butter from their consideration, I get furiously impatient with those who think wholly in terms of washing-machines. Obviously Africa means something to the British electorate; and increasingly so, as the problems of the continent intrude themselves more and more dramatically into the British conscience. Equally obviously it does not mean

ything like enough. Africa means something to the City, to veral religious groups, notably the Church of Scotland, and to e public that goes to big-game movies. It means something readers of the 'Observer', the 'News Chronicle', and the litical weeklies. It is probably fair to say that it means a eat deal more to them this year than it did last, and last year an it did the year before. It is still, in all conscience, little ough.

No individual can presume to assess a national attitude except terms of his own limited experience of it; my own has to rive largely from reactions I find to my own work. African ntroversies produce reactions more deeply felt and emotional, d at the same time less widespread, than for any of the more niliar cold-war issues. Until the state of emergency in the deration, no African situation had produced any reaction mparable to that over Cyprus, for example, which is reason-le enough since no comparable body of British troops was volved. In any case, the real answer to any sort of public gagement in a political problem is in its treatment by the ess, and it is part of the character of the British Press that it is nost impossible for any colonial issue to interest a Fleet Street ws editor until it has begun to express itself in violence. is is, of course, a truism. A drop or two of blood shed here d there (however irrelevant to the main argument) is worth ore column-inches to a colonial question than a year of patient litics; the implications of this are serious. There are prob-y a million Englishmen who think of the late Kenya troubles hen they ever do) as something grotesque and incompre-nsible and orgiastic for every one who knows even superficially at the devil it was all about. While the Press carries a big d of responsibility for this semi-frivolous public attitude, it is t easy to know what to do about it. Even serious journalists, nstakingly well-informed on the African subjects, even the sil Davidsons and Oliver Woods, know the difficulties of roducing analytical articles that cannot be "pegged", as they , to the news that someone has got himself slashed with a nga somewhere.

Naturally this explains the curiously erratic and spasmodic ttern of African coverage in the British Press. It also explains problem with which we are faced every time an endemic uation momentarily solves its frustrations by exploding, in ing to explain, every time anew, the basic facts behind this

particular melodrama. The resulting over-simplifications satisfy nobody, and frequently do as much harm as good.

This is perhaps not invariably true. Last year's violent affray in Nyasaland was in itself so shocking to ordinary British opinion —and its repercussions through the Devlin Commission and the subsequent public argument so prolonged—that time and opportunity were provided for a fairly thorough explanation of the whole impasse of the Federation. Probably ten times more ordinary British citizens are at least *aware* of a Central African problem now than ever were twelve months ago, albeit in a vague and baffled way. (It is for this reason that the Labour Party's inability to capitalise on this during the Election seems the more unfortunate.)

Similarly nothing for a long time managed to project South Africa into the British consciousness until the Cato Manor affair in Durban during the summer. It was not, I feel, a particularly significant incident, nor more explicitly symbolic of the situation than many others; nevertheless, the news broke accompanied by one particularly dramatic photograph which was front-paged by almost every English daily paper, and for a while imaginations were seized. There was a photograph of what were unmistakably women being bludgeoned by what were unmistakably policemen. It served to rouse people more immediately than any of us had been able to do for years with our endless written polemics about the Union, and for a while South Africa was worthy of heated discussion. For a while—until the next time.

The British attitude towards South Africa is extremely typical. Even the most cynical cannot deny that the British electorate is aware of South Africa, that the name suggests an emotion of bitter dislike, and that apart from a handful of professional apologists you will find no one prepared to defend the Nationalists. Popular newspapers no longer feel it necessary to define the word "apartheid" with an explanatory footnote (and if you don't think that this is an advance, you should have tried to write about the Union a couple of years ago). In general terms, South Africa lurks somewhere in the British subconscious as an evil, as the symbol and apotheosis of intolerance, as the inexplicable paradox of the Commonwealth theme. Here and there it occurs to some people to do something about it—I was myself surprised on my last return from the Union to find the Boycott idea already germinating in many unexpected quarters. It would be absurd to say that the Boycott has yet even begun to

pinge on the buying habits of anything but the tiniest minority yet last week, when my wife was buying grapes in our little ighbouring Chelsea greengrocer and stipulated "Not South rican, please", the old lady in the shop said: "That's funny, u're the fourth person this week who's said that".

There is a long way to go. Not every territorial problem is as mprehensible as that of South Africa. The question of the deration, while gradually rising to the surface, is still deeply nfused. Sir Roy Welensky, on his frequent appearances in the nited Kingdom, is a different political animal from the laird of lisbury. Sir Roy giving avuncular tongue to his Press Con-rences, Sir Roy making deprecating gestures on the television, ves the impression of making "partnership" a real word. To nnoisseurs of the cosy approach, Sir Roy in England is by ay of being a success. He has had his work cut out counter-ting the more articulate follies of Lord Malvern, but by and rge he has done it, on personality. After the Election he can w argue, I suppose, that his reward is at hand.

This is not intended to be a defeatist, or depressing, picture. ompared with the picture of public opinion a year or two ago is, indeed, encouraging. Where the British public is informed n African issues, it is almost invariably on the right side. That is not yet well enough informed is to a great degree our fault, hose job it is to enlighten; and to that extent an improvement certain, since every year there are more of us qualified to do so.

There is no use in those of us who feel committed to the frican cause disguising our discouragement and regret at the rn events have taken at the polls. Our work will be that much rder, and longer. I do not think it will be shirked.

TOWARDS AN AFRICAN LITERATURE
XI: THE HARP OF THE NATION

Dr. A. C. JORDAN
Lecturer in Bantu Languages, University of Cape Town

In the first few years of its life, from 1871 to 1878, '*ISIGIDIMI*' was highly respected and trusted by the literate section of the Africans. Politicians, ministers of religion and lovers of general cultural progress paid tribute to it in prose and poetry. But with the sharpening of the struggle between black and white in the bloodiest period of the Wars of Dispossession, the people become disillusioned; and, by 1884, hardly any of the leading writers has a good word to say for the journal.

One of the most outstanding figures of this period was a contributor from St. John's Mission, Umtata, who styled himself "*UHadi Waseluhlangeni*" (The Harp of the Nation). The author of the poem whose first two stanzas (in translation) concluded our previous instalment, "Hadi" was a highly respected writer of great intellectual integrity, widely read for that period in the literacy of the Southern Africans. It seems that no controversy could be brought to a close in '*ISIGIDIMI*' until "Hadi" had made his contribution. If he did not write, either the other participants or interested readers suggested that it was about time that he did so. As a rule his contribution to any discussion was in the form of a prose essay, but he often concluded with a poem inspired by the subject under discussion.

When '*ISIGIDIMI*' was adversely criticized by its readers "Hadi" implored the editor to exercise patience. He commended '*ISIGIDIMI*' for not losing heart in the face of such severe criticism, and likened the journal to a warrior at whom the enemy have hurled so many spears that his body becomes like that of a porcupine. Nevertheless, the warrior walks boldly on like an elephant:

Press on to the heights of Ararat,
Thy people borne bravely on thy back,
Rescued from the torrent of ignorance.
Be patient as a toiling mother
Famished, but hoeing and weeding the corn,
Her baby crying on her back,
Her corn plants withering in the sun,

t must be remembered that the wars of this period include War of Nchavechibi, against the Xhosa (1877-8), the Zulu ar (1879), and the Gun War, mainly against the Basuto 80-1). In '*ISIGIDIMI*', the whole struggle was made to appear the Xhosa reader as a struggle between Heathendom, repre-ted by "*utshaba*" (the enemy), and Christendom, represented "our troops", "the troops of Victoria, Child of the Beauti-". Those Africans who were defending their land against the ite invaders were cast as villains, and opposition to annexation l white domination was made to appear as hostility to "the ogress of the Word". Any reverse suffered by the white ops was greatly deplored, while every one of their conquests s hailed as "the triumph of the Word".

There is evidence in the letters to the editor that for a time readers were infected by this propaganda—propaganda that cessfully neutralized the African Christian intellectuals during fighting. Indeed, one writer urged that as soon as any terri-y was conquered, the pagan chieftain should immediately replaced by a Christian preacher. "Why should territory t has been won for Christ continue to be ruled by a heathen?" en when the people in general wanted to revolt against the t of Disarmament, one writer, Daniso Bulube, maintained that blacks should be forbidden firearms until they had read the ble! The first indications that the people had lost confidence '*ISIGIDIMI*' appear in 1881, when a Kimberley writer who les himself "*Ndingummbi*" (I-am-a-digger) asks indignantly: Whose messenger is '*ISIGIDIMI*'?" He is followed by several ers, including one Ndzeku who condemns '*ISIGIDIMI*' as *epa elifileyo*" (a dead paper).

It was not until April 2, 1883, after the editor had tried to fend himself against these attacks, that "Hadi" wrote as lows: "I am discussing the hostility that exists between *IGIDIMI*' and its readers across the Kei. The reason would em to be this, that the younger intellectuals say they can never ke out the true nationality of '*ISIGIDIMI*'. '*ISIGIDIMI*' never es up a clear stand on political matters. It sides with the whites, whenever a writer voices the feelings of the blacks, *IGIDIMI*' immediately makes him understand that he belongs the side of the enemy. For instance, a writer who tried to t in a word for Langalibalele (a Hlubi chief) was quickly mersed under the waters of silence: while another writer, o expressed the idea that Langalibalele was a mere goat

trying to fight against an elephant, was given praise and his words were echoed far and wide.

"In these days, when the nation is sickening to death, in these days of long-lasting wars and short-lived peace, it is demanded of you by the youth of your fatherland that you give them the length and breadth and depth of national news. Moreover, it is demanded of you that you make a clearing in your paper, a clearing that you have to keep clean for men of conflicting views, so that in this clearing they may discuss all the matters that so affect their welfare and the welfare of all the blacks. Only then shall we know what we are doing. As a result of this practice, there will emerge in this clearing national orators and bards, some praising our side, and others praising the other side. Why cannot a bard emerge for once from the people of Mokhachane (Basuto) and sing as follows:—

Arise, ye sons of the Mountain-at-Night!
The hyena howls, the white hyena,
All ravenous for the bones of Moshoeshoe,
Of Moshoeshoe who sleeps high up on the mountain.

Its belly hangs heavy and drags on the ground,
All gorged with the bones of warrior-kings;
Its mouth is red with the blood of Sandile.[1]

Awake, rock-rabbits of the Mountain-at-Night!
She darts out her tongue to the very skies,
That rabbit-snake with female breasts[2]
Who suckled and fostered the trusting Fingos,
Thereafter to eat them alive."

In our last instalment we mentioned the attitude of the African intellectuals to the quarrels amongst representatives of the various churches. The Africans would seem to have thought that it did not matter very much which church you joined, so long as you became a Christian. "Hadi" has a fairly long essay on this and kindred subjects.

"The study of theology can never make one Christian body of us blacks. There are books and books on theology, and in their nature they are very polemical, and theology itself is a sea whose waves keep things asunder. Although they all sleep in the one womb of the Bible, these books kick one another

[1]Xhosa chief.
[2]Queen Victoria.

ke Jacob and Esau in their mother's womb. Luther and Zwingli e the founders of Protestantism. They are one in their attitude sin and in regarding the scriptures as the only true beacon of ith. But in their theology they differed so much that Luther cused Zwingli of being a pagan. . . . If our forebears differed much over theology, how can we hope to be united? The otestantism that rescued us with a firm hand from the ignorant orship of the Roman Catholic Church has not the strength to nd us together into a unity like that of the Father and the Son.

"The spirit of enquiry, which is our pride and the pride of ese days, has torn the body of the church apart. Even the early aders of the church, who met at large conferences and tried to it the body together, did not succeed. Instead of coming to me agreement, their views scattered in all directions like ackers on Guy Fawkes Day. . . . And yet the true children of od in the Presbyterian, in the Wesleyan and in the Anglican nurch cry to one another wanting to worship together; but e heads of the church do not know where to find the needle d the thread that can sow together the shreds that they have eated . . ."

"Hadi's" disillusionment with the churches appears in a oem he wrote for '*ISIGIDIMI*' of February 1st, 1884, which gins:

Some thoughts till now ne'er spoken
Make shreds of my innermost being;
And the cares and fortunes of my kin
Still journey with me to the grave.

I turn my back on the many shams
That I see from day to day;
It seems we march to our very grave
Encircled by a smiling Gospel.

For what is this Gospel?
And what salvation?
The shade of a fabulous hili[3]
That we try to embrace in vain.

In the same year, an article by "*Hadi Waseluhlangeni*" was jected by the editor of '*ISIGIDIMI*', for being "too hostile to itish rule". The great paper was dying indeed.

[3] another name for a *thikoloshe* (a spirit).

THE POETRY OF MADAGASCAR

MIRIAM KOSHLAND

Lecturer, Broadcaster and Writer on African Poetry

MADAGASCAR's comparative smallness in size contrasts with the mosaic of her many races. Because of the island's particular geographical situation between three worlds—Asia, Africa and Australia—it has become a turning point of monsoons and a meeting place of peoples. Of these, the Indo-Malayans predominate.

In the west of the island live the *Sakalava* (''those holding the length and width''), an isolated tribe living on the shores opposite Mozambique. On the eastern plains live the *Antonosy* (''those of the island''), the *Tsimihety* (''those who do not cut their hair'') and the *Besimisiraka* (''those who are numerous and united'').

The *Antaimorona* (''those of the water's border'') occupy the south and show a preponderance of Arabic influence. It is through them that we know of the first Madagascan scripts dating back to the ninth and tenth centuries B.C. Still further south live other tribes: the *Tanala*, the *Vezo* (''those of the forest''), and the *Mahafaly* (''those who render happy''), with songs and funeral monuments similar to relics of ancient India. Next to them live the *Rara*, whose features indicate Australo-Melanesian blood.

And in the heart of Madagascar live the *Hova-Ambaniandro* (''People from under the Sun''). They are of Indo-Malayan origin and have preserved their ancient philosophy, rituals and system of caste, as well as their language. Madagascar's most important ruler was Andrianampoinimerina, a contemporary of Napoleon I. He restored the unity of the *Hova*, which had become decentralized after a period of many wars one century before his reign. He made Tananariva the capital of Imerina, extending the frontiers of this province; and in the process of conquering other tribes, living scattered around Imerina, he established the superiority of the *Hova* amongst the other groups of the island. He also divided Imerina into six administrative territories; at the same time organizing the populaton of Imerina into six classes, after the pattern of the earlier caste system of the aristocratic *Hova*. It is due to this monarch that, despite the multitude of tribes, so great a unity of language, manners and institutions exists today in Madagascar. For with

consolidation of tribes under his reign, the mixture of rica, India and the Far East became a unified country. Under drianampoinimerina too, much of the traditional Madagascan klore and poetry was collected, with its three surviving ncipal forms:

Hain-Teny	—	Poetry.
Kabary	—	Discourses.
Ohabolana	—	Philosophy.

The African poet Léopold Sedar-Senghor once said that it is ficult for someone not living in Madagascar, or "thinking as Madagascan thinks", to understand the full meaning of Hain-ny poetry, which is completely different from Western or n African poetry. Indeed, the only comparison possible is rhaps with Japanese Haiki poetry.

Verse in Madagascar originated as dialogue, the invention of ich demanded a great ability in the use of language. The bary (literally "discourses") have been, quite falsely, called Negro-Palavers" by Europeans; the origin of these "poems" l not lie in a social gathering, but rather in a means of com-unicating ideas in a particular way. The most important bary were royal proclamations and demands for marriage. The Hain-Teny, in a sense the more "popular" poems, are ems of love expressed by images and comparisons rather n by direct statement. Unfortunately Hain-Teny have been nslated as riddles, obscure poetry, erotic poetry (see sample word-games and especially proverbs. By the examples given er, this translation will be seen to be inadequate. Proverbs indeed used in the Hain-Teny language and are part of its rm, but there are no poems consisting of proverbs alone. many of these poems rhythm and form *resemble* proverbs and e therefore become more 'popular'. In the poems quoted ow, we see the difference between "pure" Hain-Teny mple 2), and the use of authentic proverbs where only the ntents reveal a poetic aspect (sample 3). In many of the ntemporary Hain-Teny, false proverbs sometimes serve as a t (sample 4); in others they serve as key or conclusion mple 5). "To speak or to think in Hain-Teny" is best made derstood in sample 6. Sometimes, as in other languages, the sic of words alone forms images (sample 7). For onomato-etic reasons it is impossible to translate this poem into any er language: its last lines express an arrogance symbolized locusts; their wing's noise is evoked in the poem's first lines.

Another important characteristic of the Hain-Teny, especially in the older poetry, is the particular insistence on a parallelism in symbols and comparisons (sample 8). Unascribed passages belong, of course, to the rich body of Madagascar's traditional poetry.

1. May I enter, Rosao-the-precious?
—Come in, Radriamatoa,
I will spread for you a clean mat.
—I do not care for a clean mat,
I want a corner of your loincloth.

2. I am astonished,
the great sterile rock
dares the diluvial rain
and in the hearth crackle
the bad grains of maize.
Like the renowned smoker
who sniffs the tobacco
when he has no hemp to burn.
Foot of hemp?
—Germ in the Andringitra,
is nothing but ashes here.
Perfidious flattery
stimulates love a little
but the plate is double-edged,
why change nature?
If you are tired of me
mirror yourself in the water of remorse,
you will decipher there a word I left.
(F. Ranaivo)

3. A little word, Mister,
a little advice, Madame.
I am not the one-who-comes-often
like a spoon of meagre capacity,
nor the one-who-talks-all-day-long
like the rivulet across the rocks . . .
I am not the one-who-dances-without-invitation,
nor the bachelor-who-gives-advice-to-the-married
since I am not like the blind who sees for others.
You are hardly so foolish that one must lecture you
you are of noble ancestry
you are the voara in the bushy foliage

the water-lilies finery in the pool. . . .
(F. Ranaivo)

4. Half-sigh imaginary flower,
The girl had come to meet me
when it occurred to her parents to stop her.
I addressed her with beautiful words
but she did not answer me . . .
You will get old here, you and remorse;
We and love
We shall go home.

5. I represent the eyes
you the ears:
you listen to me
I look at you.
I am the bird-trap
you the piastre-pieces:
if you abandon me, the weight can only loose;
should I abandon you,
you will rust.

6. This tree here, on the edge of a dream:
its blue leaves are intertwined
its black branches united
its twisted roots invisible
and its fruited flower the memory:
I think of you, Madame,
since the time we separated.
(Rabéarivelo)

7. Akory Rabehaitraitra
No miriintona tsy nisy ady?
Sa taitry ny akanga marevaka
Ka nandao ny akoho miara-nihafy?
Mihetaketaka foana ny aketa
Mibitabitaka foana ny ambolo — — —

8. Indigoplant flowering for the second time,
Ambrevade flowering for the third:
Gather what you have poured out
Take back what you abandoned:
Three times you have changed
And three times you have hardly found better . . .
(Rabéarivelo)

Here She Stands

Here she stands
her eyes reflecting crystals of sleep
her eyelids heavy with timeless dreams
her feet are rooted in the ocean
and when she lifts her dripping hands
they hold corals and shimmering salt.

She will pile them into little heaps
close to the bay of mist
and give them to nude sailors
whose tongues were cut out,
until the rains begin to fall.

Then one can no longer see her
but only her windswept hair
like a clump of unwinding seaweed
and perhaps some grains of salt.

JEAN JOSEPH RABÉARIVELO.

translated by Miriam Koshland

Love Song

Do not love me, my friend,
like your shadow—
shadows fade in the evening
and I will hold you
until the cock crows—
Do not love me like pepper,
it makes my belly too hot;
I cannot eat pepper
when I am hungry.
Do not love me like a pillow—
one would meet in sleep
and not see each other during the day.
Love me like a dream—
for dreams are your life in the night
and my hope in the day.

FLAVIEN RANAIVO

translated by Miriam Koshland.

CAR-BOY

IVAN HATTINGH

Last call, Richard's Bay.

One foot on the gearbox and one on the throttle (puffs of dust from the car ahead linger, and we thread them like a darting needle), through a cutting—whaaaa-wha-whaaaa—and we surge between the gum trees.

Gum trees in the wind sound like steam escaping . . . hissss . . . ssss.

Stones clatter against the mudguards hard . . . Ta-Ta-Ta.

Sometimes I'm not sure I've got control of the car.

The dust in front lies deep and ridged and furrowed. The country's dry.

Behind it rolls in the thunder, up and out.

Sharp turn . . . she slides sideways, but nothing comes on the empty road and we continue.

Jesus, she's done 98,000 miles. That's what one buys a Rolls for. 98,000 miles in a Plymouth and still she sways and surges forward when I kick.

Ernest's eyes are shut. His head nods.

I'm lonely.

. . . . . .

Ernest and I have travelled in this car for two years now. We've sat together in the heat and watched the dust ooze slowly through the floor and float in the hot still air. We've shared the same small space for two years. The car has thundered forward and the speedometer needle has swung rhythmically and uniformly from side to side . . . 65 . . . 60 . . . 65 . . . 60.

"What are you thinking about, Ernest?"

"Soccer."

"Do you feel lonely, Ernest? . . . Do you ever feel lonely and sad?"

"Yes . . . sometimes I feel sad."

. . . . . .

We surge on.

"Do you want to drive, Ernest?"

"Do you want me to drive?"

"For Christ's sake I didn't say that! . . . I asked if you wanted to drive . . . Don't you ever feel like anything but having women?"

"Yes, I will drive."

We change seats. I step out of the car, stretch, and walk to ıe other side. All is quiet after the thunder. A far-away ird calls.

He slides across the seat. The car shakes on the corrugations ; we pick up speed.

"I'm sorry, Ernest. Would you like to go to the sea after ve've been to the Trading Store?"

"Yes please. It's a long time since I was at the sea."

Yes please. It's a long time since *I* was at the sea.

I was there too . . . and the time before . . . and the time before ıat. Two years and it's still 'I'. Two years . . . We got rid f the 'Sir' first, and then we talked of politics . . . remember . . and justice . . . and religion and reality and sport and sex. wo years and still when the car door opens it's 'I'.

Has our friendship to be held together by four closed doors?

Must we be isolated by our movement across the still country efore we can talk?

. . . . .

At Richard's Bay the wind is cold.

"Would you like tea?" says the Storekeeper.

"Yes please."

The place smells dry of the country . . . and cosy. Greasy lankets, Pennant paraffin in drums, meal bags rolled down to the evel of promise (others sagged like old skin, barren), fill the oom.

"We need rain . . . Would your car-boy like tea?"

Lean through the window.

"Ernest, you like tea?"

"Yes please."

Sit down on the wooden bench.

"How's the road to Ntambanana?"

"Corrugated . . . we need rain."

"Looks like you'll get some . . . Two spoons please."

"Never, it's far too cold . . . Your car-boy take sugar?"

"Ernest," through window, "how much sugar?"

Clap . . . the door swings back and forward in the wind . . clap, clap, clap . . . a white kitten with its fur in points ppears . . . clap.

"Two if it's a cup . . . six if it's a jam tin."

"Cheeky bastard, but he's got a sense of humour."

The tea cup has minute cracks and the tea is hot. Blow an tip. Suck gently . . . blow . . . suck gently. Lower the cup

"New bridge completed?"

"Yes, they're on the one over the Mpilwane now."

. . . . .

Then down to the sea.

Through the camp sites . . . up, round, down, left, up . . . pas a hundred cosy nooks for Summer's canvas, numbered i bitumen paint on boards nailed to trees.

Two monkeys sit by the roadside.

"Monkeys."

One's tired from young, one's with young. It's late fo them . . . or is it early?

Christ I'm lonely.

A Citroen stands by the sand dunes. Over the dunes th cold wind blows, and the black man runs into the sea with hi trousers rolled. A wave breaks and he runs to where the san is dry and rubs it on his legs.

BOOK REVIEWS

A Book of South African Verse — Selected and Introduced by Guy Butler. Published by Oxford University Press, 1959. Price 21s. 6d.

An anthologist of South African English verse must decide from the start whether he wants to illustrate the national pattern of literary versifying or whether he intends an anthology of poems that can be enjoyed. The late Mr. Francis Carey-Slater's anthology provided for the first need—if it is a need. What would do most good, in a country overrun with historical self-consciousness, would be an anthology concocted quite irresponsibly by a lover of poetry who cared not a rap for literary history, but merely put in a number of South African poems he had specially enjoyed.

Professor Guy Butler is both a poet and an academic, and his anthology, '*A Book of South African Verse*', is an attempt at a compromise between the two approaches. The poets are reasonably well represented. Campbell, Plomer, Prince, Madge, Fuller, Clouts, Wright, and Butler himself are not all of them indubitably South African, but they have all written poems that are worth reading as poems. Taken together, their work occupies a good share of the anthology. But Professor Butler has not forgotten the academic's duty. He is not content with a ha'porth of bread to such an intolerable deal of sack, but sandwiches in a good deal of dry biscuit, some of it worm-eaten. Pringle's verse, for example, is of interest to the historian, to the sociologist, and perhaps even to the literary historian. But as poetry it is dismal stuff, still-born when it was written, and long-dead today. Professor Butler of course knows this perfectly well, but he has thought it his duty to the academic profession to preserve the mummified relics as exhibits in the museum of literary history. Much the same objection

might be made against the inclusion of verse which illustrate not even literary history, but only the author's private diff culties, or his 'sensitive' observation of unusual places.

But although historical piety and some uncritical charit towards the living have been allowed too large an influence, th is the best anthology of South African verse that has yet appeare The genuine poets—Campbell, Plomer, Prince, Madge, Wrigh Clouts, Fuller and Butler himself—have been allowed a goo proportion of the available space, and the examples from thei work have been on the whole well chosen. These provide sufficient body of serious poetry to give ballast to the vesse and enable it to carry a certain amount of tophamper witho capsizing.

To be self-consciously anything but a poet is usually bad for poet. Shelley as a republican and atheist, Tennyson as a Briton Hugo as a Buonapartist, and Walt Whitman 'inciting the eagle Liberty to soar', are all embarrassing to readers today. Th plague of English South African poetry is a recurrent sel consciousness, an awkward worrying about ancestors, environ ment, and social problems. Roy Campbell was not immun from this worry, but he brazened it out with an assumed assuranc and insolence, and finally escaped from the worry by becoming resident of Spain. Plomer worried too, identified his fear, an packed up and left. Madge, Prince, and Wright have also lef The imaginative English-speaking South African, it seems, ca be at home anywhere but in South Africa; for home is a plac where you can forget yourself and cease to be self-conscious, an here everything conspires to make the English poet guiltil aware of himself and his history.

The poems by Clouts included in this anthology illustrate th well enough. There are one or two of his best lyrics—clea and hard as crystals, yet most tender in feeling. But togethe with a poem like "The Sleeper" we find two poems about Ro Kloof, who suffers from a split personality. His Christian nam is English but his surname is Afrikaans. "Rock" and "shire" are divorced within him:

> "Division incarnate! An unhappy role!
> My country has given me a flint for a soul".

I am a great admirer of Clouts' poetry, and I am sorry to se that this awkward stuff has been given such prominence. Sout Africa has not given Sidney Clouts a rock for a soul, and th pretence that it has is really rather foolish. South Africa ha

permitted him to grow up with a singularly keen eye and lively imagination, and no doubt it asks him to pay the price that all awareness demands. Something of that price is indicated in the poem entitled "Within", where the division between self and reality is finely explored. But it is a far cry from perception of this kind to the self-dramatising of "Roy Kloof".

In Wright's work, this sense of not belonging to any one place is managed less awkwardly, because it is suffused with a deliberately childlike nostalgia. We are not to take it too seriously, for the poet has come to terms with himself and his history. In Delius' poem "The Pilgrims", there is a healthy movement of mind in which irony works tonically against the worry about where one really "belongs":

> "The passing of land-birds overhead
> I heard near dawn on every sea,
> the dogged sky reforms, and home
> myself shouts welcome from the quay".

The theme is continually recurrent, almost an obsession. Surely there never was a body of poets so preoccupied with arrivals and departures, home, the Pole Star and the Southern Cross, voyages of discovery, ruins, relics, and geographical landmarks. This preoccupation with the self and its place in the world is very different from creative introspection. "Look in thy heart and write!" said Sidney's Muse. "Look at thyself and write" is too often the rule followed by South African poets. Of course in some of them this bothering about themselves struggles towards sanity, yet it must be admitted that a few of the contemporary poets are represented in this anthology by poems in which they seem to hug their "problems" to their breasts.

This is by no means to assert that poets should not deal with the complexities and the pain of personal experience. Nor would I suggest that they should be indifferent to the "social problems" around them, or to the facts of history as they persist in the life of today. What I complain of is an exaggerated concern for oneself as a member of a particular group—as a Christian amongst heathens, a White man among Blacks or Coloureds, an Englishman among Afrikaners, a European in Africa, or a South African in Europe. Some such concern is perhaps right, and in any case unavoidable. We might even believe that Wordsworth's Highland Lass was suspected of singing of "old unhappy far-off things, and battles long ago" because Wordsworth as a travelling *rooinek* felt guilty about

Culloden, as well he might. But he at least allowed for the possibility of

> ". . . some more humble lay
> Familiar matter of today,
> Some natural sorrow, loss, or pain,
> That has been, and may be again."

But when Campbell sees a Zulu girl suckling a baby he can see nothing but a member of a "sweating gang" from whose breast the baby is imbibing the memory of defeat and the hope of revenge. The White South African is at the mercy of history which at the same time is politics. And this as it seems to me is a familiar disease in South African English poetry. The poet is forever worrying about his place in space and time, in South Africa and in her history. It becomes difficult for him to see other people as persons, and to forget himself in that contemplation. Butler's poem about the Cape Coloured Batman is a good example. The Batman is as sympathetically seen as are the rustics in Gray's Elegy. But he is seen historically, ethnically and sociologically. Compare Uys Krige's recent Afrikaans poems about coloured people. They are people who happen to be coloured, not people who illustrate what it is to be Coloured. And Krige feels no sense of guilt or of unauthorised intrusion. He enters into their lives with gusto.

Campbells' satire was an attempt to escape from this tendency to lose the particular in the general. It is a pity that not more of the "Veld Eclogue" is given in this anthology, for the tone of contempt with which Campbell treats the enslaving categories of South African thought is essentially healthy:

> "Think not that I on racial questions touch,
> For one was Durban-born, the other Dutch.
> I draw no line between them; for the two
> Despise each other, and with reason too!"

But this reasonable contempt for the fuss about "racial origins" hardly extends, in Campbell, beyond the colour line.

Nobody could accuse the poets represented in this anthology of being thoughtless or irresponsible. They are perhaps too much weighed down by the sense of history, by a feeling of responsibility for others, and by the determination not to indulge in rhetoric. Even Delius' satire is in its way careful and scientific. The trouble perhaps is that they know too much to indulge in facile indignation or simple feelings of any kind. But the poet must transcend the individual person and his guilt

and hesitation!

"When such as I cast out remorse
So great a sweetness flows into the breast
We must laugh and we must sing,
We are blest by everything,
Everything we look upon is blest."

South African poets are disarmingly frank about themselves, and this is one of their virtues. But their view of themselves and of the world is dimmed and blurred by failure to transcend their individual selves and speak as poets liberated by their task. They could learn much from Yeats, of whom Mr. Eliot has written that "unlike many writers, he cared more for poetry than for his own reputation as a poet or his picture of himself as a poet". It is the picture of themselves as poets, and as *South African* poets, that gets in the way of their writing better. In this anthology there is a good deal of personal frankness, but there is too little poetry that is simply forgetful of self.

Professor G. H. DURRANT
Head of the Dept. of English at the University of Natal

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